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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse étudie les déterminants qui influencent le nombre de citations, l'effet d'avoir une 
collaboration de recherche avec les scientifiques les mieux financés sur la productivité scientifique, 
et l'effet d’être titulaire d'une chaire de recherche sur la productivité scientifique. En supposant que 
le nombre de citations est une bonne mesure de l'impact de la recherche et, à son tour, d’un certain 
type de qualité, nous avons montré que le nombre d'articles et la visibilité d'un chercheur, le facteur 
d’impact de la revue, la taille de l’équipe de recherche, et le cadre institutionnel de l'université 
(effet fixe) sont les déterminants importants du nombre de citations. Cependant, nous avons 
constaté qu'il n'y a pas d'effet significatif du financement public ni du genre dans la plupart des 
domaines examinés. 
Nous avons également développé un modèle théorique et proposé quelques hypothèses sur l'effet 
de la collaboration avec les scientifiques les mieux financés sur la productivité scientifique. Ce 
modèle a ensuite permis de valider les hypothèses à l’aide d’une analyse empirique et a montré que 
cette collaboration a un effet positif sur la productivité scientifique. Cet effet significatif peut 
exister à travers différents canaux: le transfert de connaissances tacites, davantage de publications 
scientifiques, des économies d'échelle dans la production de connaissances dues à de meilleurs 
équipements de recherche et un réseau de recherche élargi. Les résultats ont également vérifié 
l'effet positif du financement, l'effet positif du réseau (mesuré par le nombre de co-auteurs), l'effet 
en forme de U-inversé de l'âge, et le plus petit nombre de publications par les femmes par rapport 
aux hommes. 
Enfin, nous avons fait une distinction entre les différents attributs des chaires de recherche et de 
leur effet sur la productivité scientifique. Une des questions importantes est de savoir si une chaire 
de recherche a encore une meilleure performance scientifique (par rapport aux non-titulaires) après 
avoir contrôlé par les fonds de recherche disponibles aux chercheurs. Pour étudier cela, nous avons 
utilisé une technique d'appariement pour identifier les paires de scientifiques (des titulaires et des 
non-titulaires de chaires) de même genre, financement et domaine de recherche. Après cette 
correspondance, nous avons constaté que l'effet du programme des chaires de recherche du Canada 
sur la productivité scientifique reste significatif et positif alors que l'effet des chaires industrielles 
et les titulaires de chaires nommés par les conseils canadiens subventionnaires fédéraux (CRSNG 
et IRSC) deviennent non significatif. Ce constat met en évidence l'efficacité de notre méthode de 
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technique d'appariement car avant l’appariement, tout type de chaire a un effet positif et significatif 
sur la productivité scientifique. 
Ce constat met en évidence les attributs spéciaux du programme de chaires de recherche du Canada, 
qui sont différents des autres programmes de chaire. Ces attributs spécifiques peuvent pousser de 
manière significative la productivité scientifique. Entre autres, les chaires de recherche du Canada 
sont généralement associés à un certain degré de prestige et confèrent une plus grande visibilité 
pour recruter des étudiants talentueux ou pour développer une collaboration de recherche avec des 
scientifiques de haut niveau dans le domaine. Le fait que d'autres types de chaires de recherche, 
une fois appariés avec des scientifiques équivalents, n’ont pas d’impact sur la production 
scientifique en termes de quantité, ne signifie pas que ces titulaires de chaire sont des scientifiques 
de moindre envergure, mais qu'ils consacrent une partie de leur temps à d'autres efforts de nature 
plus pratique ou ayant un impact sociétal différent. Ainsi les universités maintiennent un équilibre 
entre la poursuite de la connaissance scientifique pure et son application à des avantages socio-
économiques. En étudiant uniquement les articles scientifiques, il nous manque toutefois beaucoup 
d’information quant au rôle des professeurs d'université. Bien que non trivial, la recherche future 
devrait viser à ratisser plus large sur les réalisations, les résultats et les impacts de la recherche 
universitaire. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the determinants that influence the number of citations, the effect of having a 
research collaboration with top-funded scientists on scientific productivity, and the effect of 
holding a research chair on scientific productivity. Based on a review study by Bornmann and 
Daniel (2008), one can argue that non-scientific factors determining the decision to cite do not 
significantly alter the role of citation as a measure of research impact. Assuming that the number 
of citations is a good measure for research impact and, in turn, for a certain kind of quality, we 
showed that the number of articles and the visibility of a researcher, the impact factor of the journal, 
the size of the research team, and the institutional setting of the university are the important 
determinants of citation counts. However, we have found that there is no significant effect of public 
funding and gender in most of the domains examined. The point that funding amount is not a 
significant determinant of citation counts does not necessarily contradict the positive effect of 
funding on scientific productivity. 
We also developed a theoretical model and proposed some hypotheses about the effect of 
collaboration with top-funded scientists on scientific productivity. We then validated the 
hypotheses with empirical analysis and showed that such collaboration has a positive effect on 
scientific productivity. This significant effect may exist through different channels: transfer of tacit 
knowledge, more scientific publications, economy of scale in knowledge production because of 
better research equipment, and expanded research network. The results also verified the positive 
effect of funding, the positive effect of networking (measured by number of co-authors), the 
inverted U-shaped effect of age, and the fewer number of publications by women compared to men. 
Finally, we made a distinction between different attributes of research chairs and their effect on 
scientific productivity. One of the important questions is to find out whether a research chair still 
has better scientific productivity (compared to non-chair holders) after controlling for the research 
funds available to the researchers. To investigate that question, we employed a matching technique 
to identify pairs of scientists (chair and non-chair holders) of the same gender, funding and research 
field. After such matching, we found that the effect of the Canada research chair program on 
scientific productivity remains significant and positive, while the effect of industrial chairs and the 
chairs appointed by the Canadian federal granting councils (NSERC and CIHR) become non-
significant. This finding highlights the effectiveness of our matching technique methodology; 
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because before matching, holding any type of chair had a positive and significant effect on 
scientific productivity. 
This finding highlights the special attributes of the Canada research chair program, which are not 
replicated in other chairs. Those specific attributes may significantly push scientific productivity. 
For example, Canada research chairs are generally associated with some degree of prestige or 
higher visibility to recruit talented students or to have research collaboration with top scientists in 
the field. In addition, the Canada research chair program has a firm and efficient method of 
allocation (which is explained in the thesis). This approach institutionally synchronizes different 
chairs in universities and research fields. The fact that other types of research chairs, once matched 
with equivalent scientists, do not have an impact on scientific output in terms of quantity does not 
imply that these chair holders are lesser scientists, but that they are devoting part of their time to 
other endeavours of a more practical nature. Hence universities are maintaining a balance between 
the pursuit of pure scientific knowledge and its application to socioeconomic benefits. By solely 
studying scientific articles, we are missing a great deal of the university professors’ activities. 
Although not trivial, future research should aim to cast a wider net on outputs, outcomes and 
impacts of university research. 
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THESIS INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates determinants of scientific productivity. It is estimated that 1.8 million 
articles are published each year, in about 28,000 journals. About half of the academic papers are 
read only by their authors and journal editors. It is also claimed that 90 percent of papers published 
are never cited (STM report, 2012). The number of citations, as a good proxy for research impact, 
and the number of papers published in peer reviewed journals are two factors by which scientists 
are assessed. Having known determinants of scientific productivity, governments and research 
grant awarding bodies can set some policies in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
this scientific productivity. Moreover, different research fields have distinctive institutional 
settings, and therefore research field-specific policies can help scientific communities to highlight 
their core competency. 
Investigating science and technology policies should not be solely conducted based on empirical 
analysis; but the literature around theoretical modelling has not been well developed yet. 
Developing a theoretical model to predict scientific productivity and testing the prediction with 
real data is an important goal of this research. Inspired by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and by 
Durnev and Kim (2005), who developed concepts to model the incentives of firms’ managers, we 
developed a theoretical model to show how the collaboration with top-funded scientists results in 
a higher number of peer reviewed journal articles. This model explains the cost–benefit analysis of 
a researcher to publish papers. Using contract theory and mechanism design literature, the model 
provides a theoretical prediction for an empirical investigation. 
In terms of empirical analysis, different factors may affect research impact and scientific 
productivity of professors. Among other factors, funding amount, institutional support, gender, age, 
research field, and size of research team may impair or foster the scientific competency of faculty 
members, and hence lead to greater impact or greater quantity. The age effect may represent the 
life cycle trend in scientific productivity, indicating non-linearity or an inverted U-shape 
relationship between age and scientific productivity. The scientists’ gender can be another 
determinant of scientific productivity, which may be explained by their administrative positions or 
marital status. Research funding for installing new infrastructure or equipment is a significant 
requirement for development and implementation of research. Collaborative research would also 
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increase the knowledge diffusion and improve the research impact. Further, each scientific 
discipline has some field-specific characteristics that may determine scientific productivity. 
Scientists benefit from institutional and government financial support, mainly paid from the 
taxpayer’s pocket. Therefore, scientific productivity is a key concern with multiple stakeholders. 
In addition, countries’ goals and preferences in science policy are not the same. This thesis focuses 
on the productivity of Canadian scientists to provide a better understanding for the case of Canada. 
There are also some studies explaining the trend of science policy in Canada and Quebec. 
According to Phillips (2010), Quebec has shown an acceptable productivity in terms of scientific 
productivity and patenting activities. Carew (2001) refers to the appropriate public investment in 
agricultural research and development in Canada, which was amplified by private funding since 
the 1990s due to budgetary considerations of public agencies. Niosi and Bas (2004) look at this 
trend differently and find that after the late 1980s the focus changed from agriculture to health 
products and services, which resulted in Canada’s meeting the policy goals and being a leader in 
the field. 
Furthermore, this research provides an appropriate understanding about the effect of age and gender 
on scientific productivity. This insight may help policymakers to develop some promotional 
scheme for scientists to encourage more publication with higher impact. The thesis also explores 
how much scientific productivity may depend on research field characteristics in the province of 
Quebec. This perspective may highlight the core competency of that province for knowledge 
production and may provide a better information for policymakers. 
This thesis incorporates three papers about scientific productivity and research impact. To measure 
scientific productivity and research impact, we mainly focus on the number of articles and the 
number of citations respectively. However, measuring research impact is much more controversial. 
Chapter 1 reviews the related literature and chapter 2 frames the research questions and explains 
the methodology by which the hypotheses are being tested. 
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 are three independent papers. The first paper, in chapter 3, investigates the 
determinants of citations (as a measure of research impact) by analysing information about 
researchers’ funding and publication in the province of Quebec. This paper raises some novel and 
original research questions that have not been discussed previously. The first contribution of this 
paper is to analyze whether the various factors found in the literature are also positively associated, 
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in our dataset, with changes in citation counts. Because those factors may be related to each other, 
the second contribution consists in collectively considering all of the mentioned factors in one 
econometrics model to test if their specific effects remain statistically significant. The study 
confirms the significant and positive relationship between the number of articles and citation 
counts. It also shows that scientists with more articles in higher impact factor journals generally 
receive more citations, as do scientists who publish with a larger team of authors. Moreover, male 
and female scientists receive the same number of citations, all else being equal. 
The second and third papers, in chapters 4 and 5, analyse the number of articles as a measure of 
scientific productivity. The second paper tests whether collaboration with top-funded scientists 
increases the scientists’ number of articles. Combining the known effect of networking and 
scientific collaboration, on the one hand, and scientist funding capacity, on the other hand, it is 
interesting to investigate the effect of collaborators’ funding on scientific productivity. Based on a 
theory and empirical model developed in the second paper, the significance of collaboration with 
top-funded scientists in determining the number of scientific publications is shown.  
In chapter 5 we focus on the effect of holding a “research chair” as a possible determinant of 
scientific publication. On the one hand, it may help the holder of the chair to be liberated from the 
constant quest for research funds or to have time to construct a more effective network, which may 
result in propelling future knowledge production. On the other hand, greater scientific productivity 
may simply be the effect of the past productivity of a scientist, implying an intrinsic ability of 
scientists in conducting research and/or in mobilising effectively their extensive networking 
capacity. According to the chair characteristics, the networking and prestige effect of “holding a 
research chair” may be mixed with the effect of funding. To address this issue, we use a matching 
technique and compare two “chaired” and “non-chaired” scientists who have similar funding and 
the same gender, and who work in the same research field as each other. Following the 
methodology employed by Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), the selection is made by generating 
propensity scores and choosing the pairs of scientists with the closest scores to each other. The new 
data set consists of “twin” scientists who are similar to each other in terms of funding, gender, and 
research fields. This technique improves the robustness and reliability of the result because it 
disentangles the prestige effect from the funding effect of the chair. In such a setting, “holding a 
research chair” becomes a better and more informative signal for the prestige of scientists. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis identifies main determinants of scientific productivity and research impact. To measure 
scientific productivity, we mainly focus on the number of articles. However, measuring research 
impact is much more controversial. The sub-section 1.2 reviews the literature about the main 
determinants of scientific productivity and research impact. Some investigations in the literature 
identify age, gender, public grants and private contracts, research field, institutional characteristics, 
and some other factors as common determinants of scientific productivity and research impact. In 
none of mentioned factors, there is a sort of consensus. Studies have been conducted with different 
research methodologies using unrelated data sets. It is not un-expected to have distinctive 
conclusion and analysis. The following literature review gives the opportunity to identify the 
plausible determinants of research impact and scientific productivity. We try to have the best 
possible dataset and the most appropriate specification in empirical analysis in order to have a 
robust analysis. This implies having no assumption and pre-judgment on the effect of factors. 
However, where possible, we investigate whether the context of one studies may significantly 
affect the result of its analysis. Different points of view toward using number of citations as a 
measure of research impact has been discussed in sub-section 1.3. 
1.2 Determinants of scientific productivity and research impact 
The following determinants mainly refer to the required skills and capabilities for generating 
scientific outcomes in general, which are mainly reflected in the form of peer-reviewed publication 
in scientific journals. 
1.2.1 Age 
Kyvik and Olsen (2008) review different point of view in literature explaining the age effect on 
academic productivity measured by the number of articles and categorize them in six groups. All 
of the following hypotheses have been verified based on the data set used in different studies: (a) 
The utility maximizing hypothesis implies that academic staff conduct less research as they age 
because the expected utility of time spent on research diminishes; (b) The seniority burden 
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hypothesis refers to the increasing administrative load as a career advances, which decrease the 
focus on scientific endeavours; (c) The cumulative disadvantage hypothesis suggests that scientists 
who do not win research awards will gradually lose their incentives for further research; (d) The 
age decrement hypothesis proposes that older scientists mostly conduct research with a lower 
intellectual and physical level than that of their younger colleagues; (e) The obsolescence 
hypothesis implies that the younger scientists use novel tools, techniques, and methodologies for 
research more easily than their older colleagues; (f) The intellectual deadlock hypothesis suggests 
that older scientists have less tendency to “reorient their research towards new scientific or social 
problems” (Kyvik and Olsen, 2008, pp. 442). 
In addition to the above hypotheses, two trends regarding the effect of age can be observed in 
empirical investigations. First, some articles assess the life cycle trend in economic activity, 
referring to the non-linearity of human productivity during life (Becker (1962) is an example for 
this group). A number of articles show that productivity follows an inverted U-shape relationship 
with age, which can be justified by the optimization of the trade-off between the cost of human 
capital investment at a younger age and its return as benefit at an older age. For instance, Bernier 
et al. (1975) show an increase in impact and quantity of publication until the age of 44 and a 
diminution thereafter. 
Some evidence is also found about the quadratic effect of age on scientific productivity. Turner 
and Mairesse (2005) investigate 500 French physicists for period of 1980-1997 and find linear and 
quadratic variation for the number of publications and for the number of citations with increasing 
age, controlling individual and environmental characteristics. Similar findings are observed by 
Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso (2007), as they find a quadratic effect of age. In that paper, 
however, no strong evidence of investment motivated behaviour1 was found: “researchers at 65 
years are as productive as those at 43, and more than when they finished their PhD” (pp. 1050). 
They also argue that it may be due to the Mexican system which provides enough incentives for 
scientific production regardless of age. 
                                                 
1
 This behaviour explains that people use the resource of “age” to produce leisure and maximize it over the life cycle. In principle, 
because there is a trade-off between work-time and leisure, economic maximization models generally result in a peak in work-time. 
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The second group of articles generally find that scientists’ academic productivity decreases as they 
age. Diamond (1986) finds that both impact (measured by the number of citations) and quantity of 
scientific publication (measured both in terms of the number of articles and number of pages) 
decrease with respect to age. In another interesting study, Levin and Stephan (1991) find that 
scientist productivity decreases with respect to age in five of the six disciplines2 examined, 
controlling for all other probable effects. In addition, from the result of theoretical modelling, they 
attribute this phenomenon to the vintage effect3. In another investigation at the institutional level, 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2003) examine the influence of age distribution of researchers on scientific 
productivity of the Italian National Research Council and find that scientific productivity declines 
when the average age of researchers increases. 
Other arguments indicate that the age effect on scientific productivity varies between different 
disciplines (Kyvik, 1990). The author indicates that the productivity level in the social sciences is 
independent of age. In the humanities, however, the publishing activity declines during the age-
period of 55-59, but is followed by a new peak in the group of 60 years old and over. There is a 
different story in the medical sciences in which the productivity falls when researchers reach 55 
and older. In the natural sciences, productivity continuously decreases with aging. Such differences 
come from the different nature of disciplines.  As new scientific tools, methods, and equipment 
are continuously introduced, older researchers may have problems becoming familiar with them, 
and this generally referred to as the obsolescent effect in the literature (Kyvik, 1990). Vice versa, 
aging has less of an effect when the knowledge production has a lower speed, such as in the social 
sciences and humanities. 
1.2.2 Gender 
Gender effect is known as a significant determinant of scientific productivity in the literature. Hesli 
and Lee (2011)find that, in the field of political science, women publish less than what men do. 
Long (1992) obtains slightly different results by looking at the scientific productivity of 
                                                 
2
 Oceanography, geophysics, geology, solid-state/condensed-matter physics, atomic and molecular physics are the five disciplines and 
particle physics is the sixth one. 
3 The vintage effect supposes that new capital (here read knowledge) is more valuable than old capital because new capital is produced 
via new tools, techniques, and methodology. 
7 
 
 
biochemists and testing three dimensions of productivity: publication counts, level of contribution 
in a team-work, and research impact (number of citations and the impact of the journal). In terms 
of publication counts, he shows that women are less productive in the first decade of their career 
but are more productive afterwards. In the other two dimensions, there is no difference between 
men and women in terms of the level of contribution and citation. 
In terms of citations, Aksnes et al. (2011) show the female publications are significantly a bit less 
cited than are the male’s. This is due to the cumulative advantage effect, referring to the fact that 
the marginal increase in citation is growing with an increase in publication output and because 
men have more publications, they can benefit more from this advantage, and hence have more 
number of citations for their papers. 
Some researchers argue that differences in research productivity between men and women come 
from administrative positions of researchers and their marital status. For example Xie and 
Shauman (1998) conclude that gender differences in research productivity has declined over time, 
while at the same time the population of female scientists has proportionally increased (this decline 
is also observed in Abramo et al. (2009a)). Xie and Shauman (1998) also indicate that “women 
scientists publish fewer papers than men because women are less likely than men to have the 
personal characteristics, structural positions, and facilitating resources that are conducive to 
publication” (pp. 863). 
Fox (2005) argues that the effect of gender is complex in a way that it is not possible to simply 
separate the effect of married and single researchers. He also refers to the career of spouse and 
family composition as two important factors of such complexity. For example, women with 
preschool children show higher productivity than women without children and women with 
school-age children. Nakhaie (2002) also investigate the gender effect in different durations of 
time and argues that Canadian female professors publish less than their male colleagues do, both 
in a lifetime period and during a shorter period, but such effect is higher for the longer period. 
In addition to the papers which demonstrate the differences between men and women, some papers 
try to justify such differences. For example, Kyvik and Teigen (1996) develop a multiple-
regression model to find determinants of individual productivity differences between men and 
women. Using data gathered by questionnaire in the spring of 1992, they find that childcare and 
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lack of research collaboration are the two factors which negatively affect the scientific publishing 
of women and that such differences vary among nations due to factors such as the social security 
system or the child education system. In another study, Leahey (2006a) argues that the reason of 
low productivity of women is that women specialize less than men, which is an important factor 
for research productivity. 
1.2.3 Private funding 
Reviewing some socio-demographic factors, we now turn to two main funding aspect of scientific 
production. Balconi and Laboranti (2006) argue that in applied fields such as micro-electronics, 
there are two stages for the establishment of a new technology: first, the discovery of new avenues 
for potential commercial activities and second, the realisation of these possibilities by developing 
new industrial products via answering to the specific research question. To show that private 
funding is essential in some fields, the paper shows that public funding is suitable for explorative 
and uncertain research in terms of economic return (i.e. the first stage) and it is only the industrial 
support that can facilitate reaching the second stage.  
Manjarrés-Henríquez et al. (2009) find that R&D contracts with industry are effective only if the 
professor is in need of money. In the other words, “R&D contracts with industry and academic 
research activities have synergistic effects on scientific production, but only when R&D contracts 
account for a small percentage of a researcher’s total funding, otherwise, there are decreasing 
marginal returns to scientific output” (pp. 799). 
Geuna and Nesta (2003) claim that increased industrial funding will force researchers to shift to 
more applied research, neglecting their normative responsibilities for knowledge development. 
Similarly, Partha and David (1994) argue that institutions and social norms of open science are 
functionally maximizing the long term growth of scientific knowledge, but are not powerful to be 
socially optimum in terms of producing economic rents and commercial outputs from the existing 
stock of scientific knowledge. However, they explain that rules and reward systems in both 
university and industry symbiotically evolve to develop both science and technology. 
Similarly, Kleinman and Vallas (2001) address a paradox called “the industrialization of the 
academy and the collegialization of industrial research” (pp. 451). In other words, scientists and 
engineers in private industry get a higher level of autonomy and control while scientists working 
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in university settings are faced with the opposite case. In their empirical analysis, they address this 
paradox by arguing that norms, codes and practices in industry are penetrating the academy and 
vice versa. However, such infiltrating is asymmetric in favour of industrial norms.  
From another point of view, Tijssen (2004) explains the declining trend in output of corporate 
research articles as the new orientation towards commercial application of in-house research 
results. The industry side increasingly tries not to publicize its research results. Goldfarb (2008) 
refers to the same story in university and finds that having collaboration with ‘research sponsor’ 
results in a fall in the number of publications by 25%. In another study of the engineering faculty 
in Germany, Hottenrott and Thorwarth (2011) indicate that the share of private funding in 
universities is high enough4 to negatively affect the scientific publications. 
In terms of private funding, Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) find that industry funding is correlated 
with “new and interesting research topics and is prerequisite to accomplishing expensive and 
interesting projects” (pp. 947), without any significant negative influence on researcher’s 
autonomy. Furthermore, such projects and research ideas generally result in more patents, 
commercial products, development of spin-off companies, and involvement in consulting work. 
Although private funding is correlated with both scientific and commercial products, they are not 
directly correlated with each other. Their data also show that professors with industrial funding 
collaborate more with other researchers both in academia and in industry.  
In terms of the effect of such funding on industries, Berman (1990) finds that privately funded 
research has also speeded up the “transfer and utilization of academic research in industry” (pp. 
353), via developing joint projects, hiring students, and faculty consulting. 
Although the private funding is mainly provided by companies in the private sector, there are some 
examples of such funding in the form of philanthropic grants, which are provided by 
philanthropists. 
                                                 
4
 The paper finds that in the low share of private funding of total funding, the effect is not necessarily negative. 
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1.2.4 Public funding  
Pavitt (2001) refers to the importance of public support for scientific infrastructure development 
and highlights its role in the effectiveness of public grants in the US. In another study, Pavitt (2000) 
argues that equipment and networks are necessary for the development and implementation of 
research, and is thus costly. Looking at the allocation of infrastructure grants in Australia and 
Britain, Harman (2000) identifies research strengths, maintaining research impact, and distributing 
research funds selectively with considerable administrative discretion as the important criteria for 
such allocation.  
Providing required funding for conducting research via different science policies has an important 
role to push scientists toward the production of more effective and efficient research. Crespi and 
Geuna (2008) find that there is a delay for such policies to be effective. They find relatively little 
evidence of a positive impact of science policy in short lags (2-3 years), but the ‘total cumulated 
effects’ are significant for publication counts with a 5-year lag and for citations with a 6-year lag. 
Similarly, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) find an average lag of 4-6 years for the effectiveness of 
industrial research and development policies. 
One well accepted justification for developing public support of science is that it is public good 
(Partha and David, 1994). Callon (1994) further argues that science is not a public good because 
of its intrinsic and natural properties5, but a public good due to the fact that it is a source of diversity 
and flexibility. In addition, Crespi and Geuna (2008) advocate the public good nature of science 
by showing that science policy not only has a direct effect on one country and that there is a 
significant spillover between countries but also that spillover from the US to other countries are 
higher than in the reverse direction. 
Pavitt (1991) argues that high attention to the public good justification may result in policies with 
two main unwanted implications: (1) policies of high priority for basic research disregard the 
benefits from training and unplanned discoveries; and (2) policies considering economies of scale 
with much focus on larger units in basic research are not necessarily working efficiently. 
                                                 
5
 He means that it is possible to make science as private good. 
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It is not possible to claim for a uniform argument about the effect of public funding. Appleyard 
(1996) indicates that public grants may have different effects in two countries or in two industries. 
The paper compares the semiconductor sector with the steel industry and finds greater effect of 
public recourses in the former one. She also finds that the public funding in universities plays a 
more important role in Japan than in the United States. Differences between countries are also 
investigated for Europe by Geuna (2001). For example, he mentions that some countries such as 
the UK pursue mission-oriented plans for some specific sectors and follow selective policies for 
some particular technologies, while in countries such as Italy, distributive and proportional policies 
are executed, which cover most of sectors and technologies. 
Beise and Stahl (1999) show the positive effect of publicly funded research in universities on 
developing new products and processes in Germany. In a review article, Salter and Martin (2001) 
compare the papers investigating the economic effects of publicly funded basic research based on 
the methodology used in the papers. On the one hand, most of the econometric studies say that the 
economic benefits of publicly funded research in universities are crucial and substantial. On the 
other hand, the research based on surveys and case studies provide results, varying in scientific 
field, technology and industrial sector. The authors suggest the following six types of contribution 
of publicly funded research: source of new useful knowledge, new instrumentation and 
methodologies, skills developed by those involved in carrying out basic research, expansion of 
national and international networks, dealing with complex problems6, and creation of spin-off 
companies. 
As discussed in Salter and Martin (2001), there are two distinct forms of justification for public 
grant awarding bodies to award financial support. First, some justifications rely on lack of 
instruments and laboratory tools for conducting research and most such needs can be met by 
awarding infrastructure grants. The second group of justification focuses on the need for hiring 
new researchers/students or making/expanding of scientific network, which needs financial 
resources and the public grants cover them.  
                                                 
6
 The paper argues that solving the complex problem provides great benefit for the firms and organizations facing such problems. 
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Public funding can also result in knowledge flows to the private sector. Jaffe (1989) finds that 
university research significantly affects the number of patents in the area of drugs, medical 
technology, electronics, optics, and nuclear technology. Narin et al. (1997) have also provided 
some evidence of a positive effect of US public research on patent by tracing the number of papers 
(written by scientists in academy, government and other public institutions) cited in patents.  
The fall in public funding research has some influence on the university research trend. Geuna 
(2001) argues that the fading role of public funding can result in over-use of resources, focus on 
short-term research endeavor, conflict in incentive structures, and “exacerbation of the impact of 
cumulative and self-reinforcement phenomena present in the process of scientific production” (pp. 
626). 
In terms of the purpose of funding, two different objectives can be identified: funding for 
operational cost and funding for buying infrastructure. For example, the Canadian Foundation for 
Innovation (CFI) is designed to meet “the current needs of the research community, its partners 
and stakeholders. The CFI funding architecture covers the full spectrum of infrastructure: projects 
to attract a leading researcher; team-led innovative projects that have a structuring effect for an 
institution or a region; and large-scale national projects”. Generally speaking, the Canadian 
government pursues research funding through three different areas of health science, social science 
& humanities, as well as engineering and natural science7.  
1.2.5 Collaborative research 
Using data on collaborative research conducted in Canada, Godin and Gingras (2000) highlight 
the positive effect of collaborative research on scientific publication. Johnes (1988) indicate that 
the larger number of staff at a department and the larger number of co-authors of articles can 
significantly explain the higher research productivity in UK economics departments. Scientific 
collaboration, however, depends on the academic field. Abramo et al. (2009b) show that in the 
interdisciplinary fields there are more collaborations than in intramural fields and also that 
collaboration with foreign organizations are more in the basic fields than in the applied fields. In 
                                                 
7
 http://www.innovation.ca/en/OurFunds 
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addition, Ynalvez and Shrum (2011) indicate that in a resource-constrained developing country, 
scientific collaboration does not significantly affect research productivity, although most its 
scientists are involved in research collaboration even despite the coordination difficulties. 
However, such collaboration can result in professional opportunities and scientific rewards for 
researchers. 
Networking is an important concept in the process of knowledge production. Not only are the 
scientists interested in networking, but people in industry also benefit from it both via patenting 
and publishing. Hicks (1995) explains reasons why industries publish scientific papers as a 
necessity to give a signal for the presence of tacit knowledge in the firms and then to make new 
linkages with the other organizations by barter-governed exchange of scientific and technical 
knowledge. The publications bring more reputation for the firms, promoting the firms in the 
knowledge exchange. 
Chwe (2000) analyses social network using a game theory model and identifies three levels of 
hierarchy as the minimal sufficient structure of network for efficient collaboration. These 
hierarchical stages are ‘initial adopters’, ‘followers’, and then ‘late adopters’. The paper indicates 
that “a communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways: by informing each stage 
about earlier stages, and by creating common knowledge within each stage” (pp. 1). It seems that 
the implication of such structure in the scientific community would be a network where the 
scientists collaborate and produce new productions, knowing the past information. 
Most of the studies on the effects of network rely on co-authorship as a proxy of scientific 
collaboration. Melin and Persson (1996) argue that some collaboration does not generate papers 
and some co-authored articles should not necessarily be counted as the result of real scientific 
collaboration. Moreover, Katz and Martin (1997) argue that co-authorship is just a partial  indicator 
of collaboration. They also mention that the concept of ‘research collaboration’ is hard to uniquely 
define: First, it is a social relationship and it is not possible to identify the beginning and the end; 
second, determinants of scientific collaboration depend on institutions, fields, sectors, countries, 
and time. As a result, an accurate and appropriate definition of collaboration should be altered to 
match the context of study. 
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There are also some concerns about the measurement of scientific collaboration between 
institutions in different countries (international collaboration). For example, Luukkonen et al. 
(1993) point out the difference between absolute and relative measurements. They argue that the 
normalized/relative measures reflect the differences in country size and the intensity of 
collaborative links, while the absolute measures reveal the centrality and importance of each 
country in the science network. Using such a distinction, it is possible to more efficiently consider 
the effect of international collaboration on the scientific productivity. 
1.2.6 Research context and environment 
Receiving support from environment would be an important factor in promoting scientific 
productivity and research impact. On top of that, each scientific discipline have some field-specific 
characteristics that may determine scientific productivity. Looking at nanotechnology and human 
genetics in Europe and the US, Heinze et al. (2009) show that small size of research group, 
sufficient access to the various technical skills, and an appropriate leadership result in an 
improvement in research creativity. Using laboratory level evidence from a large European 
university in the period of 1993–2000, Carayol and Matt (2004) analyze the typology and 
organization of research laboratories and find a correlation between individual productivity and 
the human resource structure of laboratories. The paper indicates that a combination of full-time 
researchers and university professors significantly results in high scientific productivity. It shows 
that university professor provides mentorship/supervision and funding but fruitful research 
activities require effective collaboration with full-time research staff. 
Although most of Universities in Canada are publicly funded, university type and university 
governance may be another factor determining scientific productivity. Jordan et al. (1989) raise 
the question of efficiency of private universities in terms of research and teaching. They find strong 
and significant evidence that private institutions have a larger average productivity. Further 
investigating the question, Golden and Carstensen (1992) find that there is no difference between 
public and private universities in terms of research productivity when controlling for research 
support from leading research foundations and department faculty rating. They point out that the 
very nature of public and private institutions are different in a way that public institutions have 
more of a teaching and service role than private ones. They argue that public/private nature of an 
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institution does not have an effect on scientific production per se, hence contradicting the result of 
Jordan et al. (1989). There may be some career related factors. Manjarrés-Henríquez et al. (2008) 
find that administrative positions within the university positively affect scientific productivity 
especially when a researcher is involved in both research and university-industry relationship. 
Such positions are important because their holders are the decision makers about policies of 
universities. Similar results are provided by Carayol and Matt (2006). 
In another study by Jungnickel and Creswell (1994) the author indicate that the departmental 
workplace is very important for the scientist to generate research products from available 
resources. The factors that correlate with departmental workplace and that have significant effect 
on scholarly productivity are ‘off-campus conversation with the colleagues about research 
activities’ and ‘amount of time in research compared with other work-load’. Some articles refer to 
department characteristics as important factors in scientific production. Buchmueller et al. (1999) 
indicate that graduate school faculty size is a significant determinant of the research proficiency 
of graduates. Jordan et al. (1988, 1989) indicate that research productivity is positively associated 
with department size but that this effect becomes weaker as the size increases. Smeby and Try 
(2005) indicate that department climate (based on a qualitative questionnaire), age structure, and 
the proportion of faculty members with PhD degree affect the number of papers published by 
faculty members. Although this interesting factor can explain the scientific productivity but we do 
not have it in our database. 
To justify the differences between disciplines, Baird (1986) shows that a large research laboratory 
in chemistry, scholarly apprenticeship approach in history, and research over practice in 
psychology are important factors in scientists’ productivity. In another comprehensive study, Baird 
(1991) refers to the productivity and citation pattern differences among disciplines. 
Regarding cultural differences, Handberg (1986) make a comparison between the academic 
productivity in western and non-western society and indicates that physical and intellectual 
isolation in addition to the relative lack of significant meetings, conference, symposium, or 
convention of their disciplines or research areas negatively affect research in non-western society. 
Second, in non-western academic community the collaborative work may fail because the scientist 
are literally the only specialist in a particular topic and there are less competent interested graduate 
students or  colleagues to discuss theoretical and experimental problem. Third, teaching is the 
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primary reason that these institutions exist, which results in high teaching load and hence it hinders 
research activities. 
Lertputtarak (2008) investigates the case of Thailand and finds that research productivity mainly 
correlates with desirable factors, which influences the willingness of scientists for conducting 
research and increases the individual’s motivation. The author refers to the following factors: (1) 
to reduce teaching work-loads; (2) to overcome the inequity in salary; (3) to provide sufficient 
research facilities, consisting of resources, materials, machinery, equipment, research assistants, 
technicians, facilitators, databases, books, and stationery; (4) to set appropriate financial regulation 
and policies; (5) to top up the insufficient research funding; (6) to form positive academic and 
provide “both socializing and reinforcing organizational messages about norms, values and 
expectations concerning research” (pp. 205). We use university dummy variable to control the 
research characteristics and environment. 
1.2.7 Prestige 
There are generally two types of prestige. Regarding the effect of university prestige on research 
productivity, Crane (1965) finds that scientists at major universities are more likely to be 
productive and to get academic ranking promotion than scientists at minor universities. The main 
justification for such phenomenon comes from the fact that more prestigious universities are better 
able to select the best students, are richer and hence can recruit better researchers, and are well-
endowed to provide research procurement. In a similar study, Turner (2005) indicates that 
graduates from the “French Grandes Ecoles” publish more than other French graduates. Groot and 
Garcia-Valderrama (2006) also show that larger research groups generate better research impact. 
Focusing on the role of university prestige in academic productivity, Long et al. (1979) find a 
positive and significant correlation between the prestige of the alma matter of a scientist and where 
he is employed subsequently. They also indicate that graduating from a prestigious university has 
positive effect on citations but not on the publication counts. Furthermore, Zhou et al. (2012) look 
at the concept of prestige from another perspective. They find that the papers which are cited by 
prestigious scientists, regardless of the number of citation, have better research impact than papers 
which are cited by ‘ordinary’ scientists. This finding indirectly implies that scientist prestige can 
be an appropriate proxy for the generation of high impact research. 
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The individual prestige can be measured by some titles and awards. In Canada, research chair 
system is a set of programs to award title of research chair to different scientists along with some 
special financial support. In Canada, there are three types of research chair: (1) research chairs 
which are awarded by industry and generally referred to as industrial chairs; (2) research chairs 
which are awarded by Canadian federal funding agencies such as the Natural Science and 
Engineering Research Council (NSERC) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR); 
and (3) the ‘Canada research chairs’, whose holders are assumed to already achieve research 
excellence in one of the main fields of research. 
A number of authors tried to highlight the functions and characteristics of research chairs. Cantu 
et al. (2009) showed the research chair program would be a good strategy for implementing 
knowledge-based development. In study on German universities, Schimank (2005) argued that 
chair-holders are small businessmen with high job security and no bankruptcy in addition to a good 
level of freedom of teaching and research, indicating that research chairs have the characteristics 
of job security and sovereignty. Individual prestige can be measured by dummy variables of 
research chair. 
1.2.8 Initial condition of researchers 
Allison and Stewart (1974) use the concept of cumulative advantage to show how the difference 
between two researchers in their early career can be amplified over time. Similar to a feedback 
loop phenomenon, highly productive scientists maintain or increase their productivity, while less 
productive scientists produce even less later on, implying that the spectrum of research 
productivity becomes wider over time. This finding is verified in both cross sectional (for different 
disciplines) and longitudinal analyses (for cohorts) of publications and citations. In a similar study, 
Allison et al. (1982) use true cohorts of biochemists and chemists, and show that the inequality 
increases over time for publications but not for citations per se. However, inequality for citations 
to recent publications has increased but this is mainly due to increased inequality of publications, 
which does not come from exclusive cumulative advantage of citations. We use year dummy to 
control the effect of each year. This may partially explain the condition of researcher affected by 
each year characteristics. 
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1.3 Measuring research impact and scientific productivity 
Measuring quality of research is a controversial topic in literature. Most of the mentioned factors 
identifying scientific productivity can be also considered as determinants of research impact and 
number of citations. However, there are also some exclusive discussion about research impact in 
the literature. Ranking of journal and researcher’s affiliation would be a proxy for research impact. 
Frey and Rost (2010) compare three types of ranking based on the number of articles, number of 
citations, and membership of editorial board and of academic associations. The paper indicates 
that these rakings are not compatible with each other and suggests the use of multiple 
measurements instead of citation or publication counts. Van Raan (2005) criticize the applicability 
of university rankings such as the Shanghai ranking for evaluating academic excellence by noting 
that the ‘affiliation’, as an important factor reflecting research atmosphere, is not well addressed 
in those ranking. 
Meho (2007) argues that a very basic analysis of citations can indicate how much an article is used 
in the scientific community. Aksnes (2006) shows that citation counts match with own assessments 
of authors about their scientific contribution. However, the paper implies that citation counts are 
not reliable at the level of the individual article and average citation rate of the subfield is better 
indicator than the journal’s one. Citations are nevertheless a useful raw material to assess the 
ranking of scientist (Radicchi et al., 2009). 
Along these lines, Kostoff (1998) investigates the theory of citation and suggests that every citation 
results from the combination of two main reasons: the real component of intellectual heritage and 
random components of self-interest. Although there is a random component, the author argues that 
the random effect disappears in the aggregation of citation and therefore the number of citations is 
a good indicator of the “impact” of research. Phelan (1999) provides the same justification. 
However, Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff (1989) refer to some cautionary about the use of 
citations. The authors argue that a cited article is used to either make a linkage with the current 
literature or to be used as an evidence to complete the justification. Therefore, a cited paper may 
be used in the citing papers with different purposes and with different implications. Furthermore, 
they argue that the citation analysis is just one aspect of knowledge production process. 
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Moed et al. (1985) also note that citations just refer to impact and are not a good proxy for research 
quality. Any publication should nevertheless have a minimum quality to generate an impact. For 
example, the paper mentioned the visibility of journals and the extent to which researchers provide 
a public service as two important determinants of citing a particular paper that do not have strong 
correlation with research quality. Going further from the recent argument, Olson et al. (2002) claim 
that even publishing does not have a two-way correspondence with minimum research quality 
because for example in Medicine there is a bias for publishing research with positive results. 
It worth to mention that publication count without citation effect does not have anything about 
research impact, according to (Butler, 2003a); Butler (2003b). Nonetheless, in addition to these 
quantitative indicators, Butler (2007) argues that some qualitative assessment, like peer review, 
should be performed and combined with metrics to provide a fair and efficient overview of 
research impact. Fisher and Powers (2004) also note that peer review can indeed improve research 
impact. From another causal direction, Groot and Garcia-Valderrama (2006)find that the quality 
of peer review assessment in the Netherlands can be partially explained by number of publications 
in top-class and excellent international refereed journals, by the number of international 
proceedings, and by the number of Dutch journal articles. 
The impact factor of the journal may be one candidate to measure research impact or prestige. 
However Seglen (1997b) notes that it cannot be an appropriate measure for research impact. The 
paper argues that citation rates determine the journal impact factor but nothing can be said about 
the reverse. In addition, journal impact factors in basic research are naturally high because the 
journals cover large areas of basic research with a “rapidly expanding but short lived literature that 
use many references per article” (pp. 498).  
From another point of view, Moed and Van Leeuwen (1995) refer to the definition of citable 
documents, which exclude letters and editorials, and show that the impact factor is an inappropriate 
indicator, particularly for some journals. Favaloro (2008) further adds that impact factor tells little 
about the quality of a journal and Seglen (1994) indicates that the prestige or impact factor of a 
journal does not affect the strength level of its articles, however highly cited its articles are. 
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In contrast to the above mentioned studies, Franceschet (2010) considers two measures that are 
statistically correlated with each other: popularity and prestige8 for the journals: the former counts 
the citations while the latter recursively weights the citations with the prestige of the citing 
journals. The situation is clear when both of them are high or both of them are low but there is 
some sort of controversy in the other two cases. He argues that popular non-prestigious journals 
are not necessarily highly cited and non-popular prestigious journals are not necessarily poorly 
cited. In another study, Laband and Piette (1994) show that sub-disciplines and their application 
matter to determine the number of citations regardless of research impact. This means that in some 
sub-disciplines, there is a naturally higher rate of citations. 
Not only citation count is an important factor in scientific community, the number of published 
papers and scientists’ productivity are other factors by which scientists are assessed. In terms of 
scientific productivity, it is measured by the number of articles. In general, governments and public 
authorities seek to maximize the benefit of public spending on research. 
  
                                                 
8
 Prestige is mainly related to journal ranking 
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 DATA SET AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
In light of the literature reviewed in chapter 1, this chapter aims to shape the research method and 
address relevant methodology questions. As discussed in the previous chapter, paper production 
and research impact of academics have been discussed extensively and many determinants of this 
production are currently known as potential motives for scientific papers. Among others, age, 
gender, private and public funding, networking, field and context, university prestige, individual 
characteristics of researchers, and institutional setting are the most important factors. 
In chapter 3, our general research question is as follows: do the mentioned factors (number of 
articles, amount of funding, size of research team, gender, and research filed) significantly affect 
citation counts? This comprehensive consideration of different factors in one study allows for 
testing the co-existing effect of different determinants, which provides an original contribution to 
the literature on citations. 
In chapter 4, we tests whether collaboration with top-funded scientists shifts up scientist’s number 
of articles. Collaboration with top-funded scientists can be an opportunity for accumulating 
valuable experience and tacit knowledge, resulting in higher and better scientific production. This 
objective can be reached by conducting a two-stage econometrics model that control the 
endogeneity issue. 
We focus on the effect of holding a ‘research chair’ as a possible determinant of scientific 
publication in chapter 5. To find out the effect of holding a chair, we use a ‘matching technique’ 
and compare two ‘chair-holder’ and ‘non-chair-holder’ scientists who have similar funding, the 
same gender, and work in the same research field as each other. 
The rest of this chapter is as following: section 2 presents the research questions and their linkages 
with the current literature. Section 3 presents the research objectives and discusses how these 
objectives will be achieved. Sections 4 and 5 review the data set and the econometric analysis 
respectively. Finally, section 6 reviews the contribution of this research to the advancement of 
knowledge. 
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2.2 Research questions 
The first three questions belong to the research in chapter 3. Following the literature review in 
previous chapter, there may be numerous factors that identify the number of citations. We test 
whether the number of articles of a researcher in a given year or the journals’ impact factor can 
influence his/her number of citations. Merton (1968) argues that scientists who publish more 
articles may be more visible to other members of scientific community and hence receive more 
citations. However, the visibility of researchers may initiate from other factors. Ale Ebrahim et al. 
(2014) highlights the role of publication marketing tools and strategies while  Fowler and Aksnes 
(2007) refer to the self-citation, both of which improves the visibility of authors’ prior works. We 
propose our first question: 
Question 1: Can higher visibility to scientific community, measured by the number of articles 
and the journal impact factors, positively affect the number of citations received 
in the future? 
Some evidence also mention that ‘research collaboration’ may affect ‘research impact’. Godin and 
Gingras (2000) show positive correlation between citations and its collaborative nature. Scientific 
collaboration depends also on academic fields. Abramo et al. (2009b) show that in interdisciplinary 
studies there are more collaborations than strictly disciplinary research, and also that collaboration 
with foreign organizations are more common in basic fields than in applied ones.  However, 
research collaboration is hard to be uniquely defined: First, it is a social relationship and it is not 
possible to identify the beginning and the end; second, determinants of scientific collaboration 
depend on the size of research team, institutional settings, domains, countries, and time-specific 
characteristics. Our second question relates to research team size and goes as follows: 
Question 2: Does the number of individuals in the list of authors significantly affect the 
future number of citations received by each scientist? 
There are some evidence in the literature about the positive effect of funding on scientific 
productivity (Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Harman, 2000; Pavitt, 2000, 2001). To formulate a 
question on the effect of funding, it can be inferred that funding is a necessary condition for 
scientific research production but that it is not a sufficient condition for generating high quality 
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research. Research funding acts as a tool for researchers, and should be combined with researchers’ 
skills and expertise to generate high quality results. From another perspective, it is possible to 
argue that funding is generally enough to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, but that it 
does not guarantee that this knowledge will be of high impact. Moreover, in laboratory-based 
fields, the role of funding may be more important in being able to perform research at all. The 
source of funding may also be important in affecting the scientific impact of research (Berman, 
1990; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005), as it shapes the project’s goal and application. Hence our 
third question reads as follows: 
Question 3: Do the research funding from public, private for profit, and private not for profit 
sources have a positive effect on research scientific impact? 
In addition to the effect of funding, which has been discussed above, scientific collaboration and 
academic networking can also positively affect scientific productivity (Godin and Gingras, 2000). 
Melin (1996) also referred to the positive effect of co-authorship on scientific productivity at the 
local, national, and international levels. Combining the known effect of networking and scientific 
collaboration on the one hand and scientist funding capacity to generate knowledge on the other 
hand, it is interesting to investigate the effect of collaborators’ funding on scientific productivity. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is not a comprehensive study on the effect of collaborators’ 
funding on scientific productivity. Question 4 belongs to the research conducted in chapter 4. The 
chapter 4 tests whether collaborating with top-funded scientists has an effect on the scientific 
productivity measured by the number of articles. Hence our fourth question reads as following: 
Question 4:  Does the collaboration with top-funded scientists positively affect scientific 
productivity? 
Being a top-funded scientist can be considered as a sort of prestige. However, prestige has broader 
and different meanings. The effect of prestige on scientific productivity has been already discussed 
in the literature (Frey and Rost, 2010; Long et al., 1979; West et al., 1998; Zhou et al., 2012). One 
measure of prestige can be honors and awards such as research chair. Cantu et al. (2009) showed 
the research chair program would be a good strategy for implementing knowledge-based 
development. In chapter 5, we investigate the questions 5 and 6, which are about the effect of 
holding a research chair on the number of scientific publication. Different types of research chairs 
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are examples of awards. In Canada, there are three types of research chair: (1) research chairs 
which are awarded by industry and generally referred to as industrial chairs; (2) research chairs 
which are awarded by Canadian federal funding agencies such as the Natural Science and 
Engineering Research Council (NSERC) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR); 
and (3) the ‘Canada research chairs’, whose holders are assumed to already achieve research 
excellence in one of the main fields of research: engineering and the natural sciences, health 
sciences, humanities, and social sciences. Considering holding a chair as a measure of prestige, we 
aim to elucidate the effect of being a ‘chair-holder’ on scientific productivity. Our fifth question 
therefore reads as: 
Question 5: Does holding a chair increase a scientist’s productivity measured in terms of 
number of publications? 
Question 5 tests the productivity of chair-holders compared to other scientists and as such does not 
seek to prove causality. Considering the fact that chair-holders are the well-funded scientists too, 
this question cannot detach the funding effect of the chair from its other effects (mainly from 
prestige and networking effect). In other words, despite the evidence in literature about the benefits 
and goals of the research chair programs other than funding, question 5 is not able to disentangle 
effects. 
It is possible to look at the research chair as a result of scientists’ characteristics and achievements 
(for instance age, number of articles, and number of citations). A chair-holder may experience an 
effect specific to holding chair on his/her scientific production in addition to the contribution of 
his/her characteristics and past achievements. To disentangle the exclusive effect of chair from the 
effect of scientists’ characteristics, we propose our sixth question: 
Question 6: Keeping a scientist’s main characteristics (age, research field, and amount of 
grants) constant, does holding a research chair have a significant positive effect 
on his/her scientific production? 
2.3 Research objectives 
Having conducted this research, we may be able to meet the following objectives, starting from 
‘building up a data set on funding and publication information of the Quebec researchers’ to 
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investigating the above questions about the determinants of scientific productivity and research 
impact: 
1- Build a comprehensive database on publication and funding information of Quebec 
scientists: this needs an appropriate mix of funding and publication information. 
2- Measure the effect of visibility to the scientific community (measure by the number of past 
journal articles) and the journal impact factor, on the number of citations as a measure of 
research impact (question 1): this objective seeks for the effect of visibility on research 
impact. 
3- Identify the effect of research team size (as a proxy of research collaboration) on the 
number of citations (question 2). 
4- Explore the effect of the amount of funding on the number of citations (question 3)  
5- Examine whether collaborating with a top-funded scientist may result in a higher number 
of publications (question 4) 
6- Measure the correlation between ‘holding a research chair’ and scientific production, and 
investigate the causality enquireis  (questions 5 and 6) 
2.4 Data set 
The data set used integrates information about researchers funding and publication in the province 
of Quebec. We have access to Thomson Reuters Web of Science database on scientific articles 
(2000-2012), which includes information about date of publication, journal name, authors, 
affiliations, and number of citation each article receives. Funding information of scientists comes 
from the Quebec University Research Information System (Système d’information sur la 
recherche universitaire or SIRU) of the Ministry of Education and Research (Ministère de 
l'Éducation, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche). This database reports funding 
information including grants and contracts of all Quebec academics, on a yearly basis during the 
period 1985-2012. Age and gender of scientists was obtained from the ministry internal database.  
We use variables which count the yearly number of articles [ln(nbArticle)], the yearly average 
number of authors in the papers of scientist [ln(nbAuthor)], and the five-year average of journal 
impact factor in which scientists publish [ln(Impactfactor)]. We also add dummy variables 
indicating the affiliated university of scientists. The next set of variables are the aggregate amount 
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of money raised by each scientist. We separate the sources of research funding into public sector, 
private sector, or non-for-profit organization (NFP) with social and political mission. From another 
standpoint, research funding can have two purposes: it can be directly used for operation cost (O) 
such as research cost and researchers’ salary (mainly student stipends and technical staff salaries) 
or it indirectly help research team buying instruments or larger infrastructure (I). In this framework, 
it is possible to have six variables for research funding for each researcher9 [(1) 
ln(PublicfundingO); (2) ln(PrivatefundingO); (3) ln(NFPfundingO); (4) ln(PublicfundingI); (5) 
ln(PrivatefundingI); and (6) ln(NFPfundingI)]10. In our dataset, we have used three-year average 
of funding to test the effect of past funding on current scientific productivity. Such three-year 
average takes all possible effect of past years into account. With the same rationale, we used the 
five-year average of journal impact factor. 
The number of citations, varies from one discipline to another for two main reasons: (1) the number 
of papers and the amount of knowledge production is discipline dependent, and (2) citations may 
have different meaning in different disciplines. Two field-classifications are used in this paper. 
The first classification is used to categorize researchers into 9 broad domains, based on the U.S. 
classification of instructional programs11. The second classification is based on the field 
classification used by the U.S. National Science Foundation (||NSF). For instance, the citation 
patterns of papers in Economics is different from those of Political Science, despite the fact that 
both of them are subfields of Social Sciences. To control for such disciplinary-specific behaviour, 
we therefore calculate the relative number of citations [ln(nbCitation)], measured by the number 
of citations received so far by an article12 divided by the average citation rate of the papers 
published in the same year in the same NSF speciality. This measure is then transformed by taking 
                                                 
9
 In the cases that the funding belongs to more than one researcher, the total amount of funding is divided by the number of researchers 
to make number more informative and reliable about its effect on scientific publication. 
10
 In practice, we do not use PrivatefundingI and NFPfundingI in our analysis because of there too rare occurrence in our database. 
Funding for instruments or large infrastructure has a long-term effect that we are not able to capture with a maximum number of 12 
years in the sample including the necessary lag structure. As will be explained in the methodology section ln(PublicfundingI) is used as 
an instrument for ln(PublicfundingO). 
11
 The domains are Medical Science, Health Science, Business and Management, Social Science, Education, Humanities, Non-Health 
Professional, and Engineering, Science. 
12
 More recent articles will have cumulated citations over a smaller number of years. To account for this fact, we add year dummy 
variables to the regression analysis.  
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its natural logarithm to normalize the variables and satisfy the necessary conditions for regression 
equations in this paper13. 
The pertinent variables to investigate the effect of collaboration with top-funded scientists 
identifies whether amongst the collaborator of an individual, there are co-authors who are in the 
top 10% and top 5% most funded individuals by field, distinguishing total funding, public sector 
funding, and private sector funding (it is also a kind of big-name or prestige effect). To generate 
the variables measuring collaboration with top-funded scientists, a set of dummy variables has 
been generated to identify whether a scientist has collaborated with a top funded scientist: 
[ColT90], and [ColT95] are the dummy variables that are equal to 1 if any of the coauthors in that 
year is amongst the top funded scientists (top 10%, and top 5% of total funding respectively). The 
funding amount used to generate these dummies is the sum of operational funding and funding for 
purchasing instruments. The variables of [ColPub90] and [ColPub95] are similarly built but only 
for public funding of coauthors and the variables of [ColPriv90] and [ColPriv95] have the same 
method of generation but for private funding of coauthors. 
The titles of research project are being used to generate dummy variables identifying whether a 
scientist holds a research chair; the title field clearly states: “chair in…”. As mentioned above, 
three types of chair are available in Canada: (1) industrial research chairs [dIndChair]; (2) research 
chairs awarded by Canadian federal granting councils [dGCChair ]; and (3) Canada research chairs 
[dCRC ]. In addition, we created a dummy variable [dIndGCChair ] indicating whether the 
scientist is an industrial chair or a chair assigned by Canadian federal granting councils (the 
combination of dIndChair and dGCChair). Finally, the dummy variable [dChair] is equal to 1 for 
scientists with any type of chair (the combination of dIndChair, dGCChair, and dCRC).  Building 
such dataset will satisfy the objective 1. 
                                                 
13
 There are four main assumptions in regression analysis regarding the data: (1) the variables should have normal distributions; (2) the 
linear relationship should exist between dependent and independent variables; (3) the variables should be reported without error; and (4) 
the variance of errors is the same across all levels of the IV (homoscedasticity). With the same justification regarding regression 
assumptions, the following variables in this paper are also transformed by logarithm function: funding, number of articles, number of 
authors and journal impact factor. For the variables that include a 0 value, we take the natural logarithm of 1 + the value of the variable.  
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2.5 Model and analysis 
To investigate our research questions, we use regression analysis to estimate the number of 
publications or the number of citations by the variable listed in our research questions and a set of 
control variables discussed in the literature review chapter. The amount of financial support from 
different sources, the size of research team, the impact factor of journal, the age and the gender of 
scientists, university dummy variables, and field dummy variables are amongst the important 
variables.  All of the questions can be validated by a panel regression model14 that allows time 
variation as well as individual variation. 
The goal of the sixth research question is to find the effect of holding a chair while chair and non-
chair scientists are similar to each other in terms of some specific characteristics. In other words, 
we want to investigate what happens if two researchers with similar age, research fields, and 
funding amount are different from each other in terms of holding a research chair. Such comparison 
can be made by building the database of ‘twin15’ scientists with common characteristics and then 
comparing the effect of holding a research chair on scientific productivity in a panel regression 
model. This method is called matching technique. 
The important concern about regression equations is the causality and bilateral correlation between 
dependent and independent variable. In a simple regression, to identify the determinants of 
scientific publication, the right hand side variable may be determined by the left hand side variable 
and this phenomenon is called endogeneity, which contradicts the assumption of a simple 
regression. In econometrics, a right-hand side variable is said to be endogenous if a correlation 
exists between that variable and the error term. 
Endogeneity may occur for several reasons: measurement error, auto-regression with auto-
correlated errors, simultaneity, omitted variables, and sample selection bias. In this study, some of 
the mentioned causes for endogeneity are potentially valid. First, financial support may be award 
based on the scientific production (simultaneity). Second, it is not possible to say all effective 
factors have been counted. Therefore, the existence of omitted variables is plausible. Third, 
                                                 
14
 Question 4 is about the prediction of a theoretical model, which should be validated by an empirical regression model. 
15
 One of them should be chair and another one should be non-chair 
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scientific productivity cannot be fully reflected in the number of papers and patents and as a result, 
measurement error exists. 
The 2SLS method of regression separates correlated part of right hand side variable and just keeps 
the independent part. In the first step, the endogenous independent variable in the regression 
equation is regressed on all other exogenous variables and instrument(s). An instrument is a 
variable that is not itself part of the explanatory equation and is correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables, conditional on the other covariates. In addition, the instrument cannot be 
correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation (conditional on the other covariates). 
This means that the instrument should not suffer from the same endogeneity problem as the 
original predicting variable.  The predicted/estimated values are saved for the next stage. In the 
second stage, the normal regression will be done but the exogenous variables are substituted by 
the predicted values from the first stage. We can run a regression with 2SLS method to avoid such 
endogeneity. 
A few variables are potential instruments for the amount of public funding. The number of 
scientists in a university [nbScientistUni] can explain the allocation of money amongst scientists. 
We anticipate that a university with a higher number of scientists may be able to benefit from cost 
sharing of research expenditures, hence reducing the need for larger amounts of individual funding. 
There is an established tradition in the literature to compare past research productivity of scientists 
to allocate funds (Ho et al., 2006; Liefner, 2003). 
The rank of previous funding can be another choice to predicting the future amount of funding. 
There is an echo effect for the amount of funding, which means that highly funded scientists are 
better able to get new sources of research money. The logic behind this argument is that decent 
research funds have effective networking capacity (Winter et al., 2006) to create different 
opportunities to get funds in a country such as Canada (Salazar and Holbrook, 2007). It should 
also be noted that the rank of funding is an ordinal variable and as such does not have information 
about amounts (the amount of research fund may indicate the capacity of knowledge production 
while the rank of funding does not provide such information). Therefore, it is an informative 
variable to estimate the amount of funding but it is not the funding itself. The rank of a scientist in 
the field in terms of three-year average of funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct 
expenditure of research [PubORank] is the second instrument to predict the amount of funding. 
30 
 
 
The third instrument is the total funding of each research cluster in each university 
[totPublicfundingOcluster]. Having known the aggregate amount of funding, the rank of scientist 
in terms of funding, and the number of university, it is possible to make an estimation for funding 
of each scientist. In the first stage, the amount of public funding [ln(PublicfundingO)] is estimated 
by the instruments and the variables of the second stage regression. To avoid simultaneity 
problems, public funding is not contemporaneous to the instruments; hence one-year lags of the 
instruments are used in the first-stage regression. The equations used for regressions in chapter 3, 
4, and 5 are in the following: 
 
According to the chair characteristics in chapter 5, the networking and prestige effect of ‘holding 
a research chair’ may be mixed with the effect of funding. To address this issue, we use a matching 
technique, which is based on comparing two chair and non-chair scientists when they have some 
common characteristics. In general, matching is a statistical technique which is used to identify 
the effect of a treatment by comparing the treated and the non-treated individuals with similar 
observable characteristics. By matching treated individuals to similar non-treated units, it is 
possible to compare the effect of treatment, which is holding a research chair in this thesis. 
Following the methodology employed by Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), it is possible to find pairs 
of chair-holders and non-chair-holders by using the psmatch2 command in Stata and then to 
remove the unmatched records. The selection is made by generating propensity scores and 
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choosing the pairs of scientists with the closest scores to each other. The new data set consists of 
‘twin’ scientists who are similar to each other in terms of funding, gender, and research fields. 
Controlling with funding, gender, and research field, and keeping only the matched scientists in 
the regressions, we are able to disentangle the prestige effect from the funding effect of the chair 
and hence, ‘holding a research chair’ becomes a more informative signal for the prestige of 
scientists. In this case, the effect of ‘holding a chair’ on scientific productivity does not include 
funding effect or it is not related to the field or gender of the scientist. One of the important check-
point of the matching technique is validating the quality of matching. This implies that there should 
be no difference between the averages of the selection criteria (gender, funding, and research 
fields) when the comparison is made between chair holders and non-chair holders among the 
matched pairs. There can however be a difference when the comparison is made between the 
original database and the matched database. 
2.6 Contribution to the advancement of science 
Investigating the mentioned research questions brings some novel advancements in the analysis of 
scientists’ productivity: 
1- Mix of bibliometric and funding data in an econometric study: there are limited number of 
journal papers that investigate the effect of funding while they control other bibliometric 
indices. Such comprehensive empirical analysis improves the reliability, robustness, and 
significance of research results. We have access to Thomson Reuters Web of Science 
database on scientific articles (2000-2012), which includes information about date of 
publication, journal name, authors, affiliations, and number of citation each article 
receives. Funding information of scientists comes from the Quebec University Research 
Information System (Système d’information sur la recherche universitaire or SIRU) of the 
Ministry of Education and Research (MELS). This database reports funding information 
including research grants and contracts of all Quebec academics, on a yearly basis during 
the period 1985-2012. Age and gender of scientists was obtained from the MELS internal 
database. Description and summary of data are available in appendices. 
2- Developing a theoretical model to predict the effect of collaboration with top-funded 
scientist and test the prediction with real data: this is not only an empirical study but also 
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it is based on a theory model when it investigate the effect of collaboration with top-funded 
scientists. Inspired by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and by Durnev and Kim (2005), who 
developed concepts to model the incentives of firms’ controller, we develop a theoretical 
model explaining the cost-benefit analysis of a researcher to publish papers.  
3- Use of matching techniques to find out the effect of holding a research chair on scientific 
productivity: to show whether holding a research chair as an external support is important 
and significant in promoting scientific publication, we can run the two-stage panel 
regression on the entire data set. This determines whether ‘holding a research chair’ is a 
significant right hand side variable, either as a real cause or a channel for other 
variables/causes. However, the networking and prestige effect of ‘holding a research chair’ 
may be mixed with the effect of funding. To disentangle these two chair attributes, we use 
a matching technique and compare two ‘chaired’ and ‘non-chaired’ scientists who have 
quite similar amount funding, the same gender, and work in the same research field as each 
other. Following the methodology employed by Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), the selection 
is made by generating propensity scores and choosing the pairs of scientists with the closest 
scores to each other. The new data set consists of ‘twin’ scientists who are similar to each 
other in terms of funding, gender, and research fields. This technique improve the 
robustness and reliability of the results because it disentangles the prestige effect from the 
funding effect of the chair and hence, ‘holding a research chair’ becomes a better and more 
informative signal for the prestige of scientists. 
4- A comprehensive investigation on determinants of research impact: to the best of our 
knowledge, there is not a study that identifies the determinant of scientific productivity in 
one model for the province of Quebec. This thesis provides a relatively comprehensive 
study on this topic. 
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 ARTICLE 1 : WHAT DETERMINES RESEARCHERS’ 
SCIENTIFIC IMPACT? A CASE STUDY OF QUEBEC RESEARCHERS 
Keywords: Bibliometrics, Science Policy, Citations, Scientific Publications, Scientific Impact 
3.1 Abstract 
Using a data set integrating information about researchers’ funding and publication in the province 
of Quebec (Canada), this paper intends to identify the main determinants of citation counts as one 
measure of research impact. Using two-stage least square regressions to control for endogeneity, 
the results confirm the significant and positive relationship between the number of articles and 
citation counts. Our results also show that scientists with more articles in higher impact factor 
journals generally receive more citations and so do scientists who publish with a larger team of 
authors. Hence the greater visibility provided by a more prolific scientific production, better 
journals, and more co-authors, all contribute to increasing the perceived impact of articles. The 
paper also shows that male and female receive the same number of citations, all else being equal. 
In most of domains, the amount of funding does not have a significant effect on the citation counts. 
These results suggest that the most important determinants of researchers’ citations are the journals 
in which they publish, as well the collaborative nature of their research. 
3.2 Introduction 
Research impact and its determinants are an important topic in science policy, as governments and 
public authorities seek to maximize the benefit of public spending on knowledge production and 
science advancement. Over the last decades, a vast body of literature has used citations to assess 
the scientific impact of scholarly research (Adam, 2002; Brown and Gardner, 1985; Kostoff, 2002; 
Narin, 1976). Although the classical interpretation of citations is that citations are building blocks 
in the construction of knowledge (Moed, 2005), many other factors have been shown to influence 
citation counts.  
Assuming that citations can be a proxy for research impact (Kostoff, 1998; Moed, 2006; Phelan, 
1999), it becomes important from a science policy perspective, to better understand the various 
factors that affect researchers’ citation counts. The literature has highlighted several of the factors. 
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The size of research teams as an indicator of collaboration can influence research impact (Johnes, 
1988; Melin, 1996).  Similarly, previous findings shows that citation numbers depends on the 
domain, the prestige of the journal, and the social network of authors (Bornmann et al., 2008). 
Gender is also highlighted as a factor affecting the number of citations (Aksnes et al., 2011). The 
amount of research funding can be another determinant as it provides new opportunities for 
research and new sets of scientific findings (Harman, 2000; Pavitt, 2000, 2001), which could 
probably become an academic heritage. 
We investigate the determinants of citations by analysing information about researchers funding 
and publication in the province of Quebec16. The first contribution of this paper is to analyze 
whether the various factors found in the literature are also positively associated, in our dataset, 
with changes in citation counts. Because those factors may be related with each other, the second 
contribution consists in collectively considering all of the mentioned factors in one model to test 
if their specific effects remain statistically significant. Here is our main research question: do the 
mentioned factors (number of articles, amount of funding, size of research team, gender, and 
research filed) significantly affect citation counts? This comprehensive consideration of different 
factors in one study allows for the testing of co-existing effect of different determinants and, as 
such, consists of an original contribution to the literature on citations.  
The remainder of the paper goes as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and 
literature review; Section 3 explains the data set used in the paper and describes the research 
methodology; Section 4 analyses the regression results; and finally, Section 5 discusses the results 
and concludes. 
3.3 Literature Review and Conceptual framework 
Moed (2005) argues that citation is formal and based on pre-defined evaluation procedures, open 
without any restriction, and enlightening rather than formulaic. A few authors (for instance Cole 
and Cole (1971); Bornmann et al. (2008); Norris and Oppenheim (2003)) more or less verify the 
                                                 
16
 The dataset is presented in section 3. 
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correlation between the number of citations and research impact. However, important 
considerations in using citation counts must be highlighted. 
A natural coherence between the number of citations and scientific impact generally implies that 
scientists select their references on the basis of the “impact” of the papers they cite, but this is not 
always the case. Authors sometimes cite papers to review the opposite view in the literature or to 
provide a general literature review (Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff, 1989; Seglen, 1997a). In 
another study, Moed et al. (1985) note that citations refer to impact on the scientific community 
and it does not completely reflect research “impact”. The authors argue that any publication should 
thus have a minimum “quality” to impact other research but other factors like visibility of journals 
and the extent to which researchers provide a public service are two other important determinants 
for citing a particular paper that do not necessarily have a strong correlation with research impact. 
Later, Moed (2009) argues that other citation-based indicators (e.g. journal impact factors, Hirsch 
indices, and normalized indicators of citation impact) can be substitute indicators for measuring 
the scientific impact of research. 
Along these lines, Kostoff (1998) investigates the theory of citation and suggests that every citation 
results from the combination of two main reasons: the real component of intellectual heritage and 
random components of self-interest. Although there is a random component, the author argues that 
the random effect disappears in the aggregation of citation counts and therefore the number of 
citations is a good indicator of the “quality” of research. Phelan (1999) provides the same 
justification. In a most recent review study by Bornmann and Daniel (2008), they argue that in 
most of citation-related studies, it is concluded that citing behavior is not only because of referring 
to intellectual and cognitive influences of other scientists and that there may be some non-scientific 
factors determining the decision to cite. However, the paper concludes that the different 
motivations of citers are “not so different or ‘randomly given’ to such an extent that the 
phenomenon of citation would lose its role as a reliable measure of impact” (pp. 45). 
Assuming that citation counts are good proxies for the scientific impact of research, determinants 
of citation should be investigated. Some studies highlight a trade-off between “quality” and 
quantity of research (Broad, 1981; Butler, 2002; Hayes, 1983), which suggests that “high-quality” 
work takes time and, hence, cannot be produced at the same speed as less-quality work. In contrast, 
some studies argue that scientists who publish more articles may be more visible to other members 
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of scientific community and such scientists may thus receive more citations—an indication of 
cumulative effects in science (Merton, 1968). There is some evidence in the literature indicating 
that a higher number of articles results in an increased number of citations in general (Feist, 1997; 
Hayati and Ebrahimy, 2009). Following this line of research, article counts can thus be considered 
as a proxy for the visibility of researchers (Aaltojärvi et al., 2008; Bar-Ilan et al., 2012).  
However, the visibility of researchers does not solely depend on the number of articles they 
published and can stem from other factors. Ale Ebrahim et al. (2014) show that publication 
marketing tools and strategies significantly increase the article visibility and citation impact. 
Fowler and Aksnes (2007) indicate that self-citation improves the visibility of authors’ prior 
works. It should be noted that the self-citation is not necessarily a negative point as it acts as a 
signal to readers about the author’s prior work and background information (Sammarco, 2008). 
In addition, publication in more prestigious journals (sometimes with higher impact factors) may 
provide a higher visibility for articles and hence gain more citations (Stegmann and Grohmann, 
2001). Calderini and Franzoni (2004) and Seglen (1997b) argue that the impact factor of a journal 
may be one candidate to measure research impact or prestige. We test here whether the number of 
articles of a researcher in a given year or the journals’ impact factor can influence his/her number 
of citations. With this evidence in mind, we propose our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A higher visibility, measured by the number of articles and the journal impact 
factors, can positively affect the number of citations received in the future. 
Scientific collaboration depends on academic fields. Abramo et al. (2009b) show that in 
interdisciplinary studies there are more collaborations than strictly disciplinary research, and also 
that collaboration with foreign organizations are more common in basic fields than in applied ones. 
The number of individuals in a research team can be a proxy for the extent of networking as it 
shows the ability of researchers in collective scientific actions. More specifically, the number of 
staff in a department and the number of co-authors of articles at the local, national, and 
international levels can significantly explain research productivity of scientists (Johnes, 1988; 
Melin, 1996). However, Katz and Martin (1997) argue that co-authorship is just a partial indicator 
of collaboration. They also mention that the concept of ‘research collaboration’ is hard to define: 
First, it is a social relationship and it is not possible to identify the beginning and the end; second, 
37 
 
 
determinants of scientific collaboration depend on institutions, domains, countries, and time. Our 
second hypothesis relates to research team size and goes as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The number of individuals in the list of authors significantly affects the future 
number of citations received by each scientist. 
Funding and the effect of financial resources on generating research outputs have been investigated 
by a great number of scholars over the years (Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Harman, 2000; Pavitt, 
2000, 2001). In most analyses, raising funds has been found to have a positive effect on scientific 
production. In terms of funding from the private sector, Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) find that 
industry funding is correlated with “new and interesting research topics and is prerequisite to 
accomplishing expensive and interesting projects” (pp. 947). The authors also indicate that 
professors with industrial funding collaborate more with other researchers, both from academia 
and industry.  
Public funding can also have numerous effects on knowledge production. Beise and Stahl (1999) 
suggest the following six types of contribution publicly funded research may have: source of new 
useful knowledge, new instrumentation and methodologies, skills developed by those involved in 
carrying out basic research, expansion of national and international networks, dealing with 
complex problems17, and creation of spin-off companies. However, it is not possible to claim the 
existence of a uniform and consistent argument about the effect of public funding; Appleyard 
(1996) indicates that public grants may have different effects on scientific production in two 
different countries or  two different organisations. 
To formulate a hypothesis on the effect of funding, it can be inferred that funding is a necessary 
condition for scientific research production but that it is not a sufficient condition for generating 
high quality research. Research funding acts as a tool for researchers, and should be combined 
with researchers’ skills and expertise to generate high quality results. From another perspective, it 
is possible to argue that funding is generally enough to contribute to the advancement of 
knowledge, but that it does not guarantee that this knowledge will be of high impact. . Moreover, 
                                                 
17
 The paper argues that solving complex problems provides great benefit for the firms and organizations facing such problems. 
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in laboratory-based fields, the role of funding may be more important in being able to perform 
research at all. The source of funding may also be important in affecting the scientific impact of 
research, as it shapes the project’s goal and application. Hence our third hypothesis reads as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Research funding from public, private for profit, and private not for profit sources 
may have a positive effect on research scientific impact. 
The regression analysis described below will test whether having more financial support from the 
public, private and not-for-profit (NFP) sectors for the purposes paying research functional cost 
expenditures may increase the number of citations. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
The data set used in this article integrates information about researchers funding and publication 
in the province of Quebec. We have access to Thomson Reuters Web of Science database on 
scientific articles (2000-2012), which includes information about date of publication, journal 
name, authors, affiliations, and number of citation each article receives. Funding information of 
scientists comes from the Quebec University Research Information System (Système 
d’information sur la recherche universitaire or SIRU) of the Ministry of Education and Research 
(MELS). This database reports funding information including grants and contracts of all Quebec 
academics, on a yearly basis during the period 1985-2012. Age and gender of scientists was 
obtained from the MELS internal database. Description and summary of data are available in the 
appendices section. 
Our dependent variable, the number of citations, varies from one discipline to another for two main 
reasons: (1) the number of papers and the amount of knowledge production is discipline dependent 
(Moed et al., 1985), and (2) citations may have different meaning in different disciplines (Peters 
and Van Raan, 1994).  Two field classification are used in this paper. A first classification is used 
to categorize researchers into 9 broad domains, based on the U.S. classification of instructional 
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programs18. The second classification is based on the field classification used by the U.S. National 
Science Foundation (NSF). The latter field and subfield classification is used to perform the 
normalization of citations. For instance, the citation patterns of papers in Economics is different 
from those of Political Science, despite the fact that both of them are subfields of Social Sciences. 
To control for such disciplinary-specific behaviour, we therefore calculate the relative number of 
citations [ln(nbCitation)], measured by the number of citations received so far19 divided by the 
average citation rate of the papers published in the same year in the same NSF speciality. This 
measure is then transformed by taking its natural logarithm to normalize it and satisfy the necessary 
conditions for regression analysis in the paper20. 
We use variables which count the yearly number of articles [ln(nbArticle)], the yearly average 
number of authors in the papers of scientist [ln(nbAuthor)], and the five-year average of journal 
impact factor in which scientists publish [ln(Impactfactor)]. We also add dummy variables 
indicating the affiliated university of scientists. The variables [ln(nbArticle)] and 
[ln(Impactfactor)] are used for testing hypothesis 1 and the variable of [ln(nbAuthor)] is used to 
test hypothesis 2. 
The next set of variables addresses specific funding information on the amount of money raised 
by each scientist. We separate the sources of research funding into public sector, private sector, or 
non-for-profit organization (NFP) with social and political mission. From another standpoint, 
research funding can have two purposes: it can be directly used for operation cost (O) such as 
research cost and researchers’ salary (mainly student stipends and technical staff salaries) or it 
indirectly help research team buying instruments or larger infrastructure (I). In our framework, it 
is possible to have six variables for research funding for each researcher21 [(1) ln(PublicfundingO); 
                                                 
18
 The domains are Medical Science, Health Science, Business and Management, Social Science, Education, Humanities, Non-Health 
Professional, and Engineering, Science. 
19
 More recent articles will have cumulated citations over a smaller number of years. To account for this fact, we add year dummy 
variables to the regression analysis.  
20
 There are four main assumptions in regression analysis regarding the data: (1) the variables should have normal distributions; (2) the 
linear relationship should exist between dependent and independent variables; (3) the variables should be reported without error; and (4) 
the variance of errors is the same across all levels of the IV (homoscedasticity). With the same justification, the following variables in 
this paper are also transformed by logarithm function: funding, number of articles, number of authors and journal impact factor. For the 
variables that include a 0 value, we take the natural logarithm of 1 + the value of the variable.  
21
 In the cases that the funding belongs to more than one researcher, the total amount of funding is divided by the number of researchers 
to make number more informative and reliable about its effect on scientific publication. 
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(2) ln(PrivatefundingO); (3) ln(NFPfundingO); (4) ln(PublicfundingI); (5) ln(PrivatefundingI); 
and (6) ln(NFPfundingI)]22. The mentioned funding variables are used to test hypothesis 3. 
Gender is also available in dataset [dFemale]. A great number of scholars have examined the 
gender effect on the number of publications and citations. Some articles show that women’s 
publications are slightly less cited than that of men (Aksnes et al., 2011; Sugimoto et al., 2013). 
Long (1990) explains that women’s opportunities for collaboration are significantly less than those 
of men’s because women are more likely to have greater family responsibility than men. There are 
also some studies showing that women generally publish fewer articles than men do (Hesli and 
Lee, 2011; Leahey, 2006b). This may result in less visibility and hence fewer citations for women. 
However, Long (1992) finds that there is no difference between men and women in terms of the 
number of citations or level of contribution in a team’s work. All being considered, the effect of 
gender on the number of citations should be tested and controlled in our model. 
There are two possible levels to investigate number of citations: the author level or the article level. 
As we measure the effect of funding on relative citations, we are obliged to consider the author as 
the observation unit, rather than the article, as it is impossible to attribute a specific amount of 
funding to a particular article (even with using information contained in the acknowledgements). 
All variables are therefore aggregated (summed) at the scientist-year level (the database base being 
built as a panel). 
Our regression analysis aims to understand the citation count determinants. It is important to note 
that the two variables of [ln(PublicfundingO)] and [ln(nbCitation)] are determined by each other 
simultaneously, and hence a potential source of endogeneity, which biases the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regressions. The main reason for this potential endogeneity is that the scientists are assessed 
for public funding based on their CV and past effectiveness while at the same time, publication 
and research impact depends on the funding capability of researchers. 
                                                 
22
 In practice, we do not use PrivatefundingI and NFPfundingI in our analysis because of there too rare occurrence in our database. 
Funding for instruments or large infrastructure has a long-term effect that we are not able to capture with a maximum number of 12 
years in the sample including the necessary lag structure. As will be explained in the methodology section ln(PublicfundingI) is used as 
an instrument for ln(PublicfundingO). 
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Using instrumental variables (IV) is a standard technique suggested in literature to deal with such 
an endogeneity issue. Instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variable, and should 
not be correlated with the error term in the main regression equation, which implies that the 
instruments should not suffer from the same endogeneity problem. If there is more than one 
instrument for the endogenous variable, it is necessary to perform a two-stage regression, in which 
the first stage estimates the endogenous variable (named here as instrumented variable) on a list 
of instrumental variables. Such estimation removes the error term of the first stage and keeps the 
estimated amount for the second stage. 
In the first stage, the amount of public funding [ln(PublicfundingO)] is estimated by the following 
variables: (1) the number of articles is an important factor that measures the past productivity of 
scientists [ln(nbArticleAvg3)] as it is the main component of one’s CV; (2) infrastructure related 
public funding is a proxy indicating how much a scientist is equipped to conduct research in the 
frontier of knowledge [ln(PublicfundingO)]23; (3) age and its square, which generally measures 
the a scientist’ research experience [Age, Age2]. There is evidence in literature about the non-linear 
effect of age (Bernier et al., 1975; Diamond, 1986; Kyvik and Olsen, 2008). It should be also noted 
that in first-stage regression, public funding is not affected by the number of articles in the same 
year but from the previous years. Hence a one-year lag of the three-year average of the number of 
articles is used as an instrument in the first stage regression. Using the same rationale, a one-year 
lag is also applied for the effect of infrastructure funding. The significance of the coefficients in 
the first stage regression (reported in the appendices section) and related tests show that these 
instruments are appropriate choices (they are significant). 
Having the estimated amount of public funding from the first stage to tackle the endogeneity issue, 
the second stage estimates the relative number of citations received up to 10 years following the 
publication year [ln(nbCitation)] on funding [ln(PublicfundingO), ln(PrivatefundingO), and 
ln(NFPfundingO)], the number of articles [ln(nbArticle)], the average number of authors per paper 
[ln(nbAuthor)], and the five-year average of the journal impact factor [ln(Impactfactor)]. It should 
                                                 
23
 Infrastructure funding is generally a measure of the capability of generating original knowledge but when it comes from private or 
non-for-profit (NFP) sources, it is not significant as instrument and it only plays a small role in the development of infrastructure. 
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be noted that the funding variables are measured in three-year averages to smooth out large 
variations in yearly funding. The effect of gender is also tested. 
Moreover, the interaction between the journal impact factor and the number of articles 
[ln(nbArticle) * ln(Impactfactor)] is added to investigate whether there is a moderating effect of 
the impact factor on the number of articles. The interactive variables may have additional and 
complementary explanatory power. For this paper, although the number of articles and journal 
impact factor may have an individual effect on the number of citations, their interaction can have 
significant collective effect. 
In addition, we control for university effects to account for any impact that our explanatory 
variables do not cover. For example, papers from McGill University and the University of 
Montreal (UdeM) receive more citations (figure 3.124) than those of other universities in the 
province. We also add year dummy variables to account for year-specific characteristics of the 
research system as exemplified by the evolution of citations over time (figure 3.2). The significant 
time trend and differences between universities justify the existence of these dummy variables in 
the model. The possible reason behind yearly differences is that research fluctuates each year based 
on the economy and research policy and such fluctuation may affect the research impact. 
University dummy variables can have the same role as research setting and related motivations are 
partially university dependent. Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, the resulting 
model is given by: 
1st stage : ln PublicFundingOit( ) = g ln nbArticleAvg3it−1( ), ln PublicFundingIit−1( ), Ageit, Ageit2( )
2nd stage : ln nbCitationit( ) = f
ln PublicFundingOit( ), ln PrivateFundingOit( ), ln NFPFundingOit( ),
ln nbArticleit( ), ln ImpactFactorit( ), ln nbArticleit( ) × ln ImpactFactorit( ),
ln nbAuthorit( ), dFemalei, DField , DUniversity, DYear










 
                                                 
24
 The small universities are grouped according to their institutional similarities. The University of Quebec (except the one in Montreal) 
and Bishop University are in the same group. The second group includes “École de technologie supérieure” (ETS), “Université du 
Québec à Montréal” (UQAM), and “Institut national de la recherche scientifique” (INRS). 
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Figure 3.1: Discipline-normalized citation rates of papers from Quebec universities 
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Figure 3.2: Average of Discipline-normalized citation rates of Quebec papers, by year  
 
For a panel data set, the ‘xtivreg’ Stata command can be used to estimate two-stage least square 
models (2SLS)25. The regression analysis is conducted for each domain separately. This results in 
a better understanding of determinants specific to different domains. Just focusing on the 
regression analysis for entire data set may generate some holistic arguments without any domain-
specific interpretation. For instance, funding is not similar across domains, nor is the average 
number of authors per article. As the sample size per discipline precludes estimating the 
regressions for each discipline, the compromise used in this paper is to run regressions on groups 
of disciplines. Description and summary of variables are available in the appendices section. 
                                                 
25
 Because we are using relative citations and not direct counts of citations, Poisson or negative binomial regressions are not appropriate.  
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3.5 Regression analysis 
Because a number of our independent variables are individual effect, which are constant over time 
(for instance gender or university affiliation), we therefore prefer to estimate random effect 2SLS 
regressions, which are reported in table 3.1 (first stage regression results are reported in the 
appendices section). However, to check for the robustness of regression results, the data will be 
treated for both cross section and panel data. In addition to the two-stage regression (xtivreg 
command in Stata), a simple ordinary least square (OLS) without endogeneity is also tested for 
both cross section and panel data (reg command and xtreg command in Stata). The cross section 
OLS (no consideration of time effect) and Panel OLS analysis are reported in the appendices 
section.
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Table 3.1: The second stage regression result (citation count) 
Dependent variable: ln(nbCitation)it Domain 
  
A B A+B C D C+D E F G H I H+I All 
dFemalei 0.0095 0.0033 0.0073 0.0396 -0.0019 0.0055 -0.1010 -0.1614** -0.0820 0.0109 -0.0245 -0.0140 -0.0063 
 
(0.0134) (0.0231) (0.0116) (0.0331) (0.0221) (0.0188) (0.1007) (0.0722) (0.0622) (0.0298) (0.0193) (0.0161) (0.0077) 
ln(nbArticle)it 0.0329*** 0.0985*** 0.0422*** 0.0985** 0.0498** 0.0464** 0.0127 -0.0129 0.0886* 0.0845*** 0.0604 *** 0.0679*** 0.0570*** 
 
(0.0107) (0.0223) (0.0097) (0.0450) (0.0234) (0.0211) (0.1274) (0.1593) (0.0520) (0.0149) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0059) 
ln(Impactfactor)it 0.2987*** 0.2522*** 0.2875*** 0.3815*** 0.2678*** 0.3026*** 0.2612* 0.4352** 0.0715 0.2462*** 0.2301 *** 0.2370*** 0.2458*** 
 
(0.0207) (0.0474) (0.0189) (0.0692) (0.0367) (0.0319) (0.1493) (0.1702) (0.0891) (0.0294) (0.0242) (0.0185) (0.0105) 
ln(nbArticle)it*ln(Impactfactor)it 0.1058*** 0.0934** 0.1062*** -0.0184 0.0254 0.0046 0.0947 -0.1007 0.1765* 0.0330 0.0738 *** 0.0592*** 0.0901*** 
 
(0.0171) (0.0431) (0.0158) (0.0784) (0.0392) (0.0345) (0.1754) (0.2154) (0.0990) (0.0264) (0.0206) (0.0160) (0.0094) 
ln(nbAuthor)it 0.1945*** 0.0585*** 0.1785*** 0.0755** 0.0959*** 0.0894*** 0.0612 0.0264 0.2066*** 0.1599*** 0.1296 *** 0.1389*** 0.1357*** 
 
(0.0090) (0.0203) (0.0083) (0.0362) (0.0168) (0.0150) (0.0844) (0.0720) (0.0435) (0.0153) (0.0089) (0.0076) (0.0046) 
ln(PublicfundingO)it -0.0044 -0.0085 -0.0062 0.0084 0.0270** .02068* -0.0328 0.0462 0.0240 0.0109 0.0302 *** 0.0237*** -0.0012 
 
(0.0045) (0.0133) (0.0043) (0.0193) (0.0133) (0.0113) (0.0456) (0.0647) (0.0332) (0.0128) (0.0082) (0.0069) (0.0034) 
ln(PrivatefundingO)it 0.0028*** -0.0002 0.0025*** -0.0073 0.0012 -0.0015 0.0024 -0.0338 -0.0093 -0.0016 -0.0032 ** -0.0031*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0050) (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0193) (0.0222) (0.0065) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
ln(NFPfundingO)it -0.0014 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0057 0.0005 0.0025 0.0086 -0.0135 -0.0028 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0004 
 
(0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0134) (0.0155) (0.0082) (0.0019 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0006) 
Constant  0.2381*** 0.3000** 0.2526*** 0.0673 0.0294 0.0764 0.8766*** -0.0276 -0.0610 -0.0174 -0.0405 -0.0334 0.2489*** 
 
(0.0416) (0.1207) (0.0398) (0.1619) (0.1095) (0.0929) (0.3144) (0.4933) (0.2976) (0.1223) (0.0763) (0.0649) (0.0309) 
Number of observations 9026 1761 10787 1071 2944 4015 253 369 547 4029 7261 11290 31563 
Number of scientists 1270 301 1571 301 673 974 104 202 178 664 1100 1764 5387 
χ2 3665*** 578*** 4188*** 462*** 811*** 1188*** 84*** 134*** 182*** 941*** 1722 *** 2695*** 9448*** 
Average year activity 7.11 5.85 6.87 3.56 4.37 4.12 2.43 1.83 3.07 6.07 6.60 6.40 5.86 
R2 within groups 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.18 
R2 overall 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.27 
R2 between groups 0.47  0.24  0.43  0.39  0.35  0.35  0.19  0.25  0.24  0.28  0.38  0.35  0.34  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively – Year dummies and university dummies are significant. The definition of regression tags indicating the sample: 
A= Medical, B= Health Science, c= Business and Management, D= Social Science, E= Education, F= Humanities, G= Non-health professions, H= Engineering, I= Science. 
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The focus of this section is to analyse the two-stage least square regression (table 3.1) which 
addresses the problem of endogeneity. The regressions imply that, ceteris paribus, scientific 
publications of female scientists are cited in the same manner as men’s publication. The variable 
of [dFemale] is not significant but there is a negative effect of being female only in the humanities 
(the small sample size and the fact that research output is badly measured by the Web of Science, 
we will not dwell on this result). This finding seems to be different from what Aksnes et al. (2011) 
and Larivière et al (2013) show about the underperformance of women.  
The number of articles [ln(nbArticle)] has a significant positive effect except for education and the 
humanities. Hence, in general, a greater visibility of scientists, as determined by their number of 
articles, is associated with a greater citation rate. 
Having added the interaction between journal impact factor [ln(Impactfactor)] and number of 
articles [ln(nbArticle)] to the regression, the results still show that not only there is a positive effect 
of articles count (due to the author’s visibility), but also those papers in higher impact factor 
journals receive more citations (all domains except non-health professions). In addition, a higher 
number of articles in more higher impact factor journals (interactive variable) results in more 
citations than the same number of articles in a less prestigious journal (this effect is significant for 
medical, health science, non-health professions, and science). Consequently, it is possible to argue 
that hypothesis 1 becomes validated as the higher visibility, measured by the number of articles 
and the journal impact factors, can positively affect the number of citations. 
Turning now to the size of research team, our results show that articles with more authors 
[ln(nbAuthor)] are more likely to be cited. It indicates that hypothesis 2 is validated. This finding 
is compatible with evidence in literature indicating positive effect of collaboration on research 
impact (Johnes, 1988; Melin, 1996). As a justification, in a research team with numerous 
researchers, tasks are done collectively and by different scientists. It probably provides some sort 
of knowledge spillover or tacit knowledge transfer, which improves capability of researchers in 
conducting high impact research. 
Moreover, funding does not have a major effect on the number of citations. For example, 
[ln(PublicfundingO)] has a positive significant effect only for science and social science. The 
effect of [ln(PrivatefundingO)] is only significant for the medical (positive effect) and science 
(negative effect) domains. The coefficient of [ln(NFPfundingO)] is not significant at all. The 
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empirical and theoretical evidence in literature supporting the positive effect of funding on 
productivity of scientists are known (Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Harman, 2000; Pavitt, 2000, 
2001), but our results indicate that higher funding does not necessarily results in publications 
which are more cited. This paper does not contradict the positive effect of funding on scientific 
productivity but it indicates that higher funding is not a determinant of article citation counts. As 
a result, hypothesis 3 cannot be validated because there is no significant and comprehensive 
evidence for positive effect of funding from different sources (public, private, or NFP 
organization) on research impact. 
3.6 Policy Implications 
Assuming that the number of citations is a good proxy for research impact and, in turn, for a certain 
kind of quality, we propose some policy advice to address the issues discussed in the paper. First, 
it seems that collaborative works (measured by the size of research team) can influence the impact 
of the research, and policy makers should therefore encourage research of a more collaborative 
nature. The measure of such research collaboration is not only limited to the number of authors in 
each articles but can also measure the impact, extent, and durability of collaboration. However, 
the only variable we have on hand, which measure the research collaboration, is the number of 
individuals in the authors list. 
Second, the significance level of the funding effect on research impact (which is not the same for 
all domains) does not necessarily imply that funding is ineffective for the knowledge production 
process/chain – this paper only investigates researchers’ scientific impact and not their research 
productivity, which his considered as an input here. There is strong evidence in the literature about 
the significant effect of different funding types on scientific productivity (Manjarrés-Henríquez et 
al., 2008; Pavitt, 2001; Salter and Martin, 2001) to which our research contributes: public funding 
has a positive and significant effect for “Science” and “Social Science”, while the private funding 
effect is positive and significant for “Science” and “Medical Science”. These results point towards 
domain-specific policies and incentives because the effect of funding is domain-dependent, ceteris 
paribus. Hence a domain-specific policy can be an effective tool for improving the research impact 
in specific domains, without the need for general policy making, which may require holistic 
manipulation of science policy. 
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The third policy implication is to incentivise researchers to publish in journals with a high impact 
factor. Such journals have more visibility and their articles are widely read and used by the 
scientific community, more so than articles in other journals with lower impact factor. Moreover, 
the impact factor of a journal is a proxy for research impact because journals with higher impact 
factor have more submissions and editors are able to choose higher quality papers. Although a 
greater number of articles in the past contributes to improving the visibility of articles in the future 
(and hence their perceived research impact), the positive and significant effect of the interactive 
variable, which measures the modulating effect of the number of articles on the journal impact 
factor, on research impact implies that past articles in journals with a higher impact factor can 
reflect the intrinsic research impact of individuals. We can also argue that there is a learning 
experience from the past collaboration, especially if that collaboration led to a highly cited paper. 
The last but not the least, our research did not find any gender bias in terms of research impact 
(except for the domain of Humanities). This contrasts with some evidence in literature that points 
towards the relative under-performance of women in terms of number of articles and research 
impact. However, it is not possible to make a policy conclusion in this regard because there may 
be a great number of reasons that may explain why women are less cited in one specific domain. 
First, they publish less and are thus less visible. Second, there may be conscious or unconscious 
discrimination. Third, women may be involved in more multidisciplinary research that is harder to 
publish. Fourth, women may spend more time involved in other duties at university. Although 
more investigations are needed, some incentive programs can be to encourage women to apply for 
more funding, and to go to more conferences (to be more visible). In addition, mentorship 
programs should be put in place where the gap is significant.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The paper investigates the determinants of citation counts as an indicator of research impact. To 
reach that aim, three propositions were set to be validated: one on the effect of funding, one on the 
effect of research team size, and another one on the effect of articles count and journal impact 
factor. The last two have been validated and the first one is rejected. In conclusion, this paper 
shows that the number of articles and the visibility of a researcher, the impact factor of the journal, 
the size of the research team, and the institutional setting of the university are the important 
determinants of citation counts. In addition, the regressions show that there is no significant effect 
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of public funding and gender in most of the domains examined. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that for the domains of Education, Humanities, and Non-health professions, hypothesis 1 (about 
the effect of articles count and journal impact factor) is not validated. Moreover, hypothesis 2 
(about the effect of research team size) for the domains of Education and Humanities is not 
validated.  
In terms of validity of abovementioned interpretations, it should be noted that the study only covers 
Quebec scientists and some entries are missing in original dataset. In addition to using more 
comprehensive and complete data set, there are also some other suggestions for future works in 
this subject. First, it would be interesting to investigate the citations and group them to distinguish 
self-citations, citations due to high research impact, and citations for bringing evidence from 
literature. Each group of citations may have different sets of determinants. Second, it would also 
be of importance to investigate the time trend of citation whether it is possible to make some 
arguments about timing of citation accumulation of each scientist or each paper, based on different 
events and different factors. 
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 ARTICLE 2 : THE EFFECT OF COLLABORATION WITH 
TOP-FUNDED SCIENTISTS ON SCIENTISTS’ PERFORMANCE 
 
Keywords: Scientist Productivity, Publication Determinants, Research Funding, top-funded 
Scientists 
4.1 Abstract 
The theoretical model developed in this paper predicts that collaboration with top funded scientists 
positively affects the number of scientific publications. Having combined data on funding and 
publication of Quebec scientists, this paper empirically tests the theory predictions. The paper 
examines numerous definitions of top-funded scientists as those in the top 25%, top 10%, or top 
5% in terms of total funding, funding from the public sector, and funding from the private sector. 
The results show that collaborating with such top-funded scientists has a positive effect on 
scientists’ number of publication, which is compatible with our theory predictions. 
4.2 Introduction 
Scientists’ academic productivity has been extensively discussed in and out of the literature and 
many of its determinants are currently known as potential motives for publishing papers in peer 
reviewed journals. Among others, age, gender, private and public funding, field and context are 
the most important factors. Funding definitely plays a major role in shaping scientific productivity 
and has been extensively investigated in the literature. A number of scholars show the positive 
effect of funding on academic productivity (Crespi and Geuna, 2008; Pavitt, 2000, 2001; Salter 
and Martin, 2001). Others find evidence on the effect of different types and sources of funding, 
some of which indicate that the effect of public funding and private funding are both positive 
(Berman, 1990; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005). Other studies find that funding from the private 
sector has a detrimental effect on scientific productivity (Goldfarb, 2008; Kleinman and Vallas, 
2001). 
In addition to funding, scientific collaboration and academic networking can also positively affect 
scientific productivity. Using data on collaborative research conducted in Canada, Godin and 
Gingras (2000) indicated that not only is there a non-negative correlation between research impact 
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and its collaborative nature, but that new research opportunities and scientific productivity are 
developed during research collaboration. Melin (1996) also referred to the positive effect of co-
authorship on scientific productivity at the local, national, and international levels. Research 
collaboration is also a positive determinant of patenting in addition to scientific publication. 
Azoulay et al. (2007) provided some evidence that having a co-author who patented before 
“increases the likelihood of a patent application” (pp. 601) and also that scientists in universities 
that have good patenting records, generally patent more. In another study, Zhou (2003) also 
identified the importance of having a creative co-worker in leading to increased creativity for a 
researcher. 
The networking effect can also be investigated from the standpoint of peripheral support in 
universities and research institutions. For instance, (Crane, 1965) highlighted the effect of 
university prestige on research productivity and Johnes (1988) indicated that the number of staff 
in a department and the number of co-authors of published articles can significantly explain the 
research productivity of UK economists in academia. 
Combining the known effect of networking and scientific collaboration on the one hand and 
scientist funding capacity on the other hand, it is interesting to investigate the effect of 
collaborators’ funding on scientific productivity. Collaboration with top-funded scientists can be 
an opportunity for accumulating valuable experience and tacit knowledge, resulting in higher and 
better scientific production. This study thus tests whether collaboration with top-funded scientists 
shifts up scientist’s productivity. The rest of paper is organised as follows: A brief literature review 
and the theoretical framework are presented in section 2, the data and the econometric model are 
described in section 3, analysis of econometric results is the focus of section 4, and finally section 
5 concludes. 
4.3 Theoretical model and empirical framework 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model to show how the collaboration with top-funded 
scientists results in a higher number of peer reviewed journal articles. A brief review of the 
empirical literature is also provided to show its compatibility with our theoretical model. Inspired 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and by Durnev and Kim (2005), who developed concepts to model 
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the incentives of firms’ controller, the following paragraphs model the incentives of a researcher 
to publish a paper. This model explains the cost-benefit analysis of a researcher to publish paper. 
A number of assumptions are required prior to developing the model: 
1- A scientific collaboration between two researchers affects the research results. The power and 
quality of a scientist’s collaboration in terms of production of publishable knowledge is 
represented by a constant ‘α’ that is set between 0 and 1. In other words, ‘α’ is the probability 
of acceptance of a submitted paper (when focusing on the number of papers) or the level of its 
impact on future research in the field (when focusing on the impact of papers).  
2- The maximum contribution of all possible external factors of publication is represented by . 
In other words, it is the ‘maximum external potential of knowledge production’ (consequences 
of the factors affecting scientific production such as research budget or research support from 
the university at organizational level).  
3- The utility function of researchers is linear and risk neutral. A researcher compares the utility 
gained by publishing with the research cost and salaries paid to research assistants. We suppose 
that every unit of scientific outcomes, which is published, decreases the external potential of 
the knowledge production. In addition, such external potential should be summed up with 
personal willingness/ability of a scientist to publish a paper. This sum shows the aggregate 
possibility of scientific publications. In our utility function, this willingness is normalized to 
1. The jth unit of external and personal scientific potential is multiplied by α, the factor of 
collaboration effectiveness to calculate the gained utility from the jth article. Then it is 
compared with the constant cost of publication (c) to determine whether it is worth publishing 
or not.  
4- If the jth article is being published, the following inequality should be valid, indicating that the 
benefit of a publication should be more than its cost. The left hand-side of the inequality 
represents the utility/benefit/quality of one unit of scientific outcome or knowledge when it 
becomes a paper. The right hand-side of the inequality represents the cost of publication. 
 
α 1+ pi j( )( ) > c
where pi j( ) = pi − j
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5- Our last assumption states that if there is no support for a scientist , publishing is 
not possible (c > α). It means that a scientist cannot publish only based on personal 
characteristics and without getting support from the academic community. 
The next step consists in finding the optimum number of papers . The utility gained from the 
jth publication is decreasing in the number of articles. Therefore, j increases until the inequality 
becomes equal. 
 
If j* is divided by the ‘maximum external potential of knowledge production’ , we can calculate 
the percentage of external scientific potential which has been published as papers p*. This p* is a 
standardized level of publication regardless of the amount of external support and funding. It is a 
more appropriate tool for our analysis than j* because j* cannot be compared among the different 
types of external support that the scientists receive. 
 
It is possible to find the sensibility of p* to factors such as , c, and  to extract the theoretical 
hypotheses that will be tested empirically further in the paper. The above model suggests the 
following statements: 
1- Greater institutional and peripheral support results in more publications. This statement results 
directly from our theoretical model: 
 
2- Researchers with higher costs of publication are less likely to publish: 
 
pi j( ) = 0( )
j *( )
j * = α 1+ pi( ) − c
α
pi( )
p* =
α 1+ pi( ) − c
αpi
= 1+ α − c
αpi
= 1+ 1
pi
−
c
αpi
pi
∂ p*
∂pi = −
α − c
α
pi 2
> 0
∂p*
∂c = −
1
αpi
< 0
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3- Higher ‘power and quality of scientific collaboration’ (higher α) improves scientific 
productivity. Higher α in our model refers to collaboration with top-funded scientists. 
 
This study then aims to empirically investigate the effect of collaboration with top-funded 
scientists on the number of scientific publications, which is related to the first and third predictions 
of our theoretical model. Acknowledging the proximity between funding and publishing, we 
consider that top-funded scientists are probably also star scientists.  
There are numerous definitions of star scientists in the literature. For instance, Higgins et al. (2011) 
considered the recipients of a Nobel Prize as star scientists and showed that if they are affiliated to 
a biotechnology company they act as a signal of research impact to absorb resource and investment. 
The authors justify this by reasons such as Noble prize winners transfer tacit knowledge or bring 
valuable network to the company. In another study, Meyer (2006) proposed a different definition 
of star scientist (one who is active in both patenting and publication) and showed that inventor-
authors’ publications are over-proportionally high with a high number of citations, suggesting that 
the combination of publication and patenting activities is a good proxy for being a star scientist. 
We propose to also consider top-funded scientists as stars. This would be reasonable enough 
because of the substantial effect of funding on scientific productivity from both qualitative and 
quantitative points of view. For instance, Beise and Stahl (1999) show the positive effect of 
publicly funded research on developing new products and processes. Pavitt (2001) also refers to 
the importance of public support for scientific infrastructure development and highlights its role 
in the effectiveness of public grants. In another study, Pavitt (2000) argues that infrastructure of 
expertise, equipment and networks is necessary for development and implementation of research, 
which thus is costly. In a review article of the effect of funding, Salter and Martin (2001) suggested 
the following six types of contribution of publicly funded research: new knowledge, advance 
instrumentation and methodologies, skills to conduct basic research, expansion of research 
networks, dealing with complex problems, and establishing spin-off companies. 
∂p*
∂α = −
c
α 2pi
> 0
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The literature also provides evidence to the effect that research collaboration is an important 
determinant of scientific productivity. Scientific collaboration and being an active member of a 
scientific network positively affect scientific productivity (Azoulay et al., 2007; Chwe, 2000; 
Godin and Gingras, 2000; Hicks, 1995; Johnes, 1988; Melin, 1996). Scientific collaboration, 
however, depends on the academic field. Abramo et al. (2009b) showed that in interdisciplinary 
fields there are more collaborations than in mono-disciplinary fields and also that collaboration 
with foreign organizations more often occur in the basic fields than in the applied fields. 
Scientific collaboration can also be analysed from a social network point of view. Chwe (2000) 
analysed social networks using a game theoretic model and identified three levels of hierarchy as 
the minimal sufficient network structure for efficient collaboration. These hierarchical stages are 
‘initial adopters’, ‘followers’, and then ‘late adopters’. The author highlighted that “a 
communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways: by informing each stage about 
earlier stages, and by creating common knowledge within each stage” (pp. 1). The implication of 
such structure in the scientific community would thus be a network in which scientists collaborate 
and produce new outputs, supposing that they know past information. 
A few authors have considered the concept of ‘research collaboration’ with ‘star scientist’. 
Azoulay et al. (2010) found that when a star scientist unexpectedly dies, his/her coauthors are 
faced with a decline in their quality-adjusted publication rates. The authors also noted that such a 
decline is due to the shortage of knowledge spill over between coauthors. In studying the impact 
of co-authors, Oettl (2009) proposed the concept of helpfulness in addition to productivity to 
classify a group of immunologist star scientists: high productivity and helpfulness (All-stars), high 
productivity but average helpfulness (Lone Wolves), average productivity but high helpfulness 
(Mavens),  average productivity and helpfulness (Non-Stars). His results showed that after the 
death of star scientist, the output of the coauthors dropped by 16% in the case of All-star and by 
14% in the case of Mavens. In the other two cases, the outputs remained constant. Such results 
showed that considering only productivity may be systematically wrong as the Lone Wolves are 
overvalued and the Mavens are undervalued.  
Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2011) showed that in the Canadian biotechnology sector the presence 
of more star scientists in the research team has a positive effect on patent quality. Working on the 
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same database, Schiffauerova and Beaudry (2011) noted that star scientists play the role of 
knowledge gatekeeping who acquire external knowledge and nurture the clusters because they 
have numerous numbers of connections outside and inside clusters, enabling them to play such a 
role. Regarding the contribution of star scientists in industry, additional evidence showed that the 
involvement of a star scientist in the firm positively affects how successful the firm is (Bagchi-
Sen, 2007; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2011; Darby and Zucker, 1996; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; 
Zucker and Darby, 1996, 1997, 2001; Zucker et al., 2002). 
Both the effects of funding and collaboration on scientific productivity have been well investigated 
in literature. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is not a comprehensive study on the 
effect of collaborators’ funding on scientific productivity. Based on the known correlation between 
funding and scientific productivity, we consider funding as a proxy of being star. In other words, 
being a top-funded scientist is an instrument showing the intrinsic skills and abilities of scientist. 
This research tests whether collaborating with top-funded scientists has an effect on the scientific 
production measured by the number of articles. Hence our hypothesis reads as follows: 
Hypothesis: 
 Collaboration with top-funded scientists positively affects scientific productivity. 
Other determinants of scientific productivity have been investigated in the literature, and they 
should therefore be considered in our empirical analysis as control variables. For instance, gender 
is known as a significant determinant of scientific productivity in the literature. Some researchers 
argue that differences in research productivity between men and women come from administrative 
positions of researchers and their marital status. Xie and Shauman (1998) indicated that “women 
scientists publish fewer papers than men because women are less likely than men to have the 
personal characteristics, structural positions, and facilitating resources that are conducive to 
publication” (pp. 863). Xie and Shauman (1998) nonetheless concluded that gender differences in 
research productivity has declined over time, while at the same time the population of female 
scientists has proportionally increased - this decline is also observed in Abramo et al. (2009a). Fox 
(2005) argued that the effect of gender is complex in a way that it is not possible to simply separate 
the effect of married and single researchers and he refers to the career of the spouse and to the 
family composition as two important factors of such complexity. For example, women with 
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preschool children show higher productivity than women without children and women with 
school-age children. Nakhaie (2002) also investigated the gender effect in different durations of 
time and argued that Canadian female professors publish less than their male colleagues do, both 
in a lifetime period and during a shorter period, but that such effect is higher for the former. 
Age is another independent determinant of scientific productivity examined in the literature. There 
is evidence that the effect of age varies between different disciplines (Kyvik, 1990). The authors 
indicated that the productivity level in the social sciences is independent of age. In the humanities, 
however, publishing activity declines during the age-period of 55-59, but it is followed by a new 
peak in the group of 60 years old and over. There is a different story in the medical sciences in 
which the productivity falls when researchers reach 55 years and older. In the natural sciences, 
productivity continuously decreases with aging because new scientific tools, methods, and 
equipment are continuously introduced and older researchers may have problems becoming 
familiar with them (Kyvik, 1990). 
The inverted U-shaped effect of age (Quadratic or second-order effect of age) receives significant 
support in the literature. In a comprehensive study, Kyvik and Olsen (2008) tried to justify the 
hypotheses in the literature explaining the age effect on academic productivity and categorized 
them in six groups. All of the following hypotheses have been locally verified based on the data 
set used: (a) The utility maximizing hypothesis implies that academic staff conduct less research 
as they age because the expected utility of time spent on research diminishes; (b) The seniority 
burden hypothesis refers to the increasing administrative load as a career advances, which decrease 
the focus on scientific matter; (c) The cumulative disadvantage hypothesis suggests that scientists 
who do not win research awards will gradually lose their incentives for further research; (d) The 
age decrement hypothesis proposes that older scientists mostly conduct research with a lower 
intellectual and physical level than that of their younger colleagues; (e) The obsolescence 
hypothesis implies that the younger scientists use novel tools, techniques, and methodologies for 
research more easily than their older colleagues; (f) The intellectual deadlock hypothesis suggests 
that older scientists have less tendency to “reorient their research towards new scientific or social 
problems” (Kyvik and Olsen, 2008, pp. 442). 
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In terms of funding, Manjarrés-Henríquez et al. (2009) found that industrial R&D contracts and 
private funding are effective if the professor is in need of money. In the other words, “R&D 
contracts with industry and academic research activities have synergistic effects on scientific 
production, but only when R&D contracts account for a small percentage of a researcher’s total 
funding, otherwise, there are decreasing marginal returns to scientific output” (pp. 799). Feldman 
and Graddy-Reed (2013) also showed some evidence about the positive effect of philanthropic 
funding coming from not-for-profit (NFP) organisations. 
There are many examples for positive effect of public funding on scientific production. One 
famous justification for developing public support of science is that it is a public good (Partha and 
David, 1994). From another standpoint, Callon (1994) argued that Science is not a public good 
because of its intrinsic and natural properties, but a public good due to the fact that it is a source 
of diversity and flexibility. The fall in proportion of public funding relative to the other sources of 
funds has some influence on the university research trend. Geuna (2001) argued that the fading 
role of public funding can result in over-use of resources, focus on short-term research endeavour, 
conflict in incentive structures, and “exacerbation of the impact of cumulative and self-
reinforcement phenomena present in the process of scientific production” (pp. 626). In other 
words, the abovementioned disadvantages can become positive when public funding increases. In 
terms of private funding, there are some articles questioning the positive and significant effect of 
private funding on scientific productivity, implying that private funding has either a neutral or a 
detrimental effect (Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). 
Other university-specific effects also influence scientists’ production. Crane (1965) indicated that 
scientists in major universities are more likely to be productive than scientists in minor universities. 
The main justification for such a phenomenon comes from the fact that more prestigious 
universities are better able to select the best students, are richer and hence can recruit better 
researchers, and are more apt at providing research procurement. Kyvik (1990), Blackburn et al. 
(1978), and Landry et al. (2007) also mentioned the variation of publication counts in different 
fields.  
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4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Data and variables 
In order to validate the hypothesis, a data set based on the integration of Quebec scientists’ data 
measuring their funding and publications was built. In terms of publications, Thompson Reuters 
Web of Science provides information on scientific articles (date of publication, journal name, 
authors, coauthors, citations, and authors’ affiliations). In addition, the Quebec University 
Research Information System (Système d’information sur la recherche universitaire or SIRU) of 
the Ministry of Education and Research was used to extract the grants and contracts, including 
yearly amounts, source, type, or other funding information of all Quebec university scientists 
during the period 2000-2010. These two databases were merged based on a scientist’s unique 
identifier that was perfectly disambiguated by years of work at the Observatoire des sciences et 
des technologies (OST) in Montreal.  
The dependent variable in our regression equations is an indicator of scientist’s production and is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the yearly number of published articles [ln(nbArticle)]. 
The pertinent variables to validate our hypothesis identifies whether amongst the collaborator of 
an individual, there are co-authors who are in the top 10% and top 5% most funded individuals, 
distinguishing total funding, public sector funding, and private sector funding. To generate the 
variables measuring collaboration with top-funded scientists, a set of dummy variables has been 
generated to identify whether a scientist has collaborated with a top funded scientist: ColT90, and 
ColT95 are the dummy variables that are equal to 1 if any of the coauthors in that year is amongst 
the top funded scientists (top 10%, and top 5% of total funding respectively). The funding amount 
used to generate these dummies is the sum of operational funding and funding for purchasing 
instruments. The variables of ColPub90 and ColPub95 are similarly built but only for public 
funding of coauthors and the variables of ColPriv90 and ColPriv95 have the same method of 
generation but for private funding of coauthors. 
The database also includes other determinants of scientific productivity. Research funding can be 
awarded from different sources: the public sector, the private sector, or an organization with social 
and political missions, i.e. not-for-profit organisation (NFP). In addition, research funds can serve 
two purposes: it is directly used for research cost and researchers’ salary (operational cost – O) or 
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it indirectly helps research teams in buying instrument or logistic expenditure of laboratories 
(infrastructure costs – I). With these two mentioned categories and the three types of funding 
sources, it is possible to generate six research funding variables for each researcher 
[ln(PublicfundingO), ln(PublicfundingI), ln(PrivatefundingO), ln(PrivatefundingI), 
ln(NFPfundingO), and ln(NFPfundingI)]. Although we have information for these six variables, 
this research only focuses on the effect of the operational budget because funding for the purpose 
of research tools and instruments does not have a regular pattern, i.e. it depends on the research 
needs, field, and handiness of updated research instruments. Hence infrastructure grants will not 
be used in this paper. To make the individual funding more informative, the amount of funds which 
is awarded to a team of researchers should be divided to number of researchers in the team. In 
addition, the funding variables are measured in three-year averages to smooth out large variations 
in yearly funding. 
To complete the dataset, we add the yearly average number of authors in the papers of each 
scientist [nbAuthor]. In addition, individual characteristics regarding age and gender of scientist 
are also added to the data [Age, dFemale]. Description and summary of variables are available in 
the appendices section. 
4.4.2 Methodology and econometrics model 
To measure the effect of “collaboration with top-funded scientists” on a scientist’s productivity 
(the number of articles), a regression equation is fitted to the available data. Because we have 
information on a number of years for many researchers, the data base is built as a panel. In addition 
to the dummy variables of collaboration with top-funded scientists as the main independent right-
hand-side (RHS) variable, the left-hand-side (LHS) variable of the regression should also include 
control variables that affect the number of articles. Among others, gender, funding, and research 
field are important determinants. 
Reviewing the literature in section 1, the RHS includes the dummy variables indicating whether 
the scientist has any collaboration with top-funded scientists [ColT90, ColT95, ColPub90, 
ColPub95, ColPriv90, ColPriv95], funding for operational cost [ln(PublicfundingO), 
ln(PrivatefundingO), ln(NFPfundingO)], gender [dFemale], age [Age] and dummies for research 
field, year, and universities. 
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One may argue that research collaboration increases scientific productivity because of the simple 
fact that writing an article as a single author may take double the time of writing an article with 
two authors. To control for this issue and for the obvious impact it may have on scientific 
production, we have added the lagged number of co-authors [ln(nbAuthor)] to the RHS variables. 
In addition, we control for university and research field effects to account for any impact that our 
explanatory variables do not cover. For example, McGill University and University of Montreal 
(UdeM) produce more scientific publications (figure 4.1). The small universities are grouped 
according to their active disciplines and other institutional similarities. The University of Quebec 
and Bishop University are in the same group. The second group includes “École de technologie 
supérieure” (ETS), “Université du Québec à Montréal” (UQAM), and “Institut national de la 
recherche scientifique” (INRS). In terms of research field, the fields of Science, Engineering, 
Medical Science, and Health Science (figure 4.2) are more productive than others. We also add 
year dummy variables to account for year-specific characteristics of the research system as 
exemplified by the evolution of article counts over time (figure 4.3). The significant time trend 
and differences between different universities/research fields justify the existence of these dummy 
variables in the model. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of articles published by the scientists of each university 
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Figure 4.2: Number of articles published by the scientists in different fields 
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Figure 4.3: Average number of articles per scientist in each year 
 
The possible reason behind yearly differences is that research fluctuates each year based on the 
economy and research policy and such fluctuation may affect research impact. University dummies 
and research field dummies can have the same role as academic publication norms and standards, 
research settings and related motivations are partially university and field dependent. The “Year 
2000”, “McGill University”, and the field of “Medical science” are selected as reference point in 
dummy analysis. Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, the resulting model is given 
by: 
ln nbArticleit( ) = f ln PublicFundingOit( ),ln PrivateFundingOit( ),ln NFPFundingOit( ) ,ln nbAuthorit( ),ColTX it ,dFemalei , Ageit , Ageit2 , DField , DUniversity , DYear
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where T (in ColTX) is calculated either on the total amount of funding of the top-funded scientist, 
the total amount of public funding or the total amount of private funding, X (in ColTX) represents 
the top 75%, 90% or 95% most funded scientists, and the Ds account for field, university and year 
dummy variables.  
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It is important to note that because the two variables [ln(PublicfundingO)] and [ln(nbArticle)] are 
determined by each other, which is the source of endogeneity, the ordinary least square (OLS) 
models are biased. The main reason for this potential endogeneity is that the scientists are assessed 
in their demands for public funding based on their CV and past effectiveness while at the same 
time, publication and research impact depend on the funding capability of researchers. 
Using instrumental variables (IV) is a commonly suggested method to address endogeneity 
problems. There are two requirements for using IVs: (1) the instruments must be correlated with 
the endogenous variable, and (2) the instruments should not be correlated with the error term in 
the main regression equation. In other words, the instruments cannot suffer from the same 
endogeneity problem. If there is more than one instrument for the endogenous variable, it is 
necessary to perform a two-stage regression, in which the first stage estimates the endogenous 
variable (or instrumented variable) on a list of instrumental variables. Such estimation removes 
the error term of first stage and keeps the estimated amount for the second stage. Neglecting the 
error term of the endogenous variable and putting the estimated amount in the main regression 
equation is one way to remove the correlation of the RHS variables with the error term and to deal 
with the endogeneity problem. 
A few variables are potential instruments for the amount of public funding. The number of 
scientists in a university [nbScientistUni] can explain the allocation of money amongst scientists. 
We anticipate that a university with a higher number of scientists may be able to benefit from cost 
sharing of research expenditures, hence reducing the need for larger amounts of individual funding. 
The rank of a scientist in the field is another variable that can be used to explain research funds 
allocation. There is an established tradition in the literature to compare past research productivity 
of scientists to allocate funds (Ho et al., 2006; Liefner, 2003).  
The rank of previous funding can be another choice to predicting the future amount of funding. 
There is an echo effect for the amount of funding, which means that highly funded scientists are 
better able to get new sources of research money. The logic behind this argument is that decent 
research funds have effective networking capacity (Winter et al., 2006) to create different 
opportunities to get funds in a country such as Canada (Salazar and Holbrook, 2007). It should 
also be noted that the rank of funding is an ordinal variable and as such does not have information 
about amounts (the amount of research fund may indicate the capacity of knowledge production 
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while the rank of funding does not provide such information). Therefore, it is an informative signal 
to estimate the amount of funding but it is not the funding itself. The rank of a scientist in the field 
in terms of three-year average of funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct 
expenditure of research [PubORank] is the second instrument to predict the amount of funding. 
The third instrument is the total funding of each research cluster in each university 
[totPublicfundingOcluster]. Having known the aggregate amount of funding, the rank of scientist 
in terms of funding, and the number of university, it is possible to make an estimation for funding 
of each scientist. In the first stage, the amount of public funding [ln(PublicfundingO)] is estimated 
by the instruments and the variables of the second stage regression. To avoid simultaneity 
problems, public funding is not contemporaneous to the instruments; hence one-year lags of the 
instruments are used in the first-stage regression. Considering the mentioned explanatory 
variables, the resulting model is given by: 
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In a well-specified model, the variables of the RHS (including the instrumental variables) should 
not be highly correlated with each other. A low correlation refers to a good level of independence 
and explanatory power of RHS variables. The correlation matrix is reported in the appendices 
section and the correlation coefficients are acceptable for estimating regression equations. 
4.5 Results and discussion 
Because a number of our independent variables are individual effects (i.e. gender, university 
affiliation for vast majority of scientists), which are constant over ime, we prefer to estimate 
random effect 2SLS regressions for panel data (with the xtivreg command in Stata). The second 
stage of the two-stage panel regressions for collaboration with top 5% and 10% (in terms of public 
funding, private funding, and funding from not-for-profit sector) are presented in tables 4.1 to 4.5. 
The first stage regressions are not reported in the text to save space but the instruments significantly 
explain the public funding endogenous variable. 
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Our results indicate that the coefficients of the amounts of funding from the public, private, and 
not-for-profit sectors are all significant with positive signs in all regressions: the more funded the 
scientists are the more articles they publish. Having sufficient funds is a necessary condition for 
researchers to buy instruments and hire assistants in order to follow new ideas and conduct research 
at the frontier of knowledge. Our findings hence echo past studies in terms of public funding 
(Feldman and Graddy-Reed, 2013; Salter and Martin, 2001) and private funding (Manjarrés-
Henríquez et al., 2009; Manjarrés-Henríquez et al., 2008). 
In addition to the funding, our results show that the collaboration with top funded scientists is 
another significant determinant to foster the scientific productivity. There are different reasons for 
this effect. According to the papers assessing the effect of funding on scientific productivity (Beise 
and Stahl, 1999; Salter and Martin, 2001), it is possible to say that well-funded scientists have a 
better productivity. Collaboration with these scientists increases the chance of getting valuable 
experience and learning new skills through collaborative and collective research activities. The 
scientists who collaborated with well-funded scientists are more likely to publish papers. 
Economies of scale are the second possible reason behind our results. For instance, with a greater 
number of students that produce more articles, the per-unit fixed cost of shared resources (for 
example the cost of laboratory technician) is lower, which then leads to a decreased marginal cost 
of publication. The same can be said of instruments and infrastructure. The third explanation stems 
from having access to modern instrumentation that more funds can provide. Neumann and Finaly-
Neumann (1990) argued that research publication is directly influenced by support such as research 
instruments. Scientists who collaborate with top-funded scientists have access to better instruments 
and this would result in more scientific products. 
Furthermore, the possible fourth reason is related to the fact that large amounts of funding are 
generally given to a team of researchers. It is important to note that SIRU accounts for 
interuniversity transfers. Hence a scientists who transfers funds to a colleague in another university 
will have his funds reduced by the transferred amount. The recipient will thus have an increased 
amount of funds as a consequence. It is however not possible to rack funds from the same grants 
across universities as the reporting is not standardized. 
Regarding past networking, we can also argue that having higher a number of co-authors in the 
past significantly increases scientific production, hence supporting (Johnes, 1988; Melin, 1996). 
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Turning to the other independent variables in regression equations, we conclude that female 
scientists have a significantly lower scientific production in all regressions. Long (1990) explains 
that women’s opportunities for collaboration are significantly less than those of men’s because 
women have young children. Kyvik and Teigen (1996) find that childcare and lack of research 
collaboration are the two factors which negatively affect the scientific publishing of women. In 
another study, Leahey (2006a) argues that the reason of low production of women is that women 
specialize less than men, which is an important factor for research production.  
The age of a scientist also exhibits a significant inverted U-shaped effect with a peak at age 51. In 
other words, scientists have increasing scientific productivity until they reach the age of 51 but 
their productivity drops afterward. This statement is compatible with earlier works that explain the 
age effect (Bernier et al., 1975; Diamond, 1986; Levin and Stephan, 1991). Our model also verifies 
the effect of university and research discipline in addition to the year-specific effect on scientific 
production. 
Tables 4.2 to 4.5 present the regressions where “collaboration with top funded scientists” is 
interacted with “other determinants of scientific productivity”. Table 4.2 shows that having had a 
greater number of co-authors in the past increases scientific productivity, a phenomenon that is 
amplified if the researcher has collaborated with top-funded scientists. Table 4.3 indicates that 
although female scientists are less productive than their male colleagues in general, collaborating 
with top-funded scientists partially alleviates this negative effect. Table 4.4 and 4.5 also show the 
interactive effect of private funding and non-for-profit funding when a scientist has research 
collaboration with top-funded scientist. For private funding, there are only three significant 
interactive effects (collaboration with top-funded scientists at 10% level). The interesting point is 
that if a scientist has research collaboration with another scientist who is top-funded in terms of 
private funding, the effect of own private funding becomes negative. The other two interactive 
effects are positive. For non-for-profit funding, the story is a bit different and interactive variables 
have positive and significant effect except for [ColT95*ln(NFPfundingO)] and 
[ColPub95*ln(NFPfundingO)], which are insignificant. As reviewed, these interactive effects do 
not have same pattern and significance and it is not possible to make a general statement for that.
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Table 4.1: The second stage regression results 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0824 *** -0.0827 *** -0.0839 *** -0.0836 *** -0.0841 *** -0.0841 *** 
 
0.0116  0.0115  0.0115  0.0115  0.0116  0.0117  
Ageit 0.0328 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0318 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0339 *** 0.0343 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0035  0.0035  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1645 *** 0.1695 *** 0.1676 *** 0.1739 *** 0.1742 *** 0.1774 *** 
 
0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0445 *** 0.0467 *** 0.0431 *** 0.0459 *** 0.0500 *** 0.0503 *** 
 
0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0043 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0056 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ColT90it 0.1802 ***           
 
0.0058            
ColT95it   0.1819 ***         
 
  0.0062          
ColPub90it     0.1760 ***       
 
    0.0056        
ColPub95it       0.1723 ***     
 
      0.0061      
ColPriv90it         0.1725 ***   
 
        0.0060    
ColPriv95it           0.1641 *** 
 
          0.0067  
Constant -0.2738 *** -0.2828 *** -0.2380 *** -0.2662 *** -0.3384 *** -0.3387 *** 
 
0.0896  0.0896  0.0894  0.0894  0.0901  0.0903  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
Number of scientists 5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  
χ2 5389  5268  5428  5258  5104  4871  
sigma 0.4820  0.4814  0.4809  0.4799  0.4836  0.4846  
rho 0.4078  0.4034  0.4052  0.3982  0.4080  0.4065  
R2 within groups 0.0504  0.0462  0.0508  0.0443  0.0442  0.0384  
R2 overall 0.2667  0.2632  0.2688  0.2642  0.2569  0.2520  
R2 between groups 0.4423  0.4397  0.4454  0.4439  0.4323  0.4283  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university dummies are 
significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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Table 4.2: The second stage regression results (joint effect of research collaboration and 
number of articles) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0821 *** -0.0826 *** -0.0837 *** -0.0835 *** -0.0838 *** -0.0841 *** 
 
0.0116  0.0116  0.0115  0.0115  0.0116  0.0117  
Ageit 0.0327 *** 0.0332 *** 0.0317 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0343 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0035  0.0035  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1523 *** 0.1645 *** 0.1513 *** 0.1647 *** 0.1607 *** 0.1769 *** 
 
0.0078  0.0073  0.0076  0.0072  0.0074  0.0071  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0447 *** 0.0468 *** 0.0433 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0503 *** 0.0503 *** 
 
0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0043 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0056 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ColT90it 0.1312 ***           
 
0.0175            
ColT95it   0.1525 ***         
 
  0.0199          
ColPub90it     0.1080 ***       
 
    0.0171        
ColPub95it       0.1154 ***     
 
      0.0194      
ColPriv90it         0.0976 ***   
 
        0.0194    
ColPriv95it           0.1602 *** 
 
          0.0229  
ColT90it*ln(nbArticleit) 0.0293 ***           
 
0.0099            
ColT95it*ln(nbArticleit)   0.0167          
 
  0.0108          
ColPub90it*ln(nbArticleit)    0.0407 ***       
 
    0.0097        
ColPub95it*ln(nbArticleit)      0.0324 ***     
 
      0.0105      
ColPriv90it*ln(nbArticleit)        0.0441 ***   
 
        0.0109    
ColPriv95it*ln(nbArticleit)          0.0022  
 
          0.0123  
ColT90it*dFemalei             
Constant -0.2564 *** -0.2783 *** -0.2142 *** -0.2543 *** -0.3188 *** -0.3382 *** 
 
0.0898  0.0897  0.0896  0.0896  0.0902  0.0904  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
Number of scientists 5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  
χ2 5399  5262  5455  5264  5123  4869  
sigma 0.4820  0.4818  0.4808  0.4801  0.4834  0.4847  
rho 0.4083  0.4044  0.4053  0.3989  0.4082  0.4068  
R2 within groups 0.0507  0.0463  0.0514  0.0446  0.0448  0.0384  
R2 overall 0.2663  0.2630  0.2686  0.2641  0.2567  0.2519  
R2 between groups 0.4420  0.4393  0.4454  0.4436  0.4316  0.4282  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university dummies are 
significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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Table 4.3: The second stage regression results (joint effect of research collaboration and 
scientist’s gender) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0915 *** -0.0909 *** -0.0817 *** -0.0898 *** -0.0904 *** -0.0912 *** 
 
0.0123  0.0119  0.0122  0.0118  0.0121  0.0119  
Ageit 0.0328 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0317 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0340 *** 0.0344 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0035  0.0035  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1648 *** 0.1697 *** 0.1679 *** 0.1741 *** 0.1742 *** 0.1773 *** 
 
0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0446 *** 0.0468 *** 0.0431 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0503 *** 
 
0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0043 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0056 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ColT90it 0.1734 ***           
 
0.0065            
ColT95it   0.1727 ***         
 
  0.0070          
ColPub90it     0.1778 ***       
 
    0.0064        
ColPub95it       0.1653 ***     
 
      0.0069      
ColPriv90it         0.1668 ***   
 
        0.0067    
ColPriv95it           0.1542 *** 
 
          0.0075  
ColT90it*dFemalei 0.0287 ***           
 
0.0129            
ColT95it*dFemalei   0.0403 ***         
 
  0.0142          
ColPub90it*dFemalei     -0.0070        
 
    0.0127        
ColPub95it*dFemalei       0.0304 **     
 
      0.0141      
ColPriv90it*dFemalei         0.0257 *   
 
        0.0137    
ColPriv95it*dFemalei           0.0460 *** 
 
          0.0157  
Constant -0.2735 *** -0.2816 *** -0.2372 *** -0.2656 *** -0.3394 *** -0.3403 *** 
 
0.0895  0.0896  0.0894  0.0894  0.0901  0.0903  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
Number of scientists 5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  
χ2 5401  5285  5440  5274  5109  4884  
sigma 0.4815  0.4809  0.4804  0.4793  0.4835  0.4844  
rho 0.4070  0.4025  0.4039  0.3970  0.4079  0.4063  
R2 within groups 0.0506  0.0466  0.0507  0.0445  0.0444  0.0388  
R2 overall 0.2662  0.2626  0.2690  0.2638  0.2567  0.2516  
R2 between groups 0.4414  0.4386  0.4457  0.4430  0.4319  0.4276  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university dummies are 
significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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Table 4.4: The second stage regression results (joint effect of research collaboration and 
private funding) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0824 *** -0.0827 *** -0.0841 *** -0.0836 *** -0.0844 *** -0.0842 *** 
 
0.0115  0.0115  0.0114  0.0114  0.0116  0.0117  
Ageit 0.0326 *** 0.0330 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0339 *** 0.0343 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0035  0.0035  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1655 *** 0.1699 *** 0.1695 *** 0.1746 *** 0.1734 *** 0.1771 *** 
 
0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0067  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0446 *** 0.0468 *** 0.0432 *** 0.0459 *** 0.0500 *** 0.0503 *** 
 
0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0048 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0046 *** 0.0063 *** 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 
 
0.0009  0.0008  0.0009  0.0008  0.0009  0.0008  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0056 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ColT90it 0.1725 ***           
 
0.0070            
ColT95it   0.1819 ***         
 
  0.0078          
ColPub90it     0.1618 ***       
 
    0.0069        
ColPub95it       0.1685 ***     
 
      0.0076      
ColPriv90it         0.1907 ***   
 
        0.0077    
ColPriv95it           0.1740 *** 
 
          0.0093  
ColT90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0022 **           
 
0.0011            
ColT95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)   0.0000          
 
  0.0011          
ColPub90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)    0.0039 ***       
 
    0.0011        
ColPub95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0010      
 
      0.0011      
ColPriv90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)        -0.0043 ***   
 
        0.0012    
ColPriv95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)          -0.0019  
 
          0.0012  
Constant -0.2693 *** -0.2811 *** -0.2284 *** -0.2624 *** -0.3422 *** -0.3397 *** 
 
0.0894  0.0895  0.0891  0.0893  0.0901  0.0903  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
Number of scientists 5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  
χ2 5428  5290  5506  5291  5118  4872  
sigma 0.4805  0.4805  0.4783  0.4786  0.4834  0.4846  
rho 0.4042  0.4010  0.3987  0.3948  0.4080  0.4066  
R2 within groups 0.0503  0.0462  0.0508  0.0442  0.0447  0.0385  
R2 overall 0.2674  0.2633  0.2704  0.2646  0.2567  0.2519  
R2 between groups 0.4435  0.4398  0.4478  0.4444  0.4317  0.4281  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university dummies are 
significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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Table 4.5: The second stage regression results (joint effect of research collaboration and NFP 
funding) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0823 *** -0.0827 *** -0.0839 *** -0.0836 *** -0.0843 *** -0.0843 *** 
 
0.0115  0.0115  0.0114  0.0114  0.0116  0.0116  
Ageit 0.0325 *** 0.0329 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0322 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0342 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  0.0035  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1655 *** 0.1702 *** 0.1691 *** 0.1749 *** 0.1753 *** 0.1783 *** 
 
0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  0.0066  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0446 *** 0.0468 *** 0.0432 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0502 *** 0.0504 *** 
 
0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0043 *** 
 
0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0035 *** 0.0045 *** 0.0039 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0038 *** 0.0048 *** 
 
0.0009  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0007  
ColT90it 0.1720 ***           
 
0.0072            
ColT95it   0.1769 ***         
 
  0.0081          
ColPub90it     0.1645 ***       
 
    0.0071        
ColPub95it       0.1655 ***     
 
      0.0080      
ColPriv90it         0.1546 ***   
 
        0.0076    
ColPriv95it           0.1480 *** 
 
          0.0089  
ColT90it*ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0020 **           
 
0.0011            
ColT95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)   0.0011          
 
  0.0011          
ColPub90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)    0.0029 ***       
 
    0.0010        
ColPub95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)      0.0015      
 
      0.0011      
ColPriv90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)        0.0041 ***   
 
        0.0011    
ColPriv95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)          0.0033 *** 
 
          0.0012  
Constant -0.2680 *** -0.2793 *** -0.2308 *** -0.2617 *** -0.3325 *** -0.3359 *** 
 
0.0894  0.0895  0.0891  0.0892  0.0899  0.0902  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
Number of scientists 5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  5602  
χ2 5428  5295  5492  5302  5156  4906  
sigma 0.4805  0.4804  0.4786  0.4782  0.4820  0.4836  
rho 0.4042  0.4007  0.3994  0.3939  0.4043  0.4039  
R2 within groups 0.0503  0.0461  0.0507  0.0442  0.0443  0.0384  
R2 overall 0.2673  0.2636  0.2698  0.2647  0.2580  0.2527  
R2 between groups 0.4436  0.4403  0.4472  0.4448  0.4341  0.4296  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university dummies are 
significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively.
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this article, a theoretical model was developed to show that collaboration with top-funded 
scientists has a positive effect on the number of articles published by a scientist. In addition, the 
empirical results from a two-stage panel regression verify the results predicted by the theoretical 
model. Using a rich dataset on publication and funding of Quebec scientists, the paper shows that 
collaborating with top-funded scientists has positive effect on the productivity of a scientist. 
The results also verified the evidence from the literature regarding the positive effect of funding, 
the positive effect of past networking (measured by number of co-authors), the inverted U-shaped 
effect of age, and the fewer number of publications by women compared to men. We have also 
significant effect of university, research field, and year. This implies that each university, each 
research field, or each year has unmeasurable or hidden set of scientific, social, and financial 
characteristics affecting scientific productivity. 
Considering the significant and positive effect of collaboration with top-funded scientists on 
scientific productivity, the main policy advice is to set some incentives or to give a mandate to top-
funded scientists to have specific amount/number of collaboration with low-funded scientists. This 
kind of collaboration may positively affect the academic productivity through different channels. 
As discussed above it may result in a substantial transfer of tacit knowledge and more scientific 
publications. Moreover, it provides benefits such as economy of scale in knowledge production 
because well-funded scientists have generally larger teams of researchers and better research 
equipment. The expansion of the research network is another reviewed benefit of such 
collaboration. Collaboration with top-funded scientists has also some interactive effects with other 
determinants of scientific production, which suggests an amplified positive impact if a researcher 
has greater number of co-authors, if a researcher is female. In terms of interaction with private 
finding and NFP funding, there is not a systemic and structured pattern. However, some of 
interactive variables have positive effect. 
In terms of validity of abovementioned interpretations, one should be careful as there are a number 
of limitations in this study. First this study only covers Quebec scientists. Second the database time 
coverage is limited. Third some data entries are missing in the original dataset and we do not have 
the funding information of all collaborators, only of Quebec collaborators. In addition to addressing 
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these shortcomings in future studies with having more data entries and complete records, there are 
also some other suggestions for future works on this subject. First, this paper defines the “star” 
scientists based on the amount of funding, i.e. it identifies the top-funded scientists. As the funding 
of scientist is being determined by previous productivity and intrinsic characteristics of scientists, 
it is an appropriate proxy for research impact. However, future research can consider different 
definitions of “star scientist” to provide a more comprehensive and robust interpretation. For 
instance, star scientists can be identified based on the number of patents, the impact factor of the 
journals in which the researchers publish, and networking measure such as centrality or 
cliquishness indicators. 
The second suggestion for future studies is about different research methods. One can have a deep 
investigation on the nature of research collaboration and provide a taxonomy to explain the benefit 
and knowledge spillover of different types of research collaboration with star scientists. This will 
require data gathering by surveys and questionnaires in order to have a detailed understating the 
nature of the collaboration with star scientists. 
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 ARTICLE 3 : THE EFFECT OF HOLDING A RESEARCH 
CHAIR ON SCIENTISTS’ PRODUCTIVITY 
Keywords: Scientist Publication, Research Funding, Matching Techniques, Research Chair 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Having combined data on Quebec scientists’ funding and journal publication, this paper tests the 
effect of holding a research chair on a scientist’s productivity. The novelty of this paper is to use a 
matching technique to understand whether holding a research chair contributes to a better scientific 
productivity. This method compares two different sets of regressions which are conducted on 
different data sets: one with all observations and another with only the observations of the matched 
scientists. Two chair and non-chair scientists are deemed matched with each other when they have 
the closest propensity score in terms of gender, research field, and amount of funding. The results 
show that holding a research chair is a significant scientific productivity determinant in the 
complete data set. However, when only matched scientists are kept in data set, holding a Canada 
research chair has a significant positive effect on scientific productivity but other types of chairs 
do not have a significant effect. In the other words, in the case of two similar scientists in terms of 
gender, research funding, and research field, only holding a Canada research chair significantly 
affects scientific productivity.   
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5.2 Introduction 
Scientists’ academic productivity has been extensively discussed and many of its determinants are 
currently known as potential motives for publishing papers in peer-reviewed journals. Among 
others, age, gender, private and public funding, institutional setting, field and context are the most 
important determinants. Funding definitely plays a major role in knowledge production and in 
shaping scientific productivity: its positive effect on scientific productivity has been extensively 
demonstrated in the literature (Crespi and Geuna, 2008; Pavitt, 2000, 2001; Salter and Martin, 
2001). 
The name and prestige of research centers may generally affect scientific productivity. For 
instance, Turner (2005) showed the outstanding research productivity of ‘Grandes Ecoles’ in 
France. Beside the name and brand of academic institutions, centers with specific research 
orientations such as ‘centers for excellence’ are also effective on the level of scientific productivity 
(Niosi, 2002). 
Other desirable factors, similar to ‘centers for excellence’, may increase an individual’s research 
motivation and influence the willingness or ability of a scientist for conducting original research. 
In this paper, we focus on the effect of holding a ‘research chair’ as a possible determinant of 
scientific publication. On the one hand, it may help the holder of this chair to be liberated from the 
constant quest for research funds or to have time to construct a more effective network, which may 
result in propelling future knowledge production. On the other hand, greater scientific productivity 
may simply be the effect of the past productivity of a scientist, implying an intrinsic ability of 
scientists in conducting research and/or in mobilising effectively its extensive networking capacity. 
Using an appropriate econometric model, this paper tests whether ‘holding a chair’ has a significant 
effect on scientific productivity. The rest of paper is organised as follows: section 1 reviews the 
literature and proposes a theoretical framework that leads to two hypotheses. Section 2 explains 
how data is gathered and describes the variables used in the econometric models. Section 3 presents 
the results of the regressions in regard to testing the hypotheses. Finally, section 4 concludes and 
summarizes the results of the paper. 
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5.3 Theoretical framework 
The literature relevant to this article brushes on the importance of having a prestigious academic 
position or affiliation. Focusing on the role of university prestige in academic productivity, Long 
et al. (1979) found a positive and significant correlation between the prestige of the scientist alma 
matter and the prestige of subsequent employment affiliation. The authors also indicated that 
graduating from a prestigious university has a positive effect on citations (but not on publication 
counts). The paper also provides a justification for the effect of prestige arguing that the best 
students are admitted to the most prestigious universities and subsequently the graduates of the 
prestigious universities are generally recruited by other similar institutions. Furthermore, such 
scientists who studied in and have been recruited by prestigious universities are better able to 
interact with new gifted students (Long et al., 1979). This paper argued that academic prestige can 
push forward research and its impact. More recently, Zhou et al. (2012) showed that papers cited 
by prestigious scientists, regardless of the number of citations, are of a higher impact than papers 
which are cited by ‘ordinary’ scientists. 
Prestige can be seen from the reverse direction of causality. West et al. (1998) investigated the 
relationship between departmental climate, such as degree of formalization, support for career 
development and support for innovation on the one hand, and officially rated effectiveness of 
universities on the other hand. They conclude that the causality direction is from former to latter, 
showing that the prestige of universities is an effect and not a cause for appropriate departmental 
climate and necessary institutional setting for conducting research. 
Measuring and quantifying prestige have been discussed in some articles. Frey and Rost (2010) 
compared three types of university ranking based on the number of articles, number of citations, 
and membership of editorial board or of academic associations. The authors indicated that these 
rankings are not compatible with each other and suggested the use of multiple measurements. Van 
Raan (2005) criticized the applicability of university rankings such as the Shanghai ranking for 
evaluating academic excellence by noting that the ‘affiliation’, as an important factor reflecting 
research atmosphere, is not well addressed in those ranking. In addition to the university ranking, 
it is important to assess individual research productivity to have a better sense of prestige. 
Henrekson and Waldenström (2007) introduced three types of indicators, measuring research 
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productivity: (1) measures based on weighted journal publications, (2) measures based on citations 
to most cited works, and (3) measures based on the number of publications. 
To measure prestige with a more robust measure, it is possible to consider awards as a measure of 
prestige, which is awarded based on a deliberate assessment in specialized and independent 
committees. Different types of research chairs are examples of awards. In Canada, there are three 
types of research chair: (1) research chairs which are awarded by industry and generally referred 
to as industrial chairs; (2) research chairs which are awarded by Canadian federal funding agencies 
such as the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) and the Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR); and (3) the ‘Canada research chairs’, whose holders are 
assumed to already achieve research excellence in one of the main fields of research: engineering 
and the natural sciences, health sciences, humanities, and social sciences. The purpose of this latter 
program is to “improve […] depth of knowledge and quality of life, strengthen Canada’s 
international competitiveness, and help train the next generation of highly skilled people through 
student supervision, teaching, and the coordination of other researchers’ work. In terms of 
allocation, three separate calculations are performed for each eligible institution to determine their 
chair allocation within the three areas of research. The allocation method for regular chairs pools 
together each granting agency's funding for all universities and allocates chairs based on the portion 
of the granting agency's funding that each eligible institution has received. The funding received 
by each eligible university over three years is totalled.  The portion of granting agency support that 
each eligible institution holds in this grand total determines the number of chairs allocated (i.e., the 
percentage of funding secured = the percentage of chairs allocated).”26.  Considering holding a 
chair as some kind of measure of prestige, we aim to elucidate the effect of being a ‘chair-holder’ 
on scientific productivity. Our first hypothesis therefore reads as: 
Hypothesis 1: Holding a chair increases a scientist’s productivity measured in terms of number 
of publications. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the productivity of chair-holders compared to other scientists and as such does 
not seek to prove causality. Considering the fact that chair-holders are the well-funded scientists 
too, this hypothesis cannot detach the funding effect of the chair from its other effects (mainly from 
                                                 
26
 http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/about_us-a_notre_sujet/index-eng.aspx  
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prestige and networking effect). In other words, despite the evidence in literature about the benefits 
and goals of the research chair programs other than funding, hypothesis 1 is not able to disentangle 
them. 
A number of authors tried to highlight the functions and characteristics of research chairs. Cantu 
et al. (2009) showed the research chair program would be a good strategy for implementing 
knowledge-based development. In study on German universities, Schimank (2005) argued that 
chair-holders are small businessmen with high job security and no bankruptcy in addition to a good 
level of freedom of teaching and research, indicating that research chairs have the characteristics 
of job security and sovereignty. 
According to official documents, influencing scientific productivity is not the direct goal of a 
research chair. In the tenth-year evaluation report for Canada research chair (CRC)27 programme, 
the authors conclude that CRC program is an effective way for Canadian universities to “attract 
and retain leading researchers” from other countries (page 4). The report does not say that holding 
a research chair is a determining factor of a chair’s scientific production: “the extent to which this 
success can be related directly to the CRC is difficult to quantify” (page 5). Furthermore, holding 
a research chair does not imply a higher salary. Courty and Sim (2012) showed that although having 
Canada Research Chair (CRC) initially increases the professors’ salary, such an increase erodes 
quickly over the time. This means that getting a research chair does not necessarily result in long-
term salary jump.  
It is possible to look at the research chair as a result of scientists’ characteristics and achievements 
(for instance number of articles, and number of citations). A chair-holder may experience an effect 
specific to holding chair on his/her scientific production in addition to the contribution of his/her 
characteristics and past achievements. To disentangle the exclusive effect of chair from the effect 
of scientists’ characteristics, we propose our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Keeping a scientist’s main characteristics (gender, research field, and amount of 
grants) constant, holding a research chair does not have a significant positive 
effect on his/her scientific production. 
                                                 
27
 http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/about_us-a_notre_sujet/publications/ten_year_evaluation_e.pdf 
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This hypothesis can be tested using a matching technique, which will be explained in the 
methodology section. In addition to our two hypotheses, a number of factors have been shown in 
the literature to influence research productivity. These will be used as control variables in our 
regression models. Among others, age, gender, funding, research field, and university 
characteristics are the most important determinants of scientific production which should be 
controlled when the effect of research chair on scientific productivity is being tested. 
In terms of age, two strands of the literature about its effect on scientific productivity are in 
opposition to one another. First, some authors argue for the life cycle trend in economic activity, 
referring to the non-linearity of human productivity during life (Becker, 1962). Those articles show 
that productivity follows an inverted U-shape format (Kyvik, 1990; Kyvik and Olsen, 2008), which 
can be justified by the optimization of the trade-off between cost of human capital investment at a 
younger age and its return as a benefit at an older age. For instance, Bernier et al. (1975) showed 
an increase in impact and quantity of publications until the age of 44 and a fall after that age. The 
second strand of the literature generally finds that scientists’ academic productivity (number of 
articles and number of citations) decreases with age (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; Diamond, 1986; 
Levin and Stephan, 1991). 
Gender is also known as a significant determinant of scientific productivity in the literature. 
Nakhaie (2002) showed that Canadian female scientists have a lower scientific productivity 
compared to their male colleagues. Long (1990) explained that women’s opportunities for 
collaboration are significantly less than those of men’s because women have young children. 
However, in another study, Long (1992) showed that women are less productive in the first decade 
of their career but are more productive afterwards. Moreover, Xie and Shauman (1998) and 
Abramo et al. (2009a) argue that gender differences in research productivity have declined over 
time, while at the same time the population of female scientists has proportionally increased. 
Research funding is another important determinant of scientific productivity. In a review article on 
the effect of funding, Salter and Martin (2001) suggested the following six types of contribution of 
publicly funded research: source of new useful knowledge, new instrumentation and 
methodologies, skills developed by those involved in carrying out basic research, expansion of 
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national and international networks, dealing with complex problems28, and creation of spin-off 
companies. Pavitt (2001) also referred to the importance of public support for scientific 
infrastructure development and highlights its role in the effectiveness of public grants. In another 
study, Pavitt (2000) argued that funding for infrastructure of expertise, equipment and networks is 
necessary for the development and implementation of research. 
Another body of literature investigates the effect of university characteristics on scientific 
productivity. Heinze et al. (2009) showed that the small size of a research group, sufficient access 
to the various technical skills, and an appropriate leadership all result in an improvement in research 
productivity. Similarly, Carayol and Matt (2006) found that in a smaller laboratory, individual 
researchers publish more, compared with individuals working in a large laboratory. Other authors 
focused on the effect of faculty size. Buchmueller et al. (1999) indicated that graduate school 
faculty size is a significant determinant of the research proficiency of graduates. Jordan et al. (1988, 
1989) suggested that research productivity is positively associated with department size but that 
the effect becomes weaker as the size increases. In contrast, Kyvik (1995) rejected both hypotheses 
that large departments are more productive and that faculty members of large departments better 
assess the research environment. 
In terms of university governance, Jordan et al. (1989) found significant evidence that private 
institutions have a greater average productivity, but Golden and Carstensen (1992) found no 
difference between public and private universities in terms of research productivity when 
controlling for research support from leading research foundations and department faculty rating. 
Golden and Carstensen argued that public and private institutions are solely different in a way that 
public institutions have a greater teaching load, which may affect scientific productivity. 
Differences between fields and context are also noted by a number of authors. Blackburn et al. 
(1978) showed that the fields of humanities and sciences have different patterns of scientific 
production. To justify the differences between disciplines, Baird (1986) for instance showed that 
large research laboratories in chemistry, the scholarly apprenticeship approach in history, and 
research over practice in psychology are important field-dependent factors in scientists’ 
productivity. In another comprehensive study, Baird (1991) referred to the productivity and citation 
                                                 
28
 The paper argues that solving the complex problem provides great benefit for the firms and organizations facing such problems. 
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pattern differences among disciplines and argues that size, internal university support and federal 
support can explain such differences. The evidence from the literature clearly suggests that 
scientific productivity may depend on academic prestige and on other control variables such as 
funding, gender, age, and university-specific characteristics. 
5.4 Section 2 - Data and methodology 
5.4.1 Data and variables 
In order to validate our two hypotheses, we built a data set based on the integration of data on 
funding and journal publications for Quebec scientists. For publications, Thompson Reuters Web 
of Science provides information on scientific articles (date of publication, journal name, authors 
and their affiliations). The dependent variable of our model therefore counts the yearly number of 
articles [nbArticle] published by an individual researcher in any given year. For each publication, 
the database also provides the number of co-authors. To control for team size, we therefore 
calculate the average number of co-authors [nbAuthors] over all the articles published by an 
individual researcher in any given year. 
In terms of funding, we use a database of Quebec university researchers (Système d’information 
sur la recherche universitaire or SIRU) gathered and combined by the Ministry of Education and 
Research. This database lists the grants and contracts information, including yearly amount, source, 
and type for the period of 2000-2012 for all Quebec university scientists29 and the title of each 
specific research project for which funding was granted. The titles of research project are being 
used to generate dummy variables identifying whether a scientist has a research chair; the title field 
clearly states: “chair in…”. As mentioned above, three types of chair are available in Canada: (1) 
industrial research chairs [dIndChair]; (2) research chairs awarded by Canadian federal granting 
councils [dGCChair ]; and (3) Canada research chairs [dCRC ]. In addition, we created a dummy 
variable [dIndGCChair ] indicating whether the scientist is an industrial chair or a chair assigned 
by Canadian federal granting councils (the combination of dIndChair and dGCChair). Finally, the 
                                                 
29
 When the funding is attributed to more than one recipient researcher, the total amount of funding is divided by the number of researchers 
in the team within the same university. The SIRU data accounts for all interuniversity transfers and funds are counted where they have 
been transferred and spent. Unfortunately, we have no means by which to sum the funds from the same grants that are transferred to other 
universities, as the reporting does not allow a match between the data.  
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dummy variable [dChair] is equal to 1 for scientists with any type of chair (the combination of 
dIndChair, dGCChair, and dCRC). Description and summary of variables are available in the 
appendices section. 
The next set of variables in the data set measures funding information. In terms of source, the 
research funding can be awarded by the public sector, the private sector, or organizations with 
social and political missions, which we classify as not-for-profit (NFP) organisations. Our research 
will concentrate on operational cost30 research funding to ensure that the three fields31 examined 
are more comparable – there is relatively little infrastructure investment in the humanities and 
social sciences compared to health sciences and the engineering and natural sciences. The three 
funding variables to be considered are therefore [PublicfundingO, PrivatefundingO, and 
NFPfundingO] for the public, private and not-for-profits sectors respectively. The funding 
variables are measured in three-year averages to smooth out large variations in yearly funding.  
In addition, age and gender of scientist are also available in dataset [Age, dFemale] and provide 
useful controls for scientific productivity, as was highlighted in the theoretical framework. This 
information was disambiguated by the Observatoire des sciences et des technologies (OST) for all 
Quebec academics.  
5.4.2 Methodology and econometrics model 
To measure the effect of ‘holding a research chair’ on a scientist’s productivity, we use a panel 
regression model where the left-hand-side (LHS) variable the number of articles [nbArticle] is a 
measure of scientific productivity. On the right-hand-side (RHS), the main independent variables 
are the research chair dummy variables described above [dIndChair, dGCChair, dCRC, 
dIndGCChair, dChair]. The other independent variables are our controls, among others age [Age], 
gender [dFemale], as well as funding, and are described in the next paragraphs. 
                                                 
30
 Research funds may serve two purposes: they may be directly used for research cost and researchers’ salary as operational costs (O) 
or indirectly help research teams in buying instruments or laboratory infrastructure (I). It is therefore possible to generate six research 
funding variables for each researcher [PublicfundingO, PublicfundingI, PrivatefundingO, PrivatefundingI, NFPfundingO, and 
NFPfundingI]. In reality, research infrastructure funding stems mainly from public sources and the private and not-for-profit sources 
(PrivatefundingI, NFPfundingI) are too sporadic, i.e. rarely different from 0, to be used effectively in our models. 
31
 We have three fields: ‘engineering and the natural sciences’, ‘health sciences’, and’ humanities, and social sciences’ 
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In terms of funding, this research only focuses on the effect of the operational budget because 
funding for the purpose of buying instruments or laboratory infrastructure does not have a regular 
pattern, implying that it depends on the research needs, field, and handiness of updated research 
instruments. Hence we only use the variables of operational costs [PublicfundingO, 
PrivatefundingO, NFPfundingO] to control for the effect of funding. We also measure the 
interactive effect of funding and holding a chair on scientific productivity in regression models to 
find out whether there is a difference between the funding effect of chair-holders and of non-chair-
holders. 
Age [Age] and its square are inserted in regression to investigate a non-linear effect of age on 
scientific productivity. We also control for university, year, and research division effect in order to 
account for any impact that our explanatory variables may not cover. For example, McGill 
University and University of Montreal (UdeM) produce more scientific publications (figure 5.132). 
In terms of research divisions, Science, Engineering, Medical Science, and Health Science (figure 
5.2) are more productive than others. We also add year dummy variables to account for year-
specific characteristics of the research system as exemplified by the evolution of article counts over 
time (figure 5.3). 
                                                 
32
 The small universities are grouped according to their active disciplines and other institutional similarities. The University of Quebec 
and Bishop University are in the same group. The second group includes "École de technologie supérieure" (ETS), "Université du Québec 
à Montréal" (UQAM), and Institut national de la recherche scientifique (INRS). 
87 
  
 
Figure 5.1: Trend of scientists’ number of articles in universities 
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Figure 5.2: Trend of scientists’ number of articles in different divisions 
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Figure 5.3: Average number of articles in each year 
The possible reason behind yearly differences is that science and research policies may change 
over time. Hence funding and institutional support may have different formats over the years. In 
addition, the norms and standards for publication and motivations for research are different across 
divisions and universities. University dummies and research division dummies may thus account 
for part of the impact on scientific productivity33. Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, 
the resulting model is given by34: 
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 The “Year 2000”, “McGill University”, and the research division of “Medical science” are selected as reference points and are thus 
the excluded dummy variables.  
34
 It should be noted that variables measuring funding and number of articles are transformed by natural logarithm function to have 
normal distribution and satisfy the necessary conditions for running regression equations. 
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It is important to note that two variables [PublicfundingO] and [nbArticle] are determined by each 
other and co-evolve over time, which is a potential source of endogeneity. As a consequence, 
ordinary least square regressions (for panel data) are biased. The main reason for this potential 
endogeneity is that scientists are assessed for public funding based on their CV and past 
productivity while at the same time, publication and research impact significantly depends on the 
funding available to researchers. We have also conducted Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for 
endogeneity, in which the residuals of the endogenous right-hand side variable (as a function of all 
exogenous variables) are put in the original panel OLS model. By showing that the coefficient of 
the residuals is significant, it is possible to conclude about existence of endogeneity35. 
Using instrumental variables (IV) is a common suggested method in literature to address 
endogeneity problems. There are two main requirements for using IVs: (1) the instruments must 
be correlated with the endogenous variable, and (2) the instruments should not be correlated with 
the error term in the main regression equation, which means that the instruments must not suffer 
from the same endogeneity problem. If there is more than one instrument for an endogenous 
variable, it is necessary to perform a two-stage regression, in which the first stage estimates the 
endogenous variable (the instrumented variable) based on a list of instrumental variables and the 
independent variables of the second-stage regression. Such an estimation removes the error term 
of the first stage and keeps the estimated amount for the second stage. Neglecting the error term of 
the endogenous variable and putting the estimated amount in the main regression equation should 
generally solve the endogeneity problem. 
A number of instruments for the amount of public funding were tested during the course of this 
research and three were retained. The number of scientists in a university [nbScientistUni] is an 
indication of university size. It is expected that a university with a higher number of scientists may 
benefit from sharing of research costs and expenditures, which reduces the need for larger amounts 
of individual funding, hence benefitting from some kind of economies of scale. 
The rank of previous funding obtained by an individual scientist can predict the future amount of 
funding. We would call this an echo effect, indicating that highly funded scientists are better able 
to find new sources of research funds in the future. The rationale behind this argument is that 
                                                 
35
 The test is reported in the note of each regression table in section 3. 
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successful researchers have an effective networking capacity (Winter et al., 2006) to generate and 
benefit from funding opportunities in a country such as Canada (Salazar and Holbrook, 2007). The 
difference between funding and rank of funding is that the rank of funding is just an ordinal variable 
and as such does not have information about amounts of funding (it meets the requirements of 
being an instruments, benefit from the panel format of the data without imposing an autoregressive 
structure to the model), while the amount of funding is informative about capacity of conducting 
original research. Therefore, we can use the rank of funding as an instrument of funding amount. 
The rank of a scientist in his/her research division in terms of three-year average amount of funding 
for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research [PubORank] is the second 
instrument retained in this research. Using the same rationale we can use the rank of a scientist in 
his/her research division in terms of three-year average number of articles [PublRank] as the third 
instrument. Regarding the mentioned instruments, in the first stage, the amount of public funding 
[PublicfundingO] is estimated by the instruments with one-year lag to avoid simultaneity problems. 
Considering the mentioned explanatory variables, the resulting model is given by: 
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In a well-specified model, the RHS variables (including instrumental variables) should not be 
highly correlated with each other. The low correlation refers to good level of independence and 
explanatory power of RHS variables. The correlation matrix is reported in the appendices section 
and the correlation coefficients are acceptable for estimating the regression equations and are thus 
appropriate choices from this point of view. 
The main purpose of this research is to show whether holding a research chair as an external support 
is important and significant in promoting scientific publication. To test the first hypothesis, it is 
sufficient to run the two-stage panel regression on the entire data set to determine whether ‘holding 
a research chair’ is a significant RHS variable, either as a real cause or a channel for other 
variables/causes. 
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According to the chair characteristics, the networking and prestige effect of ‘holding a research 
chair’ may be mixed with the effect of funding. To address this issue, we use a matching technique 
and compare two ‘chaired’ and ‘non-chaired’ scientists who have similar funding, the same gender, 
and work in the same research field as each other. Following the methodology employed by Bérubé 
and Mohnen (2009), it is possible to find pairs of chair-holders and non-chair-holders by using the 
psmatch2 command in Stata and then to remove the unmatched records. The selection is made by 
generating propensity scores and choosing the pairs of scientists with the closest scores to each 
other36. The new data set consists of ‘twin’ scientists who are similar to each other in terms of 
funding, gender, and research fields. 
Controlling with funding, gender, and research field, and keeping only the matched scientists in 
the regressions allows to disentangle the prestige effect from the funding effect of the chair and 
hence, ‘holding a research chair’ becomes a better and more informative signal for the prestige of 
scientists. In this case, the effect of ‘holding a chair’ on scientific productivity does not include 
funding effect or it is not related to the field or gender of the scientist. To test the second hypothesis, 
only matched pairs of scientists are being used in the regression analysis to identify whether 
holding a research chair has a significant effect on scientific productivity. 
One of the important stages of the matching technique consists in validating the quality of 
matching. This implies that there should be no difference between the averages of the selection 
criteria (gender, funding, and research fields) when the comparison is made between chair holders 
and non-chair holders among the matched pairs. There can however be a difference when the 
comparison is made between the original database and the matched database. Table 5.1 summarizes 
these comparisons and shows that the matching is of acceptable quality for dCRC, dIndGCChair, 
and dchair. 
                                                 
36
 According to Stata handbook, “psmatch2 implements full Mahalanobis matching and a variety of propensity score matching methods 
to adjust for pre-treatment observable differences between a group of treated and a group of untreated. By default psmatch2 calculates 
approximate standard errors on the treatment effects assuming independent observations, fixed weights, homoskedasticity of the outcome 
variable within the treated and within the control groups and that the variance of the outcome does not depend on the propensity score. 
It is very important to note that the sort order of your could affect the results when using nearest-neighbor matching on a propensity score 
estimated with categorical (non-continuous) variables. Or more in general when there are untreated with identical propensity scores” 
(http://repec.org/bocode/p/psmatch2.html). 
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Table 5.1: Mean comparison between holders and non-holders of chairs for the matched and non-
matched samples to show the quality of the matching 
 Gender Funding Field
37
 Nb. of scientists 
 NSE Health 
dCRC=1 0.2000 $463,465 0.2779 0.1661 293 
dCRC=0 (before matching) 0.2963 $85,994 0.2516 0.2262 7356 
Significance level of difference38 *** *** >0.1 ***  
dCRC=0 (after matching) 0.1023 $403,051 0.3583 0.1808 293 
Significance level of difference *** >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
      
dIndGCChair=1 0.1319 $351,835 0.743 0.0694 144 
dIndGCChair=0 (before matching) 0.2957 $95,728 0.2432 0.2268 7508 
Significance level of difference *** *** *** ***  
dIndGCChair=0 (after matching) 0.1111 $369,080 0.6944 0.0902 144 
Significance level of difference >0.1 >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
       
dchair=1 0.1809 $420,693 0.4238 0.1357 418 
dchair=0 (before matching) 0.2991 $81,953 0.2427 0.229 7231 
Significance level of difference *** *** *** ***  
dchair=0 (after matching) 0.1483 $364,117 0.4880 0.1770 418 
Significance level of difference >0.1 >0.1 >0.1 >0.1  
 
5.5 Result and discussion 
Based on the models presented in methodology section, we first need to estimate the regressions 
on the entire dataset (tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4) to show that all types of chair have a positive and 
significant effect on scientific productivity. Then, after keeping only the matched scientists in the 
dataset, who are similar to each other in terms of gender, funding, and research field, the regression 
results indicate a significant and positive result only for the Canada research chair (tables 5.5, 5.6, 
and 5.7). Industrial chairs and chairs appointed by Canada research council (NSERC, SSHRC, and 
CIHR) do not have an independent positive effect on scientific productivity. However holding any 
kind of research chair [dChair] still has significant and positive effect mainly due to higher number 
of Canada research chairs included in the dChair dummy variable. 
  
                                                 
37
 The matching is done based on the dummy variables of NSE (Natural Science and Engineering) and HEALTH (Medical and Health 
Science). The third dummy is considered as the reference point. 
38
 To find out whether two variables are indifferent, we validated three null hypotheses: inequality, greater amount, smaller amount. If 
any of the hypotheses is validated at 1%, then we can say that the difference is significant at the level of 1% (***). Otherwise, the 
difference is not significant. 
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Table 5.2: The second stage regression results over the entire sample (dCRC) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0227 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0211 *** 0.0211 *** 0.0083 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0085 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0094 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0066 *** 
 
(0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0546 *** -0.0499 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0506 *** -0.0666 *** 
 
(0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0076)  (0.0071)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0038 * -0.0039 * -0.0038 * -0.0039 * 0.0049 *** 
 
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 2.00E-05  2.10E-05  2.10E-05  2.10E-05  -1.10E-04 *** 
 
(2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4654 *** 0.4654 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4855 *** 
 
(0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dCRCit   0.2449 *** 0.2760 *** 0.2021 *** 0.2321 *** 0.2414 *** 
 
  (0.0173)  (0.0192)  (0.0192)  (0.0213)  (0.0198)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.1529 ***   -0.1358 *** -0.1311 *** 
 
    (0.0420)    (0.0420)  (0.0393)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0114 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0095 *** 
 
      (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0021)  
Constant 0.0236  -0.0166  -0.0152  -0.0156  -0.0143  0.0406  
 
(0.0557)  (0.0554)  (0.0554)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0483)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 41196 *** 41247 *** 41369.1 *** 41398.8 *** 47253.6 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1868  0.1868  0.1866  0.1867  0.2079  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5503  0.5505  0.5509  0.5511  0.5512  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7681  0.7684  0.7692  0.7695  0.7562  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 4901.85 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5.3: The second stage regression results over the entire sample (dIndGCChair) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0227 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0087 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0085 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0097 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0067 *** 
 
(0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0591 *** -0.0580 *** -0.0591 *** -0.0580 *** -0.0736 *** 
 
(0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0077)  (0.0076)  (0.0077)  (0.0071)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0054 ** -0.0054 ** -0.0054 *** -0.0054 ** 0.0038 ** 
 
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 3.30E-05 * 3.20E-05  3.30E-05 * 3.30E-05 * -1.04E-04 *** 
 
(2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4870 *** 
 
(0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dIndGCChairit   0.1084 *** 0.1207 *** 0.0762 ** 0.0886 *** 0.1157 *** 
 
  (0.0247)  (0.0264)  (0.0330)  (0.0343)  (0.0318)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.0935    -0.0926  -0.1187 * 
 
    (0.0704)    (0.0704)  (0.0657)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0043  0.0043  0.0048 * 
 
      (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0027)  
Constant 0.0236  0.0281  0.0275  0.0294  0.0288  0.0810  
 
(0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0557)  (0.0485)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 40397 *** 40403.2 *** 40426 *** 40431.8 *** 46374 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1856  0.1856  0.1857  0.1857  0.2083  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5460  0.5460  0.5461  0.5461  0.5464  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7633  0.7634  0.7634  0.7635  0.7491  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 5114.92 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5.4: The second stage regression results over the entire sample (dChair) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0227 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0082 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0085 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0089 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0059 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0065 *** 
 
(0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
dFemalei -0.0591 *** -0.0554 *** -0.0505 *** -0.0557 *** -0.0512 *** -0.0669 *** 
 
(0.0076)  (0.0075)  (0.0077)  (0.0075)  (0.0077)  (0.0072)  
Ageit -0.0054 ** -0.0040 * -0.0041 ** -0.0041 ** -0.0042 ** 0.0046 ** 
 
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  
Ageit2 3.30E-05 * 2.10E-05  2.20E-05  2.20E-05  2.20E-05  -1.09E-04 *** 
 
(2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (2.0E-05)  (1.7E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.4656 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4657 *** 0.4660 *** 0.4659 *** 0.4856 *** 
 
(0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  
dChairit   0.2091 *** 0.2315 *** 0.1761 *** 0.1985 *** 0.2112 *** 
 
  (0.0147)  (0.0162)  (0.0170)  (0.0185)  (0.0172)  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.1207 ***   -0.1099 *** -0.1132 *** 
 
    (0.0367)    (0.0368)  (0.0344)  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0071 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0066 *** 
 
      (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  
Constant 0.0236  -0.0024  -0.0015  0.0025  0.0031  0.0551  
 
(0.0557)  (0.0554)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0553)  (0.0483)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  88422  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  7660  
χ2 40352.2 *** 41140 *** 41180.3 *** 41243.4 *** 41269.6 *** 47152.8 *** 
R2 within groups 0.1854  0.1870  0.1870  0.1870  0.1870  0.2082  
R2 overall 0.5456  0.5501  0.5503  0.5505  0.5506  0.5508  
R2 between groups 0.7631  0.7677  0.7680  0.7684  0.7686  0.7554  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 10.55, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 4872.39 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5.5: The second stage regression results over matched scientists (dCRC) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0278 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0255 *** 0.0255 *** 0.0096 *** 
 
(0.0074)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0075)  (0.0037)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0032  0.0035 * 0.0035 * -0.0001  0.0000  0.0030  
 
(0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0014  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016  
 
(0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0018)  
dFemalei -0.0906 * -0.0994 * -0.0480  -0.1001 ** -0.0584  -0.1266 * 
 
(0.0514)  (0.0509)  (0.0759)  (0.0509)  (0.0761)  (0.0689)  
Ageit 0.0413 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0437 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0438 *** 0.0500 *** 
 
(0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)  (0.0096)  
Ageit2 -4.45E-04 *** -4.63E-04 *** -4.59E-04 *** -4.64E-04 *** -4.61E-04 *** -6.60E-04 *** 
 
(1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (1.1E-04)  (9.4E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.6047 *** 0.6048 *** 0.6047 *** 0.6044 *** 0.6043 *** 0.5991 *** 
 
(0.0184)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0163)  
dCRCit   0.1297 *** 0.1445 *** 0.0939 ** 0.1068 ** 0.0739 * 
 
  (0.0396)  (0.0427)  (0.0430)  (0.0464)  (0.0417)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     -0.0895    -0.0726  -0.0542  
 
    (0.0978)    (0.0982)  (0.0892)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0084 ** 0.0082 ** 0.0074 ** 
 
      (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0036)  
Constant -1.2490 *** -1.3562 *** -1.3553 *** -1.3358 *** -1.3356 *** -0.7559 *** 
 
(0.2877)  (0.2881)  (0.2881)  (0.2882  (0.2882  (0.2448)  
Number of observations 6393  6393  6393  6393  6393  6979  
Number of scientists 586  586  586  586  586  586  
χ2 3159.02 *** 3200.45 *** 3201.24 *** 3205.26 *** 3205.25 *** 3416.71 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2527  0.2533  0.2532  0.2536  0.2535  0.2521  
R2 overall 0.5332  0.5384  0.5387  0.5392  0.5394  0.5093  
R2 between groups 0.6986  0.7055  0.7060  0.7068  0.7071  0.6484  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 2, 10.9, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 323.5  and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5.6: The second stage regression results over matched scientists (dIndGCChair) 
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0384 *** 0.0383 *** 0.0381 *** 0.0393 *** 0.0392 *** 0.0171 *** 
 
(0.0093)  (0.0094)  (0.0094)  (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0049)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0042  0.0043  0.0043  0.0097 ** 0.0098 ** 0.0103 *** 
 
(0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  (0.0040)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0018  0.0018  0.0018  0.0017  0.0017  0.0023  
 
(0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0025)  
dFemalei -0.1661 ** -0.1650 * -0.1462  -0.1623 * -0.1373  -0.2138 * 
 
(0.0841)  (0.0843)  (0.1275)  (0.0845)  (0.1279)  (0.1136)  
Ageit -0.0045  -0.0044  -0.0041  -0.0039  -0.0036  0.0172  
 
(0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0144)  
Ageit2 -4.20E-05  -4.30E-05  -4.50E-05  -4.70E-05  -5.00E-05  -3.51E-04 *** 
 
(1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.7E-04)  (1.4E-04)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.5046 *** 0.5041 *** 0.5043 *** 0.5062 *** 0.5065 *** 0.5284 *** 
 
(0.0261)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0228)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.0131  -0.0097  0.0496  0.0543  0.0470  
 
  (0.0587)  (0.0610)  (0.0691)  (0.0714)  (0.0630)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.0333    -0.0441  -0.0365  
 
    (0.1677)    (0.1681)  (0.1497)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      -0.0104 ** -0.0104 ** -0.0050  
 
      (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0053)  
Constant 0.0140  0.0134  0.0072  -0.0436  -0.0516  0.0580  
 
(0.4565)  (0.4566)  (0.4578)  (0.4568)  (0.4580)  (0.3821)  
Number of observations 3234  3234  3234  3234  3234  3522  
Number of scientists 288  288  288  288  288  288  
χ2 1253.64 *** 1253.36 *** 1252.08 *** 1253.15 *** 1251.95 *** 1391.07 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2256  0.2256  0.2257  0.2261  0.2261  0.2401  
R2 overall 0.4303  0.4305  0.4306  0.4302  0.4303  0.4079  
R2 between groups 0.6001  0.6002  0.6001  0.5992  0.5992  0.5381  
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 3, 11.22, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 135.45 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
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Table 5.7: The second stage regression results over matched scientists (dChair) 
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 2, 10.87, and 12 respectively. 
The amount of χ2 for Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 411.79 and significant at level of 0.01, implying that endogeneity exists. 
 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is also done for each set of regressions separately. 
As explained before, the test first generates the residuals of “public funding” (as a function of all 
exogenous variables) and then put them in the original panel OLS model39. By showing that the 
coefficient of the residuals is significant, the test revealed the existence of endogeneity. The test is 
reported in the note of each table, indicating that coefficients of the residuals are significant. 
Our results clearly validate our first hypothesis but only partially validate our second hypothesis. 
One may question whether research chairs in general are an independent contributor to research 
productivity or whether they are simply a proxy for other known factors in literature. Considering 
                                                 
39
 For this test we use all variables that are available for regression, like variables in regression 5 of each table.  
 xtivreg1  xtivreg2  xtivreg3  xtivreg4  xtivreg5  xtreg6  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0388 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0368 *** 0.0366 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0119 *** 
 
(0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0028)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0068 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0126 *** 
 
(0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0022)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0016  0.0017  0.0017  0.0017  0.0017  0.0029  
 
(0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0015)  
dFemalei -0.1016 ** -0.1076 ** -0.0794  -0.1075 ** -0.0740  -0.1441 *** 
 
(0.0422)  (0.0419)  (0.0615)  (0.0419)  (0.0616)  (0.0554)  
Ageit 0.0187 ** 0.0204 ** 0.0202 ** 0.0209 ** 0.0206 ** 0.0380 *** 
 
(0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0079)  
Ageit2 -2.24E-04 ** -2.40E-04 *** -2.38E-04 *** -2.43E-04 *** -2.41E-04 *** -5.24E-04 *** 
 
(8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (8.9E-05)  (7.6E-05)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.5553 *** 0.5569 *** 0.5568 *** 0.5576 *** 0.5575 *** 0.5669 *** 
 
(0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0131)  
dChairit   0.1195 *** 0.1273 *** 0.1462 *** 0.1562 *** 0.1540 *** 
 
  (0.0321)  (0.0344)  (0.0353)  (0.0378)  (0.0342)  
dChairit*dFemalei     -0.0515    -0.0612  -0.0425  
 
    (0.0820)    (0.0823)  (0.0743)  
dChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      -0.0058 * -0.0059 * -0.0043  
 
      (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0030)  
Constant -0.7362 *** -0.7928 *** -0.7921 *** -0.8208 *** -0.8208 *** -0.5576 *** 
 
(0.2365)  (0.2361)  (0.2361)  (0.2366)  (0.2366)  (0.2015)  
Number of observations 9092  9092  9092  9092  9092  9928  
Number of scientists 836  836  836  836  836  836  
χ2 4290.62 *** 4334.55 *** 4333.85 *** 4336.14 *** 4335.52 *** 4721.13 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2426  0.2437  0.2436  0.2441  0.2441  0.2516  
R2 overall 0.5054  0.5097  0.5098  0.5095  0.5097  0.4877  
R2 between groups 0.6817  0.6872  0.6874  0.6865  0.6867  0.6388  
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the literature and mentioned mission or mandate of research chairs, it is possible to argue that 
holding a chair increases the amount of funding available to scientists. 
In our second hypothesis, we make a distinction between the effect of funding and holding a 
research chair. By matching pairs of chair holders and non-chair-holders who are similar to each 
other in terms of funding, gender, and research field, we can investigate other aspects of the impact 
of holding chair such as collaborating with brilliant talents. By estimating the regression model 
only on matched pairs of scientists, holding a chair cannot be a proxy for the matching criteria 
(funding, gender, and research field) anymore. Considering tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7, we can verify 
hypothesis 2 for industrial chairs and research chairs appointed by federal granting councils but 
this hypothesis cannot be validated for the ‘Canada research chairs’ because its effect is still 
positive and significant even after matching. In other words, same gender holders of Canada 
research chairs with equivalent funding and in the same research field as other scientists still 
generate a greater number of articles than these other scientists.  
A number of factors can contribute to explaining this finding. The first is that the Canada research 
chair intends to be a prestigious research sign in Canada. Based on its mandate, the Canada research 
chair program aims to attract and retain some of most accomplished and promising minds in the 
world and it is awarded to scientists from all disciplines including engineering and the natural 
sciences, health sciences, humanities, and social sciences. It is more prestigious than any other 
research chairs, with the exception perhaps of the newly introduced Canada research excellence 
chairs, and the holders are expected to be more capable in expanding their collaborative research. 
Other scientists may also have more willingness to conduct collaborative research with the Canada 
research chair holders. In addition, the Canada research chair programme grants more visibility to 
the chair-holders and they can recruit more talented students and researchers. 
The second explanation is that industrial chairs are appointed by firms to promote research and its 
application, probably with major benefits to the firms themselves and as such, serve an entirely 
different purpose. In other words, this type of chair is not necessarily and originally designed for 
the sake of scientific publication. The chairs appointed by research councils may have quite similar 
characteristics. Looking at these chairs’ description, most of chair holders are appointed as 
industrial chair, partly funded by industry and by the relevant granting council. There is some 
evidence in the literature indicating that industrial funding forces researchers to shift to more 
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applied research, neglecting their normative responsibilities for knowledge development (Geuna 
and Nesta, 2003; Partha and David, 1994). 
In addition to the effect of holding a chair on scientific productivity, there are also some interesting 
results regarding the control variables in econometric model. Funding from different sources is 
always a positive and significant determinant of scientific productivity before matching40. After 
matching, however, the positive effect of funding is only significant for public funding and private 
funding. We also consider the effect of interaction between “holding a chair” and the amount of 
funding. From a technical point of view, it is not possible to estimate the interactive effect with an 
endogenous variable in 2SLS models because its amount is estimated in the first stage and we are 
not using the raw value reported in dataset. However, we can estimate the effect of the interaction 
of holding a chair with private funding41. 
The effect of this interactive variable is positive and significant for dCRC before and after 
matching. This suggests that private funding contributes to helping Canada research chair-holder 
increase their scientific productivity. In contrast, the funding and chair interaction is not significant 
for dIndGCChair before matching but negative and significant after matching, hence implying that 
both chair-holders and non-chair-holders positively benefit from private funding before matching 
but after matching this effect disappears. The same story is valid for dChair. The interactive effect 
of dChair and private funding is positive before matching but negative after matching. Looking 
precisely at the numbers, the results reveal that private funding has a positive effect before 
matching but its positive effect is be weakened or even disappears after matching (the combined 
effect of private funding with its interactive effect is shown in figure 5.4 for dIndGCChair and 
dChair after matching). 
                                                 
40
 Funding from the private sector and funding from the not-for-profit sector are directly put in the regression equation while funding 
from the public sector is first estimated by the instrumental variables and then inserted into the regression model. The first stage model 
regressions, reported in the appendices section, show the significant role of instrumental variables. 
41
 The interaction with between the chair dummy variables and not-for-profit funding was tested and was never significant.  
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of private funding effect on scientific productivity for different values of 
dIndGCChair and dChair 
 
Considering the fact that industrial chairs are partially funded by the private sector, we suspect that 
more private funding for industrial chair-holders may detract the chair holder from scientific 
traditional outputs and towards non-scientific and/or more technological and applied outputs such 
as patents. The negative effect of private funding on scientific productivity finds some echo in the 
literature (Goldfarb, 2008; Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). 
The gender of a scientist has a negative and significant impact, implying that women are less likely 
to publish than men, another result vastly supported in the literature (Kyvik and Teigen, 1996; 
Leahey, 2006a; Long, 1990). In terms of interaction between chair and gender, we would argue 
that before matching, this interactive effect is negative and significant for dCRC and dChair but is 
non-significant after matching. This would tend to suggest that in general a female scientist may 
benefit less from holding a chair than her male colleagues. But when only matched pairs are kept 
in the dataset, the higher scientific productivity of male chair-holder compared to male non-chair-
holder is not different from that of their female colleagues. 
The age of the scientists seems to affect scientific productivity negatively before matching and with 
an inverted-U shape pattern (with a peak around 48 years old) after matching. Such life-cycle and 
investment motivated behaviour is acknowledged in the literature (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; 
The effect of private funding
for non-IndGCChair after
matching (slope=0.0097)
The effect of private funding
for IndGCChair after matching
(slope= -0.0007)
The effect of private funding
for non-dChair after matching
(slope=0.0097)
The effect of private funding
for non-dChair after matching
(slope=0.0039)
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Diamond, 1986; Levin and Stephan, 1991). Age loses its significance when scientist pairs are 
matched based on dIndGCChair, possibly because of smaller size of data for this chair. The results 
for panel OLS regression are also provided to show that the results of our paper are robust enough 
(the sixth row of each table). 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we show that holding a research chair is a significant determinant of scientific 
publication when the regression is run over the entire data set of Quebec scientists. As previously 
explained, a distinction should be made to clarify different attributes of research chairs and their 
effect on scientific productivity. For instance, the research chair comes with its own funds so the 
question of interest is whether we can find a positive effect of research chairs on scientific 
productivity after controlling for the funding obtained by the chair holder. To investigate this 
relationship, we applied a matching technique to control for gender, funding and research field of 
chair and non-chair holders. This may indicate whether the effect of holding a research chair on 
scientific productivity is still significant after controlling for the mentioned attributes.  
After such matching, the results show that the effect of the Canada research chair program on 
scientific productivity remains significant and positive while the effect of industrial chairs and the 
chairs appointed by Canada federal granting council (NSERC, and CIHR) become non-significant. 
This finding highlights the special attributes of the Canada research chair program, which are not 
replicated in other chairs. Those specific attributes may significantly push scientific productivity. 
Among others, Canada research chairs are generally associated with some degree of prestige or 
higher visibility to recruit talented students or to have research collaboration with top scientists in 
the field. The fact that other types of research chairs, once matched with equivalent scientists, do 
not have an impact on scientific output in terms of quantity, implies not that these chair holders are 
lesser scientists, but that they are devoting part of their time to other endeavours of a more practical 
nature. Hence universities are maintaining a balance between the pursuit of pure scientific 
knowledge and its application to socio-economic benefits. We are not going to shock anyone by 
stating that by solely studying scientific articles, we are missing a great deal of the role of university 
professors. Although not trivial, future research should aim to cast a wider net on outputs, outcomes 
and impacts of university research. 
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Our research has a number of limitations. First, the data has a number of missing entries, 
particularly regarding gender and age, there may be some selection bias introduced by this missing 
information. Second, our study only covers the province of Quebec and may not be generalised to 
other parts of the world. Third, in the 2SLS model, we used instruments for public funding, which 
were the best possible and accessible variables at the time of the study but there may be better 
instruments such as the size of the department or of the research group. Fourth, we used the number 
of articles as a measure of scientific productivity, which is appropriate but it cannot completely 
reflect the productivity of scientists. In addition, the Web of Science does not cover adequately the 
social sciences and humanities fields.  
Let us now make a few suggestions for further studies. The first suggestion is to make a qualitative 
analysis on the attributes of the research chairs. Gathering data from interviews with chair-holders 
or surveys filled up by experts would shed some light on how holding a research chair contributes 
to scientific productivity. Such qualitative work could help investigate the effect of research chair 
from a social or psychological point of view. Moreover, it would also be possible to find the 
institutional effect of the research chairs or the impact of peripheral institutional settings on the 
productivity of research chairs. 
The second suggestion is to make a comparison between the short-term and long-term effect of 
research chairs on scientific productivity. Although we understand that some types of research 
chairs may not have a significant effect on scientific publication (a short-term effect), our research 
did not make any investigation on how they form networks and accumulate research skills for 
future studies or how the chairs train the next generation of scientists. 
Finally, a third suggestion would be to investigate other types of outputs for research chairs which 
are not devoted to purely academic endeavours but aimed at a more applied impact. The results for 
the impact of these types of chairs may be completely different. Our research is therefore limited 
by the variables used to measure output (of a purely scientific nature). 
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 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, we investigated the main determinants of scientific production and research impact. 
Scientific production is measured by the number of articles and research impact is quantified by 
the citation count. To do so, we have integrated the data sets of researchers funding and publication 
in the province of Quebec. We have access to Thomson Reuters Web of Science database on 
scientific articles (2000-2012), which includes information about date of publication, journal name, 
authors, affiliations, and number of citation each article receives. Funding information of scientists 
comes from the Quebec University Research Information System (Système d’information sur la 
recherche universitaire or SIRU) of the Ministry of Education and Research (MELS). This database 
reports funding information including grants and contracts of all Quebec academics, on a yearly 
basis during the period 1985-2012. The age and gender of scientists was obtained from the MELS 
internal database. 
In identifying the main determinants, we have used a two-stage regressions to address endogeneity 
issue in our papers. The amount of funding received and the number of articles published are co-
evolved and determined by each other simultaneously. Such co-determination is a potential source 
of endogeneity, which biases the result of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The main 
explanation for such endogeneity is that the scientists are evaluated for public funding contest based 
on their CV and past effectiveness, while at the same time, publication and research impact depends 
on the funding capability of researchers. 
Using instrumental variables (IV) is a common method in literature to deal with endogeneity issues. 
Instruments are required to be correlated with the endogenous variable, and should not be 
correlated with the error term in the main regression equation, which means that instruments should 
not induce another source of endogeneity. If there is more than one instrument, the endogenous 
variable is being estimated in a first-stage regression based on a list of instruments. Such estimation 
removes the error term (source of endogeneity) and keeps the estimated amount for the second 
stage. 
In the first stage, the amount of public funding [ln(PublicfundingO)] is estimated by the following 
variables: (1) the number of articles is an important factor that measures the past productivity of 
scientists [ln(nbArticleAvg3)] as it is the main component of one’s CV; (2) infrastructure related 
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public funding is a proxy indicating how much a scientist is equipped to conduct research in the 
frontier of knowledge [ln(PublicfundingO)] ; (3) age and its square, which generally measures the 
a scientist’ research experience [Age, Age2].  
As discussed in chapter 3, there is still a controversial debate in the literature about using citations 
as a measure research impact. Based on Aksnes (2006), citation counts correlate with own 
assessments of authors about their scientific contribution. However, the author notes that citation 
counts are not reliable at the level of the individual article and average citation rate of the discipline 
is a more robust measure than the journal’s one. Citations are nonetheless a useful indicator for 
assessing the ranking of scientist (Radicchi et al., 2009). 
In a different study, Kostoff (1998) argues that every citation comes from the combination of two 
main reasons: the real component of intellectual heritage and random components of self-interest. 
The author notes that the random effect exists but it disappears in the aggregation of citation counts 
and therefore the number of citations is a good measure for the “impact” of research. Phelan (1999) 
provides the same justification. 
Some warning are however given by Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff (1989) about the use of 
citation count as a measure of research impact. The authors note that an article is being cited either 
to make a linkage with the current literature or to be used as an evidence for the line of reasoning 
in the paper. Therefore, a cited paper may be used in the citing papers with distinctive purposes 
and implications. 
Moed et al. (1985) also argue that citations just refer to the impact and are not an indicator of 
research impact. Any publication should nonetheless have a minimal quality to generate a research 
impact. For instance, the visibility of journals and the extent to which researchers provide a public 
service are two factors that positively affect the citation but they are not a real and significant 
determinants of research impact. Furthermore, Olson et al. (2002) claim that even peer reviewed 
publications do not guarantee a minimum research impact because for example in medical fields, 
there is a bias for publishing research with positive results. 
Assuming the number of citations as a measure for research impact, there are different determinants 
for the number of citations. First, our regressions show that scientific publications of female 
scientists are cited similarly as men’s publication because the gender variable is not a significant 
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determinant except for the research domain of humanities (it is mainly due to the small sample size 
of that domain). However, this contrasts with some evidence in the literature that points towards 
the relative under-performance of women in terms of number of articles and research impact. 
A greater visibility of scientists, as determined by their number of articles or by the journal impact 
factor, is associated with a greater number of citations. In addition to the separate assessment of 
the effect of the number of articles or journal impact factor, our regression models have also tested 
the collaborative effect. 
The regression shows that a higher number of articles in higher impact factor journals results in 
more citations than the same number of articles in less prestigious journals. The policy implication 
of our results should be to encourage scientists to publish in journals with a high impact factor, 
mainly because articles in theses journals are widely read and used by the scientific community. 
The journal impact factor is also a proxy for research impact because such journals have more 
paper submissions and editors have more options to choose higher impact papers. 
The results also show that articles with more authors are generally more likely to be cited. The 
possible reasons behind this finding are related to the benefits of collective work, which increase 
the research impact, knowledge spillover or tacit knowledge transfer. The effect of the funding 
amount on the number of citations is domain dependent in a sense that in some domains it is 
insignificant and in some domains it is positive and significant. This non-significance does not 
necessarily imply that funding is ineffective for scientific productivity because the model just 
investigates the number of citations (not the number of articles). Considering the mixed effect of 
funding on the number of citations, which depends on the research domain, it is possible to propose 
domain-specific policies to improve the effectiveness of research funding on the number of 
citations. 
In chapter 4, a contract theory model is developed to predict the effect of collaboration with star 
scientists. This model explains the cost-benefit process of a researcher in publishing a paper. We 
first reviewed distinctive definitions of star scientists in the literature. Both the effects of funding 
and collaboration on scientific productivity have been examined in literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, there is not a comprehensive study on the effect of collaborators’ funding on 
scientific productivity. Based on the known correlation between funding and scientific 
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productivity, we consider funding as a proxy for being star. We have introduced our definitions of 
star scientists as those in the top 25%, top 10%, or top 5% in terms of total funding, funding from 
the public sector, and funding from the private sector. 
Having adequate funds is a necessary condition for researchers to buy instruments and hire research 
assistants in order to follow new ideas and conduct research at the frontier of knowledge. The 
results showed that collaboration with top funded scientists significantly contribute to the scientific 
productivity. Among different reasons, top funded scientists may have advanced and updated 
research tools and equipment that can improve scientific productivity. In addition, such 
collaboration may increase knowledge transfer, getting valuable experience, and learning new 
skills.  
Economies of scale are the second possible reason justifying our results. The per-unit fixed cost of 
shared resources (for instance the cost of laboratory equipment) is lower in the case of research 
collaboration, which decreases the marginal cost of publication. The third explanation is related to 
the fact that researcher with more fund can have access to modern and up-to-date instrumentation. 
This leads to more options for conducting research. Neumann and Finaly-Neumann (1990) argued 
that research publication is directly influenced by support such as research instruments. 
Chapter 5 exclusively investigated the effect of holding a research chair on scientific productivity. 
According to the chair features, the networking and prestige effect of ‘holding a research chair’ 
may be mixed with the effect of funding. It is possible to separate the two mentioned effect by 
comparing two ‘chaired’ and ‘non-chaired’ scientists who have similar funding, the same gender, 
and work in the same research field as each other (matching techniques). Matching chair and non-
chair can be made by generating propensity scores and choosing the pairs of scientists with the 
closest scores to each other. 
One of the important steps in matching technique is to control the quality of matching. This means 
that there should be no difference between the averages of the selection criteria (gender, funding, 
and research fields) when the comparison is made between chair holders and non-chair holders 
among the matched pairs. There can however be a difference when the comparison is made between 
the original database and the matched database. In chapter 5, we showed that the matching process 
has acceptable quality. 
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According to the matching technique, the regression models were first run on the entire dataset, 
which show that all types of chair have a positive and significant effect on scientific productivity. 
However, after matching when only matched scientists (who are similar to each other in terms of 
gender, funding, and research domain) are kept in the dataset, the regression results reveal a 
significant and positive result only for the Canada research chair while industrial chairs and chairs 
appointed by Canada research council (NSERC, SSHRC, and CIHR) become insignificant.  We 
aimed to make a distinction between the effect of exclusive funding of chair and the effect of other 
attributes of holding a research chair.  This aim is met when we compared two chair and non-chair 
scientists with the same amount of funding.  
To investigate reason behind this observation, it is possible to argue that the Canada research chair 
is designed to be a prestigious research sign in Canada to attract and retain some of most 
accomplished and promising minds in the world. It stresses on the research expertise and capability. 
Moreover, it has more prestige than any other research chairs, which may lead to more visibility. 
Another difference between Canada research chair and other types of chair is that industrial chairs 
are appointed by firms to promote research and its application related to firm, which is not 
necessarily aimed for the sake of scientific publication while Canada research chairs are appointed 
by independent selection committee, in which conducting high quality research is one of the most 
important criteria. 
Holding a research chair may also affect other determinants of scientific productivity. For instance, 
the positive effect of private funding is higher for Canada research chair-holders. There is also 
some sort of interaction between holding a research chair and the gender of a scientist. A female 
scientist may benefit less from holding a chair than her male colleagues. However, after matching 
and keeping only matched scientists in data set, this difference disappears. 
In all of the three chapters, we introduced control variables to make the regression results more 
reliable and robust. These also deserve some remarks particularly regarding the effect of funding, 
gender, and age on scientific productivity and on research impact in our database. The effect of 
gender of a scientist is sometimes insignificant. But if it is significant, it has a negative impact, 
implying that women are less likely to publish than men, a result that is vastly supported in the 
literature (Kyvik and Teigen, 1996; Leahey, 2006a; Long, 1990). The age of a scientist also exhibits 
a significant inverted U-shaped effect. Scientists have increasing scientific productivity until a 
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specific age but their productivity drops afterward. This is similar to the earlier works explaining 
the age effect (Bernier et al., 1975; Diamond, 1986).  
Considering the size of research team, our results show scientists with more co-authors are 
expected to have more articles and better quality of research. This finding is compatible with 
evidence in literature indicating positive effect of collaboration (Johnes, 1988; Melin, 1996). To 
justify such finding, in a research team with numerous researchers, tasks are done collectively and 
cooperatively. It probably leads to knowledge spillover or tacit knowledge transfer, which increases 
the capacity and capability of researchers in conducting original research. Our model also verifies 
the effect of university and research discipline in addition to the year-specific effect on scientific 
productivity and research impact. 
In terms of funding, it does not have a major effect on the number of citations. For example, public 
funding has a positive significant effect only for science and social science. The effect of private 
funding is significant only for the medical science. The non-for-profit funding effect is not 
significant at all. The empirical and theoretical evidence in literature supporting the positive effect 
of funding on productivity of scientists are known, but our results indicate that higher funding does 
not necessarily results in publications which are more cited. This does not contradict the positive 
effect of funding on scientific productivity but it indicates that higher funding is not a determinant 
of article citation counts. 
In terms of scientific productivity, our results indicate the positive effect of funding on the number 
of articles. All types of funding from different sources (funding from the public, private, and not-
for-profit sectors) are all positively and significantly increase the number of scientific publications: 
the more funded the scientists are the more articles they publish. As a simple justification, it is 
possible to argue that sufficient financial support is a necessary condition for researchers to buy 
instruments and hire assistants in order to follow new ideas and conduct research at the frontier of 
knowledge. Our findings hence echo past studies in terms of public funding (Feldman and Graddy-
Reed, 2013; Salter and Martin, 2001) and private funding (Manjarrés-Henríquez et al., 2009; 
Manjarrés-Henríquez et al., 2008). 
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 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis studied the determinants of number of citations, the effect of having a research 
collaboration with top-funded scientists on scientific productivity, and the effect of holding a 
research chair on scientific productivity. In chapter 3 we have concluded that the number of articles 
and the visibility of a researcher, the impact factor of the journal, the size of the research team, and 
the institutional setting of the university are the important determinants of citation counts. 
However, we have found that there is no significant effect of public funding and gender in most of 
the domains examined. 
Assuming that the number of citations is a good measure for research impact and, in turn, for a 
certain kind of quality, we proposed some policy advice to address the issues discussed in the 
chapter. First, it seems that collaborative works (measured by the size of research team) can 
influence the impact of the research, and policy makers should therefore encourage research of a 
more collaborative nature. The measure of such research collaboration is not only limited to the 
number of authors in each articles but can also measure the quality, extent, and durability of 
collaboration. However, the only variable we have on hand, which measure the research 
collaboration, is the number of individuals in the authors list. 
Second, the significance level of the funding effect on research impact (which is not the same for 
all domains) does not necessarily imply that funding is ineffective for the knowledge production 
process/chain – this paper only investigates researchers’ scientific impact and not their research 
productivity, which his considered as an input here. There is strong evidence in the literature about 
the significant effect of different funding types on scientific productivity (Manjarrés-Henríquez et 
al., 2008; Pavitt, 2001; Salter and Martin, 2001) to which our research contributes: public funding 
has a positive and significant effect for “Science” and “Social Science”, while the private funding 
effect is positive and significant for “Science” and “Medical Science”. These results point towards 
domain-specific policies and incentives because the effect of funding is domain-dependent, ceteris 
paribus. Hence a domain-specific policy can be an effective tool for improving the research impact 
in specific domains, without the need for general policy making, which may require holistic 
manipulation of science policy. 
The third policy implication is to incentivise researchers to publish in journals with a high impact 
factor. Such journals have more visibility and their articles are widely read and used by the 
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scientific community, more so than articles in other journals with lower impact factors. Moreover, 
the impact factor of a journal is a proxy for research impact because journals with higher impact 
factor have more submissions and editors are able to choose higher quality papers. Although a 
greater number of articles in the past contributes to improving the visibility of articles in the future 
(and hence their perceived research impact), the positive and significant effect of the interactive 
variable, which measures the modulating effect of the number of articles on the journal impact 
factor, on research impact implies that past articles in journals with a higher impact factor can 
reflect the intrinsic research impact of individuals. We can also argue that there is a learning 
experience from the past collaboration, especially if that collaboration led to a highly cited paper. 
The last but not the least, our research did not find any gender bias in terms of research impact 
(except for the domain of Humanities). This contrasts with some evidence in the literature that 
points towards the relative under-performance of women in terms of number of articles and 
research impact. However, it is not possible to make a policy conclusion in this regard because 
there may be a great number of reasons that may explain why women are less cited in one specific 
domain. First, they publish less and are thus less visible. Second, there may be conscious or 
unconscious discrimination. Third, women may be involved in more multidisciplinary research that 
is harder to publish. Fourth, women may spend more time involved in other duties at university. 
Although more investigations are needed, some incentive programs can be to encourage women to 
apply for more funding, and to go to more conferences (to be more visible). In addition, mentorship 
programs should be put in place where the gap is significant. 
Chapter 4 developed a theoretical model and extract some hypotheses about the effect of 
collaboration with top-funded scientists on the scientific productivity. It then validated the 
hypotheses with empirical analysis and showed that such collaboration has a positive effect on 
scientific productivity. This significant effect may exist through different channels: transfer of tacit 
knowledge, more scientific publications, economy of scale in knowledge production because of 
better research equipment, and expanded research network. The results also verified the positive 
effect of funding, the positive effect of past networking (measured by number of co-authors), the 
inverted U-shaped effect of age, and the fewer number of publications by women compared to men. 
Considering the significant and positive effect of collaboration with top-funded scientists on 
scientific productivity, the main policy advice is to continue to promote incentives for such 
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collaborations and to maximize the benefits of such collaborations. This kind of collaboration may 
positively affect the academic productivity through different channels. As discussed above it may 
result in a substantial transfer of tacit knowledge and more scientific publications. Moreover, it 
provides benefits such as economy of scale in knowledge production because well-funded scientists 
have generally larger teams of researchers and better research equipment. The expansion of the 
research network is another reviewed benefit of such collaboration. Collaboration with top-funded 
scientists has also some interactive effects with other determinants of scientific production, which 
suggests an amplified positive impact if a researcher has a greater number of co-authors, if a 
researcher is female. In terms of interaction with private funding and NFP funding, there is not a 
systemic and structured pattern. However, some of interactive variables have positive effects. 
The main purpose of chapter 5 was to make a distinction between different attributes of research 
chairs and their effect on scientific productivity. One of the important questions is to find out 
whether a research chair still has a better scientific productivity (compared to non-chair) after 
controlling the exclusive fund of research chair. To investigate that, we employed a matching 
technique to make pairs of scientists (chair and non-chair holders) with similar gender, funding and 
research field. After such matching, we have found that the effect of the Canada research chair 
program on scientific productivity remains significant and positive while the effect of industrial 
chairs and the chairs appointed by the Canadian federal granting council (NSERC, and CIHR) 
become non-significant. This finding highlights the effectiveness of our matching technique 
methodology because before matching holding any type of chair had positive and significant effect 
on scientific productivity. 
This finding highlights the special attributes of the Canada research chair program, which are not 
replicated in other chairs. Those specific attributes may significantly push scientific productivity. 
Among others, Canada research chairs are generally associated with some degree of prestige or 
higher visibility to recruit talented students or to have research collaboration with top scientists in 
the field. The fact that other types of research chairs, once matched with equivalent scientists, do 
not have an impact on scientific output in terms of quantity, does not imply that these chair holders 
are lesser scientists, but that they are devoting part of their time to other endeavours of a more 
practical nature. Hence universities are maintaining a balance between the pursuit of pure scientific 
knowledge and its application to socio-economic benefits. We are not going to shock anyone by 
stating that by solely studying scientific articles, we are missing a great deal of the role of university 
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professors. Although not trivial, future research should aim to cast a wider net on outputs, outcomes 
and impacts of university research. 
This thesis brings some novel advancements in the analysis of scientists’ productivity. In terms of 
data set we used, there is a mix of bibliometric and funding data in an econometric study. There 
are a limited number of scientific papers that investigate the effect of funding while controlling 
other bibliometric indices. Such comprehensive empirical analysis improve the reliability and 
significance of research results. Second, we have conducted a comprehensive investigation on 
determinants of research impact and citation count. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study 
that identifies the determinants of scientific productivity and research productivity of scientist in 
the province of Quebec using comprehensive econometric analysis. This thesis provides a 
relatively comprehensive study on this topic. 
Third, we developed a theoretical model to predict the effect of collaboration with top-funded 
scientist and test the prediction with real data. Using contract theory and mechanism design 
modeling, this thesis tries to provide a theoretical prediction for empirical investigation. Last, we 
have used matching techniques to find out the influence of holding a research chair on scientific 
productivity: this technique improve the robustness and reliability of the result because it 
disentangles the prestige effect from the funding effect of the chair and hence, ‘holding a research 
chair’ becomes a better and more informative signal for the prestige of scientists. 
There are some suggestions for future works on this subject. The first paper use the number of 
citation as measure of research impact. Other measures and proxies can be used in future studies 
to check whether determinants are still significant. The second paper defines the “star” scientists 
based on the amount of funding, i.e. it identifies the top-funded scientists. As the funding of 
scientist is being determined by previous productivity and intrinsic characteristics of scientists, it 
is an appropriate proxy for research impact. However, future research can consider different 
definitions of “star scientist” to provide a more comprehensive and robust interpretation. For 
instance, star scientists can be identified based on the number of patents, the impact factor of the 
journals in which the researchers publish, and networking measure such as centrality or 
cliquishness indicators. Another suggestion for future studies is about different research methods. 
One can have a deep investigation on the nature of research collaboration and provide a taxonomy 
to explain the benefit and knowledge spillover of different types of research collaboration with star 
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scientists. This will require data gathering by surveys and questionnaires in order to have a detailed 
understating the nature of the collaboration with star scientists. 
In terms of suggestion for future studies related to the third paper, we can note about qualitative 
analysis on the attributes of the research chairs. Gathering data from interviews with chair-holders 
or surveys filled up by experts would shed some light on how holding a research chair contributes 
to scientific productivity. Such qualitative work could help investigate the effect of research chair 
from a social or psychological point of view. Moreover, it would also be possible to find the 
institutional effect of the research chairs or the impact of peripheral institutional settings on the 
productivity of research chairs.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A – VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTER 3 
Variable name Variable description 
ln(nbCitation)it 
Natural logarithm of number of citations of papers published by scientist i in year t 
(10 years following publication year) divided by the average citation rate of the papers 
published in the same year in the same discipline  
ln(PublicfundingO)it Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of public sector funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of research of researcher i 
ln(PublicfundingI)it Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of public sector funding for the purpose of buying instruments for researcher i 
ln(PrivatefundingO)it Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of private sector funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of research of researcher i 
ln(NFPfundingO)it 
Natural logarithm of three-year average up to year t of funding from not-for-profit 
institutions (NFP) for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of 
research of researcher i 
ln(nbArticle)it Natural logarithm of number of articles published in year t by researcher i 
ln(nbAuthor)it Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of number of authors in the papers of researcher i 
ln(Impactfactor)it Natural logarithm of the five-year average up to year t of journal impact factor in 
which the scientist publishes 
ln(nbArticle)it* 
ln(Impactfactor)it 
Interaction between ln(nbArticle)it and ln(Impactfactor)it: 
ln(nbArticle)it X ln(Impactfactor)it 
dFemalei Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the scientist is a woman and 0 otherwise 
Ageit Age of a researcher i at year t 
d2000, d2001, …. Dummy variables indicating the year 
ln(nbArticleAvg3)it Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of articles published by 
researcher i 
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APPENDIX B – SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CHAPTER 3 
variable Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
nbCitation 1.183177 1.74 0 74.575 
Age 50.62187 9.26 16 92 
dfemale 0.228939 0.42 0 1 
nbArticle 3.469125 3.66 0 84 
Impactfactor 1.130298 0.63 0.016 12.476 
nbAuthor 7.269147 52.02 1 3174.5 
PublicfundingO 112969.6 203169.30 0 1.01E+07 
PrivatefundingO 21543.06 96437.42 0 4077193 
NFPfundingO 21294.22 128658.50 0 8720387 
PublicfundingI 30482.68 222562.50 0 1.28E+07 
The variables are not summarized in logarithmic scale and they are raw amount. In some disciplines of Physics, there are many scientists 
involved in one project and therefore, the maximum for the number of authors is high. (No. observation: = 31,563)
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APPENDIX C – CORRELATION TABLE OF CHAPTER 3 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ln(nbCitation)it 1 1            
ln(PublicfundingI)it-1 2 0.0733 1           
Ageit 3 -0.0377 -0.1247 1          
ln(nbArticleAvg3)it-1 4 0.1945 0.2000 0.1130 1         
dFemalei 5 -0.0318 -0.1020 -0.1197 -0.1203 1        
ln(nbArticle)it 6 0.2359 0.1912 0.0136 0.6728 -0.0995 1       
ln(Impactfactor)it 7 0.4686 0.1029 -0.0440 0.2209 -0.0406 0.2192 1      
ln(nbArticle)it*ln(Impactfactor)it 8 0.4695 0.1114 -0.0409 0.2772 -0.0449 0.3005 0.9087 1     
ln(nbAuthor)it 9 0.2724 0.0039 0.0668 0.3098 0.0046 0.2898 0.2382 0.2794 1    
ln(PublicfundingO)it 10 0.0707 0.2905 -0.1044 0.2571 -0.0218 0.2347 0.1094 0.1163 -0.0002 1   
ln(PrivatefundingO)it 11 0.0723 0.1415 -0.007 0.2141 -0.1219 0.2163 0.0487 0.0550 0.1385 0.1294 1  
ln(NFPfundingO)it 12 0.1017 0.1145 -0.0603 0.2470 -0.0178 0.2339 0.1216 0.1422 0.1952 0.1963 0.2227 1 
Significant at 1% level (No. observation: 31,563) 
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APPENDIX D – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF CHAPTER 3 
Dependent variable: PublicfundingO Domain 
  A B A+B C D C+D E F G H I H+I All 
dFemalei 0.2876 *** 0.2993 * 0.4328 *** 0.2781  0.2907 ** 0.2834 *** -0.1251  0.1731  0.9591 ** -0.0572  -0.0723  -0.0683  0.1568 *** 
 
(0.1103)  (0.1687)  (0.0938)  (0.2072)  (0.1213)  (0.1064)  (0.4732)  (0.2831)  (0.3760)  (0.1405)  (0.0996)  (0.0806)  (0.0492)  
ln(nbArticle)it 0.4649 *** 0.3078 ** 0.4427 *** 0.7069 *** 0.4027 *** 0.4487 *** 0.4014  0.3092  0.2613  0.1989 *** 0.3317 *** 0.2856 *** 0.3922 *** 
 
(0.0815)  (0.1534)  (0.0725)  (0.2701)  (0.1174)  (0.1077)  (0.5902)  (0.5991)  (0.3978)  (0.0667)  (0.0562)  (0.0429)  (0.0343)  
ln(Impactfactor)it 0.6793 *** 0.1979  0.5225 *** 0.1001  0.2232  0.2232  0.2278  0.1913  0.4793  0.2884 ** 0.4161 *** 0.3557 *** 0.3085 *** 
 
(0.1670)  (0.3367)  (0.1496)  (0.4328)  (0.2017)  (0.1796)  (0.6987)  (0.6751)  (0.6336)  (0.1364)  (0.1216)  (0.0905)  (0.0658)  
ln(nbArticle)it*ln(Impactfactor)it -0.2200  -0.1469  -0.1574  0.2390  -0.0709  -0.0426  -0.2590  -0.0838  -0.3334  -0.1483  -0.2412 ** -0.1954 ** -0.1326 ** 
 
(0.1394)  (0.3063)  (0.1265)  (0.4913)  (0.2157)  (0.1947)  (0.8194)  (0.8580)  (0.7133)  (0.1231)  (0.1044)  (0.0792)  (0.0594)  
ln(nbAuthor)it -0.4378 *** -0.1446  -0.4527 *** -0.2270  0.1611 * 0.1010  0.6436 * 0.3161  -0.6015 ** -0.0372  -0.2073 *** -0.1671 *** -0.3551 *** 
 
(0.0710)  (0.1445)  (0.0639)  (0.2269)  (0.0912)  (0.0847)  (0.3632)  (0.2572)  (0.2847)  (0.0716)  (0.0456)  (0.0375)  (0.0286)  
ln(PrivatefundingO)it -0.0382 *** 0.0556 *** -0.0318 *** 0.1253 *** 0.0663 *** 0.0893 *** 0.0786  0.1491 * 0.0189  0.0962 *** 0.0676 *** 0.0776 *** 0.0267 *** 
 
(0.0082)  (0.0184)  (0.0075)  (0.0261)  (0.0191)  (0.0153)  (0.0887)  (0.0779)  (0.0475)  (0.0071)  (0.0068)  (0.0049)  (0.0038)  
ln(NFPfundingO)it 0.0895 *** 0.0451 *** 0.0800 *** 0.0897 *** 0.0490 *** 0.0568 *** 0.1222 *** 0.1051 * 0.1543 *** 0.0489 *** 0.0601 *** 0.0560 *** 0.0574 *** 
 
(0.0077)  (0.0157)  (0.0070)  (0.0247)  (0.0131)  (0.0116)  (0.0562)  (0.0589)  (0.04210  (0.0080)  (0.0066)  (0.0051)  (0.0036)  
ln(PublicfundingI)it-1 0.1217 *** 0.1007 *** 0.1191 *** 0.0719 *** 0.0769 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0089  0.0837 * 0.1662 *** 0.0666 *** 0.0754 *** 0.0717 *** 0.0927 *** 
 
(0.0088)  (0.0209)  (0.0081)  (0.0244)  (0.0129)  (0.0113)  (0.0631)  (0.0451)  (0.0568)  (0.0065)  (0.0058)  (0.0043)  (0.0036)  
Ageit 0.1304 *** 0.4570 *** 0.1872 *** 0.1685 * 0.0468  0.0370  0.5601 *** -0.1593  0.3943 ** 0.1431 *** 0.2126 *** 0.1886 *** 0.1550 *** 
 
(0.0399)  (0.0823)  (0.0359)  (0.0951)  (0.0474)  (0.0425)  (0.1889)  (0.1288)  (0.1627)  (0.0331)  (0.0296)  (0.0223)  (0.0171)  
Age2it -0.0017 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0061 *** 0.0014  -0.0041 ** -0.0016 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0018 *** 
 
(0.0004)  (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.0010)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0018)  (0.0013)  (0.0016)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
ln(nbArticleAavg3)it-1 1.5659 *** 0.8759 *** 1.4303 *** 1.1544 *** 1.1444 *** 1.1767 *** 0.8231 * 1.2543 *** -0.1928  0.6174 *** 0.7661 *** 0.7135 *** 0.9977 *** 
 
(0.0816)  (0.1489)  (0.0725)  (0.2222)  (0.1085)  (0.0969)  (0.4539)  (0.4056)  (0.3582)  (0.0663)  (0.0568)  (0.0432)  (0.0339)  
Constant  4.4273 *** -2.4294 0.2430 3.2488 *** 4.9033 ** 6.9708 *** 7.3620 *** -6.1381  11.3988 *** -0.3949  5.7952 *** 4.0233 *** 4.6705 *** 4.9276 *** 
 
(1.0653)  (2.0788)  (0.9517)  (2.3117)  (1.1890)  (1.0572)  (4.9201)  (3.2269)  (4.0890)  (0.8470)  (0.7648)  (0.5738)  (0.4411)  
Number of observations 9026  1761  10787  1071  2944  4015  253  369  547  4029  7261  11290  31563  
χ2 1770 *** 256 *** 1906 *** 277 *** 510 *** 704 *** 75 *** 63 *** 124 *** 983 *** 1490 *** 2398 *** 4942 *** 
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively – Year dummies and university dummies are significant. The definition of regression tags indicating the sample: 
A= Medical, B= Health Science, c= Business and Management, D= Social Science, E= Education, F= Humanities, G= Non-health professions, H= Engineering, I= Science. 
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APPENDIX E – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF CHAPTER 3 
Dependent variable: ln(nbCitation)  Domain 
  A B A+B C D C+D E F G H I H+I All 
dFemalei 0.0072  0.0001  0.0074  0.0229  0.0103  0.0112  -0.0644  -0.1348 * -0.0498  0.0067  -0.0245  -0.0161  -0.0049  
 
(0.0123)  (0.0201)  (0.0106)  (0.0389)  (0.0212)  (0.0186)  (0.0824)  (0.0732)  (0.0389)  (0.0297)  (0.0161)  (0.0141)  (0.0070)  
ln(nbArticle)it 0.0359 *** 0.0755 *** 0.0395 *** 0.0981 ** 0.0817 *** 0.0812 *** -0.0399  0.0416  0.0629  0.1203 *** 0.1037 *** 0.1083 *** 0.0667 *** 
 
(0.0088)  (0.0186)  (0.0080)  (0.0393)  (0.0202)  (0.0178)  (0.0853)  (0.1732)  (0.0416)  (0.0150)  (0.0134)  (0.0104)  (0.0057)  
ln(Impactfactor)it 0.2978 *** 0.2194 *** 0.2801 *** 0.3672 *** 0.2582 *** 0.2928 *** 0.2082  0.4411 ** 0.0784  0.2249 *** 0.2626 *** 0.2497 *** 0.2461 *** 
 
(0.0278)  (0.0444)  (0.0248)  (0.0687)  (0.0392)  (0.0328)  (0.1367)  (0.1770)  (0.0775)  (0.0297)  (0.0383 ) (0.0284)  (0.0154)  
ln(nbArticle)it*ln(Impactfactor)it 0.1172 *** 0.1185 *** 0.1201 *** -0.0227  0.0630  0.0362  0.2107  -0.0940  0.1817 ** 0.0641 ** 0.0899 *** 0.0800 *** 0.1100 *** 
 
(0.0220)  (0.0388)  (0.0199)  (0.0781)  (0.0412)  (0.0350)  (0.1557)  (0.2287)  (0.0811)  (0.0256)  (0.0347)  (0.0259)  (0.0137)  
ln(nbAuthor)it 0.1944 *** 0.0499 * 0.1782 *** 0.0420  0.0802 *** 0.0662 *** 0.0186  0.0596  0.1710 *** 0.1440 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0892 *** 0.1090 *** 
 
(0.0141)  (0.0279)  (0.0131)  (0.0375)  (0.0187)  (0.0167)  (0.0712)  (0.0562)  (0.0465)  (0.0214)  (0.0177)  (0.0156)  (0.0086)  
ln(PublicfundingO)it -0.0008  -0.0001  -0.0010  0.0085 * 0.0092 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0021  0.0129  -0.0014  0.0030  0.0040  0.0040  0.0001  
 
(0.0013)  (0.0029)  (0.0012)  (0.0046)  (0.0031)  (0.0025)  (0.0114)  (0.0096)  (0.0059)  (0.0036)  (0.0030)  (0.0024)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingO)it 0.0043 *** -0.0021  0.0036 *** -0.0043  0.0040  0.0022  0.0126  -0.0262 *** -0.0048  -0.0006  -0.0013  -0.0015  0.0013 ** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0025)  (0.0010)  (0.0053)  (0.0033)  (0.0029)  (0.0138)  (0.0092)  (0.0053)  (0.0018)  (0.0015)  (0.0011)  (0.0007)  
ln(NFPfundingO)it -0.0030 *** 0.0031  -0.0021 *** 0.0072  0.0041  0.0050 ** 0.0075  -0.0148  0.0066  -0.0006  0.0013  0.0010  -0.0009  
 
(0.0010)  (0.0024)  (0.0009)  (0.0044)  (0.0025)  (0.0022)  (0.0100)  (0.0118)  (0.0054)  (0.0019)  (0.0015)  (0.0012)  (0.0006)  
Constant  0.2768 *** 0.3968 *** 0.2945 *** 0.2945 *** 0.2575 *** 0.2822 *** 0.8582 *** 0.4314 ** 0.3331 ** 0.1809 *** 0.3295 *** 0.2872 *** 0.3584 *** 
 
(0.0290)  (0.0696)  (0.0269)  (0.0820)  (0.0463)  (0.0398)  (0.2167)  (0.1896)  (0.1301)  (0.0494)  (0.0429)  (0.0352)  (0.0175)  
Number of observations 10124  1954  12078  1243  3265  4508  281  420  613  4466  8089  12555  35201  
Log likelihood -4776.06  -825.66  -5675.60  -747.64  -1753.85  -2526.03  -193.77  -390.39  -345.74  -2162.48  -4108.04  -6312.27  -17887.10  
F-test .  25.34 *** 98.82 *** 21.31 *** 36.59 *** 53.31 *** 12.50 *** 57.48 *** 25.17 *** 45.19 *** 52.96 *** 84.53 *** 268.80 *** 
R2 0.32   0.25   0.31   0.28   0.26   0.26   0.33   0.28   0.28   0.22   0.24   0.24   0.27   
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively – Year dummies and university dummies are significant. The definition of regression tags indicating the sample: 
A= Medical, B= Health Science, c= Business and Management, D= Social Science, E= Education, F= Humanities, G= Non-health professions, H= Engineering, I= Science. 
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APPENDIX F – PANEL REGRESSION OF CHAPTER 3 (no endogeneity assumption) 
Dependent variable: ln(nbCitation)  Domain 
  A B A+B C D C+D E F G H I H+I All 
dFemalei 0.0061  0.0010  0.0058  0.0070  0.0100  0.0102  -0.0733  -0.1126  -0.0612  0.0009  -0.0268  -0.0183  -0.0063  
 
(0.0137)  (0.0228)  (0.0121)  (0.0375)  (0.0201)  (0.0182)  (0.0918)  (0.0708)  (0.0473)  (0.0311)  (0.0179)  (0.0157)  (0.0083)  
ln(nbArticle)it 0.0234 *** 0.0752) *** 0.0288 *** 0.0231  0.0689 *** 0.0560 *** -0.0466  0.0425  0.0819 * 0.0753  0.0741 *** 0.0732 *** 0.0438 *** 
 
(0.0087)  (0.0189)  (0.0080)  (0.0396)  (0.0190)  (0.0171)  (0.1068)  (0.1327)  (0.0479)  (0.0130)  (0.0098)  (0.0077)  (0.0049)  
ln(Impactfactor)it 0.3027 *** 0.2358 *** 0.2889 *** 0.3958 *** 0.2709 *** 0.3049 *** 0.2484 * 0.4423 *** 0.1064  0.2359 *** 0.2380 *** 0.2346 *** 0.2472 *** 
 
(0.0193)  (0.0446)  (0.0177)  (0.0640)  (0.0342)  (0.0299)  (0.1346)  (0.1628)  (0.0798)  (0.0280)  (0.0223)  (0.0173)  (0.0099)  
ln(nbArticle)it*ln(Impactfactor)it 0.0956 *** 0.0928 ** 0.0958 *** -0.0771  0.0372  0.0081  0.1043  -0.0995  0.1388  0.0523 ** 0.0782 *** 0.0704 *** 0.0859 *** 
 
(0.0163)  (0.0405)  (0.0151)  (0.0728)  (0.0369)  (0.0327)  (0.1583)  (0.2059)  (0.0918)  (0.0256)  (0.0193)  (0.0152)  (0.0090)  
ln(nbAuthor)it 0.2045 *** 0.0601 *** 0.1884 *** 0.0528  0.0853 *** 0.0751 *** 0.0308  0.0674  0.1675 *** 0.1425 *** 0.1124 *** 0.1239 *** 0.1376 *** 
 
(0.0082)  (0.0195)  (0.0076)  (0.0339)  (0.0151)  (0.0139)  (0.0712)  (0.0573)  (0.0352)  (0.0151)  (0.0083)  (0.0072)  (0.0044)  
ln(PublicfundingO)it -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0008  0.0089 * 0.0073 ** 0.0069 *** 0.0060  0.0120  -0.0039  0.0027  0.0064 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0012  
 
(0.0012)  (0.0031)  (0.0011)  (0.0048)  (0.0030)  (0.0026)  (0.0131)  (0.0124)  (0.0056)  (0.0030)  (0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0008)  
ln(PrivatefundingO)it 0.0032 *** -0.0003  0.0029 *** -0.0064  0.0027  0.0002  0.0005  -0.0240  -0.0076  -0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0011  0.0003  
 
(0.0010)  (0.0025)  (0.0009)  (0.0045)  (0.0032)  (0.0026)  (0.0180)  (0.0183)  (0.0059)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingO)it -0.0021 ** 0.0013  -0.0016 * 0.0088 ** 0.0026  0.0042 ** 0.0020  -0.0169  0.0050  0.0000  0.0010  0.0008  -0.0009  
 
(0.0009)  (0.0021)  (0.0008)  (0.0041)  (0.0022)  (0.0020)  (0.0114)  (0.0149)  (0.0055)  (0.0017)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)  
Constant  0.2690 ** 0.3782 * 0.2848 ** 0.3647 * 0.2731 ** 0.3033 ** 0.7501  0.4237  0.3376 * 0.2333 ** 0.2918 ** 0.2705 ** 0.3384 ** 
 
(0.0233)  (0.0540)  (0.0216)  (0.0793)  (0.0418)  (0.0368)  (0.1817)  (0.1739)  (0.0990)  (0.0429)  (0.0289)  (0.0240)  (0.0134)  
Number of observations 10124  1954  12078  1243  3265  4508  281  420  613  4466  8089  12555  35201  
Number of scientists 1330  313  1643  336  708  1044  111  225  191  679  1131  1810  5634  
χ2 . *** 537.41 *** 4479.74 *** 390.77 *** 923.51 *** 1258.02 *** 92.61 *** 144.61 *** 190.72 *** 880.63 *** 1841.27 *** 2734.85 *** 9506.55 *** 
Average number of years  7.61  6.24  7.35  3.70  4.61  4.32  2.53  1.87  3.21  6.58  7.15  6.94  6.25  
R2 within groups 0.25  0.19  0.23  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.25  0.23  0.19  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.17  
R2 overall 0.32  0.25  0.31  0.28  0.26  0.26  0.31  0.28  0.28  0.21  0.24  0.23  0.27  
R2 between groups 0.49   0.26   0.44   0.33   0.38   0.35   0.27   0.25   0.27   0.28   0.41   0.37   0.35   
*, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively. Year dummies and university dummies are significant. The definition of regression tags indicating the sample: 
A= Medical, B= Health Science, c= Business and Management, D= Social Science, E= Education, F= Humanities, G= Non-health professions, H= Engineering, I= Science. 
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APPENDIX G – VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTER 442 
Variable name Variable description 
ColT90it and ColT95it  Dummy variables taking the value 1 if any of the coauthors of researcher i is 
amongst top funded scientists (top 10% and top 5% of total funding respectively) 
ColPub90it and ColPub95it  Dummy variables taking the value 1 if any of the coauthors of researcher i is 
amongst top funded scientists (top 10% and top 5% of public funding respectively) 
ColPriv90it, and ColPriv95it Dummy variables taking the value 1 if any of the coauthors of researcher i is 
amongst top funded scientists (top 10% and top 5% of private funding respectively) 
ln(PublicfundingOit) 
Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of public sector funding 
for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of research of 
researcher i 
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 
Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of private sector funding 
for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of research of 
researcher i 
ln(NFPfundingOit) 
Natural logarithm of three-year average up to year t of funding from not-for-profit 
institutions (NFP) for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of 
research of researcher i 
ln(nbArticleit) Natural logarithm of the yearly number of articles published in year t by researcher i 
ln(nbAuthorit) Natural logarithm of the three-year average of number of authors in the papers of 
researcher i 
PubORankit Normalized rank of researcher i in the field in terms of three-year average of funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research 
nbScientistUniit Number of scientists in the university and division43 of researcher i 
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 
Natural logarithm of the three-year average up to year t of public sector funding 
for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditures of research, which is 
aggregated over cluster44 of researcher i 
Ageit Age of researcher i in year t 
dFemalei Dummy variable taking the value 1 if researcher i is a woman and 0 otherwise 
dULavali, dUMcGilli, …, 
dUdeMi Dummy variables indicating the university affiliation of researcher i 
dMedicali, dHumanitiesi, …, 
dSciencei Dummy variables indicating the field of researcher i 
d2000, d2001, …., d2012 Dummy variables indicating the year 
 
                                                 
42
 Some variables are transformed by natural logarithm function to be normal variables and satisfy the necessary conditions for the right 
hand side variables of the regression equations. 
43
 There are 9 divisions of  Basic Medical Sciences, Business & Management, Education, Engineering, Health Sciences, Humanities, 
Non-Health Professional, Sciences, and Social Sciences 
44
 Cluster is more detail categorization of researchers. There are 42 clusters of Agricultural & Food Sciences, Anthropology, Archaeology 
& Sociology, Biology & Botany, Business, Chemical Engineering, Chemistry, Civil Engineering, Computer & Information Science, 
Dentistry, Earth & Ocean Sciences, Economics, Education, Electrical & Computer Engineering, Fine & Performing Arts, Foreign 
Languages Literature, Linguistic, French/English, General Medicine, Geography, History, Kinesiology / Physical Education, Laboratory 
Medicine, Law & Legal Studies, Library & Information Sciences, Mathematics, Mechanical & Industrial Engineering, Media & 
Communication Studies, Medical Specialties, Nursing, Other Engineering, Other Health Sciences, Other Social Sciences & Humanities, 
Philosophy, Physics & Astronomy, Planning & Architecture, Political Science, Psychology, Public Health & Health Administration, 
Rehabilitation Therapy, Religious Studies & Vocations, Resource Management & Forestry, Social Work, and Surgical Specialties. 
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APPENDIX H – SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CHAPTER 4 
 Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
nbArticle 3.3880 3.6327 1 85 
PublicfundingO 113,648 200,875 0 10,100,000 
PrivatefundingO 21,609 96,627 0 5,508,461 
NFPfundingO 21,197 126,788 0 8,404,625 
dFemale 0.2348 0.4239 0 1 
Age 50.482 9.209 16 92 
nbAuthor 6.0821 34.6297 0.3333 2063.646 
PubORank 0.6704 0.2314 0.0010 1 
totPublicfundingOcluster 31,600,000 32,000,000 73615 121,000,000 
nbScientistUni 452.84 446.59 5 1604 
ColT90 0.4113 0.4921 0 1 
ColT95 0.2766 0.4473 0 1 
ColPub90 0.4113 0.4921 0 1 
ColPub95 0.2712 0.4446 0 1 
ColPriv90 0.3331 0.4713 0 1 
ColPriv95 0.2165 0.4119 0 1 
The variables are not summarized in logarithmic scale and they are raw amount. In some disciplines of Physics, there are many scientists 
involved in one project and therefore, the maximum for the number of authors is high. (No. observation: 32,299)
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APPENDIX I – CORRELATION TABLE OF CHAPTER 4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ln(nbArticle) 1 1 
ln(PublicfundingO) 2 0.2240 1
ln(PrivatefundingO) 3 0.2205 0.0958 1
ln(NFPfundingO) 4 0.2343 0.1647 0.2194 1
dFemale 5 -0.1088 -0.0265 -0.131 -0.0217 1
Age 6 0.0218 -0.0714 0.0072 -0.0462 -0.1185 1
ln(nbAuthor) 7 0.4026 0.0578 0.185 0.2339 -0.0446 0.0772 1
PubORank 8 0.2963 0.6635 0.1391 0.2050 -0.0349 0.0230 0.1483 1
ln(totPublicfundingOcluster) 9 0.2078 0.0639 0.1278 0.2492 -0.0228 0.0425 0.3552 0.0438 1
ln(nbScientistUni) 10 0.0711 -0.1094 0.0676 0.1021 -0.0239 0.0872 0.1974 0.0006 0.1830 1
ColT90 11 0.3788 0.1895 0.2532 0.2808 -0.0436 -0.0132 0.3616 0.2673 0.2508 0.1053
ColT95 12 0.3537 0.1586 0.2339 0.2494 -0.0411 -0.0082 0.3216 0.2213 0.2313 0.0942
ColPub90 13 0.3727 0.2261 0.1900 0.2266 -0.0305 -0.0143 0.3299 0.3084 0.2304 0.0891
ColPub95 14 0.3459 0.1922 0.1711 0.2028 -0.0322 -0.0158 0.2905 0.2536 0.2053 0.0752
ColPriv90 15 0.3133 0.0428 0.4560 0.2034 -0.0638 -0.0178 0.2874 0.0859 0.1990 0.1038
ColPriv95 16 0.2857 0.0349 0.3821 0.1847 -0.0502 -0.0236 0.2646 0.0690 0.1763 0.1046
 
 
 
 
 11 12 13 14 15 16
ColT90 11 1 
ColT95 12 0.7399 1
ColPub90 13 0.7934 0.6522 1
ColPub95 14 0.7299 0.7943 0.7299 1
ColPriv90 15 0.5070 0.4803 0.3887 0.3801 1
ColPriv95 16 0.4910 0.4996 0.3497 0.3660 0.7437 1
Significant at 1% level (No. observations = 32,299) 
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APPENDIX J – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.1 
Dependent Var: PublicfundingO (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei 0.0676  0.0672  0.0674  0.0681  0.0644  0.0648  
 
0.0466  0.0464  0.0465  0.0461  0.0467  0.0466  
Ageit 0.0272 ** 0.0276 ** 0.0260 ** 0.0265 ** 0.0290 ** 0.0287 ** 
 
0.0138  0.0138  0.0138  0.0137  0.0138  0.0138  
Ageit2 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
ln(nbAuthorit) -0.0659 ** -0.0609 ** -0.0687 ** -0.0661 ** -0.0449 * -0.0474 * 
 
0.0267  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0081 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0090 *** 
 
0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0029  0.0029  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0150 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0160 *** 0.0159 *** 
 
0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  
PubORankit 7.4159 *** 7.4413 *** 7.4071 *** 7.4412 *** 7.4442 *** 7.4472 *** 
 
0.0612  0.0610  0.0613  0.0610  0.0610  0.0610  
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 0.2871 *** 0.2885 *** 0.2840 *** 0.2866 *** 0.2918 *** 0.2915 *** 
 
0.0369  0.0367  0.0368  0.0365  0.0369  0.0368  
ln(nbScientistUniit) -0.3863 *** -0.3856 *** -0.3865 *** -0.3851 *** -0.3855 *** -0.3856 *** 
 
0.0298  0.0296  0.0297  0.0294  0.0298  0.0297  
ColT90it 0.1126 ***           
 
0.0230            
ColT95it   0.0813 ***         
 
  0.0247          
ColPub90it     0.1347 ***       
 
    0.0226        
ColPub95it       0.1183 ***     
 
      0.0243      
ColPriv90it         -0.0349    
 
        0.0240    
ColPriv95it           -0.0188  
 
          0.0266  
Constant 1.8282 *** 1.7941 *** 1.9162 *** 1.8485 *** 1.7043 ** 1.7128 ** 
 
0.8048  0.8017  0.8031  0.7978  0.8050  0.8038  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
χ2 18026  18096  18097  18223  17988  18017  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX K – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.2 
Dependent Var: PublicfundingO (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei 0.0693  0.0675  0.0685  0.0682  0.0651  0.0656  
 
0.0467  0.0465  0.0465  0.0461  0.0467  0.0466  
Ageit 0.0266 ** 0.0278 ** 0.0254 ** 0.0265 ** 0.0286 ** 0.0282 ** 
 
0.0138  0.0138  0.0138  0.0137  0.0138  0.0138  
Ageit2 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
ln(nbAuthorit) -0.1447 *** -0.0809 *** -0.1530 *** -0.0910 *** -0.0753 *** -0.0931 *** 
 
0.0314  0.0294  0.0308  0.0291  0.0297  0.0285  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0082 *** 0.0081 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0081 *** 0.0099 *** 0.0093 *** 
 
0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0029  0.0029  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0151 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0160 *** 0.0160 *** 
 
0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  
PubORankit 7.4241 *** 7.4428 *** 7.4162 *** 7.4424 *** 7.4490 *** 7.4567 *** 
 
0.0612  0.0611  0.0613  0.0610  0.0610  0.0610  
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 0.2895 *** 0.2891 *** 0.2859 *** 0.2877 *** 0.2935 *** 0.2949 *** 
 
0.0369  0.0367  0.0368  0.0365  0.0369  0.0368  
ln(nbScientistUniit) -0.3844 *** -0.3850 *** -0.3845 *** -0.3843 *** -0.3846 *** -0.3843 *** 
 
0.0298  0.0296  0.0296  0.0294  0.0298  0.0297  
ColT90it -0.2042 ***           
 
0.0704            
ColT95it   -0.0428          
 
  0.0798          
ColPub90it     -0.2173 ***       
 
    0.0687        
ColPub95it       -0.0390      
 
      0.0778      
ColPriv90it         -0.2040 ***   
 
        0.0778    
ColPriv95it           -0.4041 *** 
 
          0.0913  
ColT90it*ln(nbArticleit) 0.1898 ***           
 
0.0399            
ColT95it*ln(nbArticleit)   0.0705          
 
  0.0432          
ColPub90it*ln(nbArticleit)     0.2106 ***       
 
    0.0388        
ColPub95it*ln(nbArticleit)       0.0896 **     
 
      0.0421      
ColPriv90it*ln(nbArticleit)         0.0996 **   
 
        0.0436    
ColPriv95it*ln(nbArticleit)           0.2172 *** 
 
          0.0492  
Constant 1.8952 *** 1.8018 *** 1.9988 *** 1.8586 *** 1.7164 *** 1.7181 ** 
 
0.8050  0.8024  0.8029  0.7983  0.8050  0.8038  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
χ2 18052  18079  18141  18215  17993  18040  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX L – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.3 
Dependent Var: PublicfundingO (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei 0.0680  0.0744  0.0596  0.0771  0.0607  0.0543  
 
0.0495  0.0478  0.0493  0.0475  0.0485  0.0476  
Ageit 0.0271 ** 0.0275 ** 0.0260 ** 0.0263 ** 0.0291 ** 0.0289 ** 
 
0.0138  0.0138  0.0138  0.0137  0.0138  0.0138  
Ageit2 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
ln(nbAuthorit) -0.0663 *** -0.0612 *** -0.0692 *** -0.0666 *** -0.0450 *** -0.0477 *** 
 
0.0267  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  0.0266  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0080 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0091 *** 
 
0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0029  0.0029  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0150 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0160 *** 0.0159 *** 
 
0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  
PubORankit 7.4178 *** 7.4430 *** 7.4107 *** 7.4433 *** 7.4449 *** 7.4479 *** 
 
0.0612  0.0610  0.0613  0.0610  0.0610  0.0610  
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 0.2871 *** 0.2883 *** 0.2841 *** 0.2864 *** 0.2917 *** 0.2914 *** 
 
0.0368  0.0367  0.0367  0.0365  0.0369  0.0368  
ln(nbScientistUniit) -0.3862 *** -0.3854 *** -0.3865 *** -0.3850 *** -0.3855 *** -0.3857 *** 
 
0.0297  0.0296  0.0296  0.0294  0.0298  0.0297  
ColT90it 0.1128 ***           
 
0.0262            
ColT95it   0.0893 ***         
 
  0.0280          
ColPub90it     0.1289 ***       
 
    0.0257        
ColPub95it       0.1282 ***     
 
      0.0276      
ColPriv90it         -0.0384    
 
        0.0269    
ColPriv95it           -0.0336  
 
          0.0298  
ColT90it*dFemalei -0.0012            
 
0.0520            
ColT95it*dFemalei   -0.0347          
 
  0.0571          
ColPub90it*dFemalei     0.0242        
 
    0.0511        
ColPub95it*dFemalei       -0.0429      
 
      0.0564      
ColPriv90it*dFemalei         0.0154    
 
        0.0548    
ColPriv95it*dFemalei           0.0684  
 
          0.0626  
Constant 1.8289 ** 1.7960 ** 1.9157 ** 1.8533 ** 1.7048 ** 1.7128 ** 
 
0.8042  0.8010  0.8021  0.7970  0.8048  0.8037  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
χ2 18042  18115  18125  18248  17991  18022  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX M – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.4 
Dependent Var: PublicfundingO (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei 0.0678  0.0674  0.0678  0.0684  0.0648  0.0651  
 
0.0464  0.0463  0.0461  0.0459  0.0467  0.0466  
Ageit 0.0270 ** 0.0273 ** 0.0255 ** 0.0261 ** 0.0290 ** 0.0287 ** 
 
0.0138  0.0138  0.0137  0.0137  0.0138  0.0138  
Ageit2 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
ln(nbAuthorit) -0.0665 *** -0.0609 *** -0.0702 *** -0.0669 *** -0.0434  -0.0464 * 
 
0.0267  0.0266  0.0266  0.0265  0.0266  0.0266  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0049  0.0059 * 0.0054  0.0067 ** 0.0057  0.0072 ** 
 
0.0036  0.0033  0.0035  0.0032  0.0036  0.0032  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0150 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0159 *** 0.0159 *** 
 
0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  0.0026  
PubORankit 7.4241 *** 7.4469 *** 7.4215 *** 7.4489 *** 7.4445 *** 7.4471 *** 
 
0.0612  0.0610  0.0612  0.0610  0.0610  0.0610  
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 0.2876 *** 0.2890 *** 0.2846 *** 0.2868 *** 0.2923 *** 0.2918 *** 
 
0.0367  0.0366  0.0365  0.0364  0.0369  0.0368  
ln(nbScientistUniit) -0.3853 *** -0.3846 *** -0.3854 *** -0.3845 *** -0.3850 *** -0.3853 *** 
 
0.0296  0.0295  0.0294  0.0293  0.0298  0.0297  
ColT90it 0.0914 ***           
 
0.0280            
ColT95it   0.0569 *         
 
  0.0312          
ColPub90it     0.1155 ***       
 
    0.0276        
ColPub95it       0.1048 ***     
 
      0.0305      
ColPriv90it         -0.0709 **   
 
        0.0309    
ColPriv95it           -0.0518  
 
          0.0369  
ColT90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0059            
 
0.0044            
ColT95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)   0.0058          
 
  0.0045          
ColPub90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)    0.0052        
 
    0.0043        
ColPub95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0033      
 
      0.0045      
ColPriv90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)        0.0085 *   
 
        0.0046    
ColPriv95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)          0.0062  
 
          0.0048  
Constant 1.8231 ** 1.7878 ** 1.9123 ** 1.8495 ** 1.6995 ** 1.7087 ** 
 
0.8022  0.8000  0.7984  0.7954  0.8049  0.8039  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
χ2 18102  18146  18232  18293  17993  18017  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX N – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.5 
Dependent Var: PublicfundingO (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei 0.0683  0.0678  0.0681  0.0687  0.0645  0.0647  
 
0.0464  0.0463  0.0462  0.0459  0.0465  0.0464  
Ageit 0.0268 ** 0.0271 ** 0.0256 * 0.0260 * 0.0288 ** 0.0287 ** 
 
0.0138  0.0137  0.0137  0.0137  0.0138  0.0138  
Ageit2 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
ln(nbAuthorit) -0.0657 ** -0.0601 ** -0.0700 *** -0.0665 ** -0.0457 * -0.0474 * 
 
0.0267  0.0266  0.0266  0.0265  0.0266  0.0266  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0077 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0095 *** 0.0089 *** 
 
0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0028  0.0029  0.0029  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0096 *** 0.0122 *** 0.0127 *** 0.0130 *** 0.0139 *** 0.0137 *** 
 
0.0034  0.0030  0.0033  0.0030  0.0031  0.0029  
PubORankit 7.4242 *** 7.4474 *** 7.4211 *** 7.4520 *** 7.4535 *** 7.4538 *** 
 
0.0612  0.0610  0.0612  0.0610  0.0609  0.0609  
ln(totPublicfundingOclusterit) 0.2875 *** 0.2888 *** 0.2843 *** 0.2871 *** 0.2921 *** 0.2918 *** 
 
0.0367  0.0366  0.0365  0.0363  0.0367  0.0367  
ln(nbScientistUniit) -0.3850 *** -0.3848 *** -0.3858 *** -0.3843 *** -0.3849 *** -0.3847 *** 
 
0.0296  0.0295  0.0294  0.0293  0.0296  0.0296  
ColT90it 0.0681 **           
 
0.0289            
ColT95it   0.0354          
 
  0.0326          
ColPub90it     0.1114 ***       
 
    0.0285        
ColPub95it       0.0807 **     
 
      0.0321      
ColPriv90it         -0.0601 **   
 
        0.0306    
ColPriv95it           -0.0626 * 
 
          0.0355  
ColT90it*ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0109 **           
 
0.0043            
ColT95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)   0.0097 **         
 
  0.0045          
ColPub90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)    0.0056        
 
    0.0042        
ColPub95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)      0.0080 *     
 
      0.0044      
ColPriv90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)        0.0055    
 
        0.0043    
ColPriv95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)          0.0088 * 
 
          0.0048  
Constant 1.8350 ** 1.8005 ** 1.9188 *** 1.8483 ** 1.7038 ** 1.7083 ** 
 
0.8021  0.7997  0.7988  0.7947  0.8022  0.8019  
Number of observations 32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  32299  
χ2 18109  18158  18219  18317  18066  18075  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively.  
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APPENDIX O – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.1 
(CLUSTERED GROUPS – NO ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0933 *** -0.0923 *** -0.0947 *** -0.0931 *** -0.0947 *** -0.0941 *** 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  
Ageit 0.0163 *** 0.0166 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0173 *** 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
Ageit2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.2444 *** 0.2514 *** 0.2466 *** 0.2533 *** 0.2644 *** 0.2683 *** 
 
(0.0054)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0289 *** 0.0303 *** 0.0267 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0352 *** 0.0351 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0103 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0076 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0090 *** 0.0096 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0114 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.2462 ***           
 
(0.0060)            
ColT95it   0.2566 ***         
 
  (0.0064)          
ColPub90it     0.2520 ***       
 
    (0.0058)        
ColPub95it       0.2626 ***     
 
      (0.0063)      
ColPriv90it         0.2239 ***   
 
        (0.0065)    
ColPriv95it           0.2241 *** 
 
          (0.0071)  
Constant 0.0985  0.0999  0.1309  0.1157 * 0.0012  0.0217  
 
(0.0630)  (0.0631)  (0.0629)  (0.0630)  (0.0634)  (0.0636)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Log likelihood -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  
Aikaike information criterion 49475  49574  49299  49445  49963  50154  
Bayesian information criterion 49755  49854  49579  49725  50243  50434  
R2 0.2831  0.2811  0.2866  0.2837  0.2732  0.2693  
Adjusted R2 0.2825  0.2805  0.2860  0.2831  0.2726  0.2687  
F-test 439  435  447  441  418  410  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX P – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.2 
(CLUSTERED GROUPS – NO ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0934 *** -0.0924 *** -0.0945 *** -0.0930 *** -0.0947 *** -0.0944 *** 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  
Ageit 0.0163 *** 0.0165 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0164 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0173 *** 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
Ageit2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.2468 *** 0.2599 *** 0.2347 *** 0.2486 *** 0.2643 *** 0.2786 *** 
 
(0.0067)  (0.0061)  (0.0066)  (0.0061)  (0.00610  (0.0059)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0289 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0352 *** 0.0350 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0103 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0076 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0090 *** 0.0096 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0114 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.2559 ***           
 
(0.0179)            
ColT95it   0.3123 ***         
 
  (0.0208)          
ColPub90it     0.2016 ***       
 
    (0.0176)        
ColPub95it       0.2310 ***     
 
      (0.0205)      
ColPriv90it         0.2231 ***   
 
        (0.0197)    
ColPriv95it           0.3182 *** 
 
          (0.0232)  
ColT90it*ln(nbAuthorit) -0.0058 ***           
 
(0.0101)            
ColT95it*ln(nbAuthorit)   -0.0313 ***         
 
  (0.0111)          
ColPub90it*ln(nbAuthorit)     0.0302 ***       
 
    (0.0099)        
ColPub95it*ln(nbAuthorit)       0.0179 ***     
 
      (0.0111)      
ColPriv90it*ln(nbAuthorit)         0.0004 ***   
 
        (0.0108)    
ColPriv95it*ln(nbAuthorit)           -0.0522 *** 
 
          (0.0123)  
Constant 0.0952  0.0899  0.1479 ** 0.1219 ** 0.0014  0.0099  
 
(0.0633)  (0.0632)  (0.0631)  (0.0631)  (0.0635)  (0.0636)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Log likelihood -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  
Aikaike information criterion 49477  49568  49292  49445  49965  50137  
Bayesian information criterion 49765  49857  49581  49733  50254  50426  
R2 0.2831  0.2813  0.2868  0.2838  0.2732  0.2697  
Adjusted R2 0.2824  0.2806  0.2861  0.2831  0.2726  0.2690  
F-test 426  422  434  427  406  398  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX Q – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.3 
(CLUSTERED GROUPS – NO ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0800 *** -0.0807 *** -0.0700 *** -0.0794 *** -0.0887 *** -0.0901 *** 
 
(0.0079)  (0.0072)  (0.0079)  (0.0072)  (0.0075)  (0.0070)  
Ageit 0.0162 *** 0.0166 *** 0.0155 *** 0.0162 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0173 *** 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
Ageit2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.2444 *** 0.2515 *** 0.2467 *** 0.2534 *** 0.2645 *** 0.2683 *** 
 
(0.0054)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0289 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0352 *** 0.0351 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0102 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0116 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0075 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0090 *** 0.0096 *** 0.0101 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0114 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.2542 ***           
 
(0.0066)            
ColT95it   0.2668 ***         
 
  (0.0071)          
ColPub90it     0.2667 ***       
 
    (0.0065)        
ColPub95it       0.2748 ***     
 
      (0.0070)      
ColPriv90it         0.2284 ***   
 
        (0.0071)    
ColPriv95it           0.2286 *** 
 
          (0.0078)  
ColT90it*dFemalei -0.0349 ***           
 
(0.0125)            
ColT95it*dFemalei   -0.0461 ***         
 
  (0.0141)          
ColPub90it*dFemalei     -0.0636 ***       
 
    (0.0125)        
ColPub95it*dFemalei       -0.0546 ***     
 
      (0.0140)      
ColPriv90it*dFemalei         -0.0202 ***   
 
        (0.0134)    
ColPriv95it*dFemalei           -0.0211 *** 
 
          (0.0156)  
Constant 0.0978  0.0986  0.1282 ** 0.1146 * -0.0001  0.0209  
 
(0.0630)  (0.0631)  (0.0629)  (0.0630)  (0.0634)  (0.0636)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Log likelihood -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  
Aikaike information criterion 49470  49566  49275  49432  49963  50154  
Bayesian information criterion 49758  49854  49564  49721  50251  50442  
R2 0.2833  0.2813  0.2871  0.2840  0.2733  0.2694  
Adjusted R2 0.2826  0.2807  0.2865  0.2833  0.2726  0.2687  
F-test 426  422  435  428  406  398  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX R – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.4 
(CLUSTERED GROUPS – NO ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0927 *** -0.0919 *** -0.0942 *** -0.0928 *** -0.0948 *** -0.0942 *** 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  
Ageit 0.0166 *** 0.0168 *** 0.0159 *** 0.0164 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0173 *** 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
Ageit2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.2455 *** 0.2523 *** 0.2488 *** 0.2544 *** 0.2642 *** 0.2682 *** 
 
(0.0054)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0286 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0262 *** 0.0283 *** 0.0352 *** 0.0351 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0052 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0091 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0077 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0089 *** 0.0095 *** 0.0100 *** 0.0104 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0114 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.2131 ***           
 
(0.0072)          9  
ColT95it   0.2276 ***         
 
  (0.0081)          
ColPub90it     0.2077 ***       
 
    (0.0070)        
ColPub95it       0.2286 ***     
 
      (0.0079)      
ColPriv90it         0.2279 ***   
 
        (0.0082)    
ColPriv95it           0.2253 *** 
 
          (0.0098)  
ColT90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0094 ***           
 
(0.0011)            
ColT95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)   0.0068 ***         
 
  (0.0012)          
ColPub90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)     0.0124 ***       
 
    (0.0011)        
ColPub95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)       0.0084 ***     
 
      (0.0012)      
ColPriv90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)         -0.0010 ***   
 
        (0.0012)    
ColPriv95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)           -0.0002 *** 
 
          (0.0013)  
Constant 0.1051 * 0.1029  0.1423 ** 0.1223 * 0.0008  0.0216  
 
(0.0630)  (0.0631)  (0.0628)  (0.0630)  (0.0634)  (0.0636)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Log likelihood -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  
Aikaike information criterion 49409  49542  49177  49397  49965  50156  
Bayesian information criterion 49697  49831  49466  49686  50253  50444  
R2 0.2845  0.2818  0.2891  0.2847  0.2732  0.2693  
Adjusted R2 0.2838  0.2811  0.2884  0.2840  0.2726  0.2687  
F-test 429  423  439  429  406  398  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX S – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF TABLE 4.5 
(CLUSTERED GROUPS – NO ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION) 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0925 *** -0.0918 *** -0.0940 *** -0.0927 *** -0.0950 *** -0.0943 *** 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  
Ageit 0.0164 *** 0.0166 *** 0.0157 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0177 *** 0.0175 *** 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
Ageit2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.2455 *** 0.2526 *** 0.2481 *** 0.2547 *** 0.2651 *** 0.2692 *** 
 
(0.0054)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0286 *** 0.0300 *** 0.0264 *** 0.0284 *** 0.0349 *** 0.0349 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0102 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0116 *** 0.0118 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0075 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0046 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0076 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0089 *** 
 
(0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ColT90it 0.2113 ***           
 
(0.0074)            
ColT95it   0.2187 ***         
 
  (0.0085)          
ColPub90it     0.2119 ***       
 
    (0.0073)        
ColPub95it       0.2220 ***     
 
      (0.0083)      
ColPriv90it         0.1815 ***   
 
        (0.0081)    
ColPriv95it           0.1772 *** 
 
          (0.0094)  
ColT90it*ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0088 ***           
 
(0.0011)            
ColT95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)   0.0079 ***         
 
  (0.0012)          
ColPub90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)     0.0100 ***       
 
    (0.0011)        
ColPub95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)       0.0088 ***     
 
      (0.0012)      
ColPriv90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)         0.0099 ***   
 
        (0.0011)    
ColPriv95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)           0.0097 *** 
 
          (0.0013)  
Constant 0.1116 * 0.1100 * 0.1433 ** 0.1246 * 0.0146  0.0289  
 
(0.0630)  (0.0631)  (0.0628)  (0.0630)  (0.0633)  (0.0635)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Log likelihood -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  -30643  
Aikaike information criterion 49416  49531  49219  49392  49889  50097  
Bayesian information criterion 49705  49819  49507  49680  50177  50386  
R2 0.2843  0.2820  0.2883  0.2848  0.2748  0.2705  
Adjusted R2 0.2837  0.2814  0.2876  0.2842  0.2741  0.2699  
F-test 429  424  437  430  409  400  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively.  
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APPENDIX T – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHOUT 
ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION FOR TABLE 4.1 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0868 *** -0.0865 *** -0.0878 *** -0.0876 *** -0.0872 *** -0.0869 *** 
 
(0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0090)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  
Ageit 0.0353 *** 0.0358 *** 0.0339 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0377 *** 
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Ageit2 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1836 *** 0.1903 *** 0.1869 *** 0.1943 *** 0.1977 *** 0.2012 *** 
 
(0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0205 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0197 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0239 *** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0077 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0060 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0069 *** 0.0075 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0085 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.1987 ***           
 
(0.0055)            
ColT95it   0.1998 ***         
 
  (0.0059)          
ColPub90it     0.1982 ***       
 
    (0.0054)        
ColPub95it       0.1966 ***     
 
      (0.0058)      
ColPriv90it         0.1777 ***   
 
        (0.0058)    
ColPriv95it           0.1719 *** 
 
          (0.0064)  
Constant -0.1566 ** -0.1634 ** -0.1164  -0.1403 ** -0.2485 *** -0.2428 *** 
 
(0.0732)  (0.0732)  (0.0730)  (0.0730)  (0.0736)  (0.0738)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Number of scientists 5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  
χ2 7451.4  7301.32  7575.32  7377.75  6991.21  6740.93  
sigma 0.3735  0.3744  0.3736  0.3747  0.3746  0.3757  
rho 0.2503  0.2463  0.2461  0.2407  0.2527  0.2517  
R2 within groups 0.0636  0.0589  0.0635  0.0573  0.0571  0.0514  
R2 overall 0.2769  0.2746  0.2806  0.2772  0.2662  0.2621  
R2 between groups 0.4640  0.4647  0.4698  0.4702  0.4544  0.4514  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX U – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHOUT 
ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION FOR TABLE 4.2 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0867 *** -0.0866 *** -0.0877 *** -0.0876 *** -0.0871 *** -0.0870 *** 
 
(0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  
Ageit 0.0352 *** 0.0357 *** 0.0335 *** 0.0347 *** 0.0374 *** 0.0377 *** 
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Ageit2 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1783 *** 0.1924 *** 0.1727 *** 0.1877 *** 0.1908 *** 0.2056 *** 
 
(0.0070)  (0.0066)  (0.0068)  (0.0064)  (0.0067)  (0.0064)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0206 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0197 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0238 *** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0077 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0086 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0042 *** 0.0060 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0069 *** 0.0075 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0085 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.1762 ***           
 
(0.0166)            
ColT95it   0.2109 ***         
 
  (0.0190)          
ColPub90it     0.1324 ***       
 
    (0.0164)        
ColPub95it       0.1486 ***     
 
      (0.0188)      
ColPriv90it         0.1397 ***   
 
        (0.0183)    
ColPriv95it           0.2081 *** 
 
          (0.0214)  
ColT90it*ln(nbAuthorit) 0.0135            
 
(0.0094)            
ColT95it*ln(nbAuthorit)   -0.0062          
 
  (0.0102)          
ColPub90it*ln(nbAuthorit)     0.0396 ***       
 
    (0.0092)        
ColPub95it*ln(nbAuthorit)       0.0275 ***     
 
      (0.0102)      
ColPriv90it*ln(nbAuthorit)         0.0224 **   
 
        (0.0102)    
ColPriv95it*ln(nbAuthorit)           -0.0203 * 
 
          (0.0115)  
Constant -0.1467 ** -0.1643 ** -0.0886  -0.1267 * -0.2378 *** -0.2489 *** 
 
(0.0733)  (0.0732)  (0.0730)  (0.0730)  (0.0737)  (0.0738)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Number of scientists 5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  
χ2 7474.97  7322.29  7670.03  7434.88  7001.65  6743.49  
sigma 0.3734  0.3743  0.3734  0.3746  0.3745  0.3757  
rho 0.2488  0.2449  0.2412  0.2375  0.2523  0.2518  
R2 within groups 0.0638  0.0589  0.0639  0.0575  0.0574  0.0513  
R2 overall 0.2769  0.2747  0.2809  0.2773  0.2660  0.2624  
R2 between groups 0.4643  0.4648  0.4720  0.4712  0.4545  0.4517  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX V – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHOUT 
ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION FOR TABLE 4.3 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0896 *** -0.0887 *** -0.0799 *** -0.0878 *** -0.0883 *** -0.0908 *** 
 
(0.0099)  (0.0095)  (0.0099)  (0.0094)  (0.0098)  (0.0095)  
Ageit 0.0352 *** 0.0358 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0377 *** 
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Ageit2 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1839 *** 0.1905 *** 0.1873 *** 0.1946 *** 0.1978 *** 0.2012 *** 
 
(0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0206 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0197 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0239 *** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0077 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0061 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0069 *** 0.0075 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0085 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.1967 ***           
 
(0.0062)            
ColT95it   0.1976 ***         
 
  (0.0067)          
ColPub90it     0.2040 ***       
 
    (0.00610        
ColPub95it       0.1966 ***     
 
      (0.0066)      
ColPriv90it         0.1769 ***   
 
        (0.0065)    
ColPriv95it           0.1668 *** 
 
          (0.0072)  
ColT90it*dFemalei 0.0087            
 
(0.0122)            
ColT95it*dFemalei   0.0101          
 
  (0.0136)          
ColPub90it*dFemalei     -0.0239 **       
 
    (0.0120)        
ColPub95it*dFemalei       0.0008      
 
      (0.0134)      
ColPriv90it*dFemalei         0.0040    
 
        (0.0130)    
ColPriv95it*dFemalei           0.0238  
 
          (0.0149)  
Constant -0.1556 ** -0.1625 ** -0.1156  -0.1391 ** -0.2480 *** -0.2426 *** 
 
(0.0731)  (0.0731)  (0.0729)  (0.0729)  (0.0736)  (0.0737)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Number of scientists 5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  
χ2 7467.68  7314.53  7602.34  7397.69  6998.72  6751.82  
sigma 0.3734  0.3743  0.3736  0.3747  0.3746  0.3757  
rho 0.2492  0.2454  0.2445  0.2393  0.2521  0.2512  
R2 within groups 0.0637  0.0590  0.0633  0.0573  0.0572  0.0516  
R2 overall 0.2769  0.2745  0.2810  0.2772  0.2662  0.2619  
R2 between groups 0.4638  0.4645  0.4708  0.4703  0.4543  0.4509  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX W – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHOUT 
ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION FOR TABLE 4.4 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0867 *** -0.0865 *** -0.0879 *** -0.0877 *** -0.0875 *** -0.0870 *** 
 
(0.0091)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  
Ageit 0.0351 *** 0.0355 *** 0.0334 *** 0.0344 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0377 *** 
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Ageit2 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1852 *** 0.1916 *** 0.1896 *** 0.1960 *** 0.1970 *** 0.2010 *** 
 
(0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0206 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0197 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0239 *** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.00100  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0056 *** 0.0071 *** 0.0056 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0064 *** 
 
(0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0069 *** 0.0075 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0085 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
ColT90it 0.1843 ***           
 
(0.0066)            
ColT95it   0.1915 ***         
 
  (0.0074)          
ColPub90it     0.1768 ***       
 
    (0.0065)        
ColPub95it       0.1856 ***     
 
      (0.0073)      
ColPriv90it         0.1921 ***   
 
        (0.0074)    
ColPriv95it           0.1780 *** 
 
          (0.0088)  
ColT90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0042 ***           
 
(0.0010)            
ColT95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)   0.0021 **         
 
  (0.0011)          
ColPub90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)     0.0062 ***       
 
    (0.0010)        
ColPub95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)       0.0029 ***     
 
      (0.0011)      
ColPriv90it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)         -0.0035 ***   
 
        (0.0011)    
ColPriv95it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)           -0.0012  
 
          (0.0012)  
Constant -0.1490 ** -0.1577 ** -0.1030  -0.1317 * -0.2499 *** -0.2431 *** 
 
(0.0730)  (0.0730)  (0.0726)  (0.0728)  (0.0736)  (0.0738)  
(Number of observations) 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Number of scientists 5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  
χ2 7539.92  7371.85  7742.08  7475.38  7006.08  6744.94  
sigma 0.3735  0.3744  0.3735  0.3747  0.3745  0.3757  
rho 0.2455  0.2418  0.2379  0.2348  0.2524  0.2515  
R2 within groups 0.0634  0.0587  0.0634  0.0570  0.0576  0.0515  
R2 overall 0.2782  0.2752  0.2830  0.2781  0.2660  0.2621  
R2 between groups 0.4666  0.4662  0.4743  0.4722  0.4537  0.4513  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
  
151 
  
APPENDIX X – PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHOUT 
ENDOGENEITY ASSUMPTION FOR TABLE 4.5 
Dependent Var: nbArticle (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
dFemalei -0.0866 *** -0.0864 *** -0.0877 *** -0.0876 *** -0.0876 *** -0.0871 *** 
 
(0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0089)  (0.0091)  (0.0091)  
Ageit 0.0349 *** 0.0354 *** 0.0334 *** 0.0343 *** 0.0371 *** 0.0374 *** 
 
(0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Ageit2 -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1855 *** 0.1922 *** 0.1892 *** 0.1966 *** 0.1998 *** 0.2031 *** 
 
(0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0058)  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  
ln(PublicfundingOit) 0.0206 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0198 *** 0.0213 *** 0.0240 *** 0.0239 *** 
 
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0077 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0086 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0060 *** 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0050 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0071 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0073 *** 
 
(0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
ColT90it 0.1836 ***           
 
(0.0068)            
ColT95it   0.1863 ***         
 
  (0.0078)          
ColPub90it     0.1820 ***       
 
    (0.0067)        
ColPub95it       0.1841 ***     
 
      (0.0076)      
ColPriv90it         0.1561 ***   
 
        (0.0073)    
ColPriv95it           0.1486 *** 
 
          (0.0084)  
ColT90it*ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0040 ***           
 
(0.0010)            
ColT95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)   0.0030 ***         
 
  (0.0011)          
ColPub90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)     0.0042 ***       
 
    (0.0010)        
ColPub95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)       0.0030 ***     
 
      (0.0011)      
ColPriv90it*ln(NFPfundingOit)         0.0052 ***   
 
        (0.0010)    
ColPriv95it*ln(NFPfundingOit)           0.0050 *** 
 
          (0.0010)  
Constant -0.1445 ** -0.1533 ** -0.1033  -0.1289 * -0.2370 *** -0.2346 *** 
 
(0.0729)  (0.0729)  (0.0726)  (0.0726)  (0.0733)  (0.0735)  
Number of observations 35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  35684  
Number of scientists 5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  5772  
χ2 7567.56  7403.18  7725.21  7520.69  7116.95  6846.46  
sigma 0.3735  0.3744  0.3735  0.3747  0.3746  0.3757  
rho 0.2435  0.2400  0.2375  0.2319  0.2457  0.2457  
R2 within groups 0.0634  0.0586  0.0632  0.0569  0.0571  0.0513  
R2 overall 0.2782  0.2755  0.2821  0.2783  0.2678  0.2634  
R2 between groups 0.4668  0.4669  0.4732  0.4727  0.4578  0.4543  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 respectively; Year dummies, field dummies, and university 
dummies are significant. The minimum year activity, average year activity, and maximum year activity are 1, 6.13, and 12 respectively. 
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APPENDIX Y – VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTER 5 
Variable name Variable description 
dIndChair Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a research chair awarded by industry (industrial chair) 
dGCChair Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a research chair awarded by Canadian funding agencies (NSERC, SSHRC, and CIHR) 
dCRC Dummy variables taking the value 1 if a scientist has a Canada research chair 
dIndGCChair Dummy variables taking the value 1 if dIndChair or dGCChair are equal to 1 
dChair Dummy variables taking the value 1 if any of dIndChair, dGCChair, or dCRC is equal to 1 
ln(PublicfundingO) Natural logarithm of the three-year average of public sector funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research 
ln(PrivatefundingO) Natural logarithm of the three-year average of private sector funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure of research 
ln(NFPfundingO) 
Natural logarithm of three-year average of funding from not-for-profit 
institutions (NFP) for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure 
of research 
ln(nbArticle) Natural logarithm of the yearly number of articles 
PubORank 
Normalized rank of researcher in the research division in terms of three-year 
average of funding for the purpose of operational costs and direct expenditure 
of research 
PublRank Normalized rank of researcher in the research division in terms of three-year 
average of number of articles 
nbScientistUni Number of scientists in the university and division45 of researcher 
Age Age of a scientist  
dFemale Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the scientist is a woman and 0 otherwise 
ULaval, dUdeM, dUQ_UBishop, 
dUConcordia, dUMcGill 
dUSherbrooke, 
dUQAM_ETS_INRS 
Dummy variables indicating the university affiliation of researcher 
dMedical, dScience, 
dBusinessManagement, 
dEducation, dEngineering, 
dHealthScience, dHumanities, 
dNonhealth, and dSocialScience 
Dummy variables indicating the research division of researcher 
d2000, d2001, …., d2012 Dummy variables indicating the year 
  
                                                 
45
 There are 9 divisions of  Basic Medical Sciences, Business & Management, Education, Engineering, Health Sciences, Humanities, 
Non-Health Professional, Sciences, and Social Sciences 
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APPENDIX Z – SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CHAPTER 5 
 Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
nbArticles 1.3881 2.8361 0 85 
PublicfundingO 64,890.39 151,411.80 0 10,100,000 
PrivatefundingO 10,885.52 68,773.97 0 6,257,323 
NFPfundingO 11,070.96 84,990.96 0 8,404,625 
Age 52.6287 9.9491 1 94 
dFemale 0.2829 0.4504 0 1 
nbAuthor 0.8476 0.8295 0 7.6327 
PubORank 0.5663 0.2576 0.0005 1 
PublRank 0.7442 0.1833 0.3206 1 
nbScientistUni 5.5921 0.8049 0.6931 7.3803 
dCRC 0.0391 0.1938 0 1 
dIndGCChair 0.0206 0.1421 0 1 
dChair 0.0569 0.2317 0 1 
The variables are not summarized in logarithmic scale and they are raw amount. In some disciplines of Physics, there are many scientists 
involved in one project and therefore, the maximum for the number of authors is high. (Number of Observations: 80775) 
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APPENDIX AA – CORRELATION TABLE OF CHAPTER 5 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
ln(nbArticles) 1 1             
ln(PublicfundingO) 2 0.3543 1            
ln(PrivatefundingO) 3 0.3207 0.2120 1           
ln(NFPfundingO) 4 0.3093 0.2605 0.2843 1          
Age 5 -0.1415 -0.2794 -0.0742 -0.1140 1         
dFemale 6 -0.1100 -0.0014 -0.1311 -0.0329 -0.1298 1        
ln(nbAuthor) 7 0.7127 0.3502 0.3285 0.3262 -0.1263 -0.1013 1       
PubORank 8 0.3502 0.7036 0.2099 0.2633 -0.1371 -0.0052 0.3375 1      
PublRank 9 0.3382 0.2770 0.0919 0.1300 -0.1196 0.0508 0.3204 0.4026 1     
ln(nbScientistUni) 10 0.1545 -0.0152 0.1216 0.1157 0.0617 -0.0767 0.2442 0.0454 -0.0902 1    
dCRC 11 0.1554 0.1590 0.1032 0.1112 -0.0743 -0.0385 0.1090 0.2258 0.1052 -0.0223 1   
dIndGCChair 12 0.0800 0.0872 0.2112 0.1017 0.0095 -0.0486 0.0529 0.1082 0.0044 -0.0055 0.0724 1  
dChair 13 0.1700 0.1780 0.1959 0.1432 -0.0543 -0.0572 0.1171 0.2426 0.0866 -0.0243 0.8211 0.5906 1 
Significant at 1% level (No. observations: 80775) 
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APPENDIX BB – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION OF TABLE 5.2 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) -0.0048  -0.0049 * -0.0049 * -0.0034  -0.0034  
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0211 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0214 *** 
 
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2396 *** 0.2374 *** 0.2401 *** 0.2391 *** 
 
(0.0384)  (0.0380)  (0.0385)  (0.0379)  (0.0384)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1361 *** 0.1361 *** 
 
(0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1956 *** 0.1956 *** 0.1949 *** 0.1949 *** 
 
(0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dCRCit   -0.2791 *** -0.2945 *** -0.1849 * -0.1926 * 
 
  (0.0873)  (0.0974)  (0.0970)  (0.1078)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     0.0744    0.0343  
 
    (0.2116)    (0.2118)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      -0.0255 ** -0.0253 ** 
 
      (0.0115)  (0.0115)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.1046 *** 10.1057 *** 10.1080 *** 10.1084 *** 
 
(0.0485)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  (0.0488)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6057 *** 1.6057 *** 1.6046 *** 1.6047 *** 
 
(0.0957)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4339 *** -0.4340 *** -0.4349 *** -0.4350 *** 
 
(0.0259)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0256)  (0.0256)  
Constant 0.7895 ** 0.8879 *** 0.8894 *** 0.8982 *** 0.8988 *** 
 
(0.3235)  (0.3225)  (0.3223)  (0.3219)  (0.3219)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 76288 *** 76318 *** 76438 *** 76450 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2080  0.2080  0.2079  0.2079  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5504  0.5506  0.5511  0.5512  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7548  0.7551  0.756  0.7562  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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APPENDIX CC – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION OF TABLE 5.3 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) -0.0048  -0.0037  -0.0037  -0.0039  -0.0038  
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0211 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 0.0215 *** 
 
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2440 *** 0.2459 *** 0.2439 *** 0.2458 *** 
 
(0.0384)  (0.0384)  (0.0386)  (0.0383)  (0.0386)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1395 *** 0.1396 *** 0.1394 *** 0.1395 *** 
 
(0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 0.1952 *** 
 
(0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.4995 *** -0.4778 *** -0.5273 *** -0.5052 *** 
 
  (0.1244)  (0.1328)  (0.1660)  (0.1727)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.1650    -0.1641  
 
    (0.3539)    (0.3537)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0037  0.0036  
 
      (0.0147)  (0.0147)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.0824 *** 10.0823 *** 10.0829 *** 10.0828 *** 
 
(0.0485)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  (0.0486)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6056 *** 1.6051 *** 1.6051 *** 1.6046 *** 
 
(0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  (0.0957)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** -0.4275 *** 
 
(0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  (0.0259)  
Constant 0.7895 ** 0.7590 ** 0.7584 ** 0.7618 ** 0.7612 ** 
 
(0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  (0.3235)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 75835 *** 75838 *** 75859 *** 75862 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2083  0.2083  0.2083  0.2083  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5462  0.5463  0.5463  0.5464  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7489  0.749  0.7491  0.7491  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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APPENDIX DD – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION OF TABLE 5.4 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) -0.0048  -0.0042  -0.0042  -0.0024  -0.0024  
 
(0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)  (0.0031)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0211 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0217 *** 
 
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
dFemalei 0.2437 *** 0.2391 *** 0.2369 *** 0.2400 *** 0.2390 *** 
 
(0.0384)  (0.0380)  (0.0388)  (0.0380)  (0.0387)  
Ageit 0.1395 *** 0.1363 *** 0.1363 *** 0.1364 *** 0.1363 *** 
 
(0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  
Ageit2 -0.0019 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1965 *** 0.1950 *** 0.1949 *** 0.1942 *** 0.1942 *** 
 
(0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  (0.0214)  
dChairit   -0.3415 *** -0.3518 *** -0.2579 *** -0.2632 *** 
 
  (0.0745)  (0.0820)  (0.0857)  (0.0937)  
dChair5it*dFemalei     0.0547    0.0255  
 
    (0.1850)    (0.1853)  
dChair5it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      -0.0181 ** -0.0180 ** 
 
      (0.0092)  (0.0093)  
PubORankit-1 10.0707 *** 10.1136 *** 10.1144 *** 10.1165 *** 10.1169 *** 
 
(0.0485)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  (0.0489)  
PublRankit-1 1.5967 *** 1.6149 *** 1.6150 *** 1.6150 *** 1.6150 *** 
 
(0.0957)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  (0.0958)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4284 *** -0.4346 *** -0.4346 *** -0.4350 *** -0.4351 *** 
 
(0.0259)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  
Constant 0.7895 *** 0.8798 *** 0.8810 *** 0.8733 *** 0.8740 *** 
 
(0.3235)  (0.3223)  (0.3222)  (0.3220)  (0.3220)  
Number of observations 80775  80775  80775  80775  80775  
Number of scientists 7651  7651  7651  7651  7651  
χ2 75797 *** 76248 *** 76270 *** 76338 *** 76349 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2082  0.2082  0.2083  0.2082  0.2082  
R2 overall 0.5459  0.5502  0.5504  0.5506  0.5508  
R2 between groups 0.7486  0.7545  0.7548  0.7552  0.7554  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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APPENDIX EE – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION OF TABLE 5.5 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0384 *** 0.0387 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0551 *** 0.0546 *** 
 
(0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0306 *** 0.0306 *** 0.0306 *** 0.0307 *** 0.0307 *** 
 
(0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  
dFemalei -0.1671  -0.1820  -0.4000 ** -0.1792  -0.3540 * 
 
(0.1283)  (0.1270)  (0.1896)  (0.1269)  (0.1898)  
Ageit 0.0905 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0966 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0964 *** 
 
(0.0278)  (0.0279)  (0.0279)  (0.0278)  (0.0279)  
Ageit2 -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0011 *** 
 
(0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1554 *** 0.1569 *** 0.1568 *** 0.1588 *** 0.1586 *** 
 
(0.0513)  (0.0513)  (0.0513)  (0.0512)  (0.0512)  
dCRCit   0.2235 ** 0.1596  0.3833 *** 0.3280 *** 
 
  (0.0991)  (0.1073)  (0.1070)  (0.1159)  
dCRCit*dFemalei     0.3792    0.3040  
 
    (0.2447)    (0.2454)  
dCRCit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      -0.0378 *** -0.0368 *** 
 
      (0.0096)  (0.0096)  
PubORankit-1 6.4595 *** 6.4423 *** 6.4395 *** 6.4371 *** 6.4348 *** 
 
(0.1224)  (0.1229)  (0.1229)  (0.1227)  (0.1227)  
PublRankit-1 0.8820 *** 0.8443 *** 0.8515 *** 0.8452 *** 0.8511 *** 
 
(0.2087)  (0.2089)  (0.2089)  (0.2086)  (0.2087)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.2852 *** -0.2669 *** -0.2730 *** -0.2722 *** -0.2769 *** 
 
(0.0700)  (0.0697)  (0.0698)  (0.0697)  (0.0698)  
Constant 4.5170 *** 4.2376 *** 4.2679 *** 4.1752 *** 4.2009 *** 
 
(0.8221)  (0.8278)  (0.8279)  (0.8272)  (0.8274)  
Number of observations 6393  6393  6393  6393  6393  
Number of scientists 586  586  586  586  586  
χ2 4260 *** 4288 *** 4292 *** 4313 *** 4315 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2527  0.2519  0.2518  0.2521  0.2521  
R2 overall 0.5038  0.5084  0.5087  0.5092  0.5093  
R2 between groups 0.6404  0.6471  0.6475  0.6483  0.6484  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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APPENDIX FF – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION OF TABLE 5.6 
 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0457 *** 0.0481 *** 0.0481 *** -0.0108  -0.0106  
 
(0.0085)  (0.0086)  (0.0086)  (0.0120)  (0.0120)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0304 *** 0.0311 *** 0.0313 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0324 *** 
 
(0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  
dFemalei 0.0215  0.0476  0.3081  0.0150  0.2072  
 
(0.2363)  (0.2366)  (0.3577)  (0.2355)  (0.3562)  
Ageit 0.3513 *** 0.3537 *** 0.3552 *** 0.3461 *** 0.3473 *** 
 
(0.0463)  (0.0463)  (0.0464)  (0.0460)  (0.0461)  
Ageit2 -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** 
 
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1862 ** 0.1735 ** 0.1768 ** 0.1511 * 0.1536 * 
 
(0.0803)  (0.0805)  (0.0806)  (0.0800)  (0.0801)  
dIndGCChairit   -0.3138 ** -0.2690  -0.9872 *** -0.9519 *** 
 
  (0.1646)  (0.1712)  (0.1894)  (0.1961)  
dIndGCChairit*dFemalei     -0.4566    -0.3369  
 
    (0.4696)    (0.4675)  
dIndGCChairit*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.1119 *** 0.1115 *** 
 
      (0.0158)  (0.0158)  
PubORankit-1 6.8202 *** 6.8098 *** 6.8054 *** 6.7298 *** 6.7268 *** 
 
(0.1870)  (0.1870)  (0.1870)  (0.1859)  (0.1860)  
PublRankit-1 1.3377 *** 1.3282 *** 1.3256 *** 1.2888 *** 1.2871 *** 
 
(0.3000)  (0.3000)  (0.3001)  (0.2979)  (0.2980)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.4670 *** -0.4341 ** -0.4282 ** -0.4165 ** -0.4122 ** 
 
(0.1786)  (0.1794)  (0.1798)  (0.1785)  (0.1789)  
Constant -1.6525  -1.8467  -1.9517  -1.3026  -1.3824  
 
(1.6226)  (1.6254)  (1.6305)  (1.6175)  (1.6228)  
Number of observations 3234  3234  3234  3234  3234  
Number of scientists 288  288  288  288  288  
χ2 2879 *** 2885 *** 2884 *** 2977 *** 2976 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2396  0.2396  0.2397  0.24  0.2401  
R2 overall 0.4085  0.4083  0.4083  0.408  0.4079  
R2 between groups 0.5395  0.5392  0.539  0.5383  0.5381  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently.  
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 xtreg1  xtreg2  xtreg3  xtreg4  xtreg5  
ln(PrivatefundingOit) 0.0281 *** 0.0281 *** 0.0281 *** 0.0135 ** 0.0133 ** 
 
(0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  
ln(NFPfundingOit) 0.0266 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0265 *** 0.0266 *** 
 
(0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  
dFemalei -0.0492  -0.0464  -0.1461  -0.0473  -0.1738  
 
(0.1141)  (0.1134)  (0.1664)  (0.1134)  (0.1667)  
Ageit 0.1203 *** 0.1194 *** 0.1202 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1181 *** 
 
(0.0247)  (0.0246)  (0.0247)  (0.0246)  (0.0247)  
Ageit2 -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** 
 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
ln(nbAuthorit) 0.1686 *** 0.1673 *** 0.1675 *** 0.1640 *** 0.1642 *** 
 
(0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  (0.0453)  
dChairit   -0.0492  -0.0771  -0.1837 * -0.2219 ** 
 
  (0.0875)  (0.0939)  (0.0963)  (0.1031)  
dChair5it*dFemalei     0.1819    0.2309  
 
    (0.2223)    (0.2228)  
dChair5it*ln(PrivatefundingOit)      0.0292 *** 0.0298 *** 
 
      (0.0087)  (0.0088)  
PubORankit-1 7.0954 *** 7.1057 *** 7.1028 *** 7.1086 *** 7.1050 *** 
 
(0.1067)  (0.1071)  (0.1072)  (0.1071)  (0.1072)  
PublRankit-1 1.1549 *** 1.1578 *** 1.1579 *** 1.1592 *** 1.1593 *** 
 
(0.1783)  (0.1784)  (0.1784)  (0.1783)  (0.1783)  
ln(nbScientistUniit-1) -0.1736 *** -0.1772 *** -0.1794 *** -0.1777 *** -0.1806 *** 
 
(0.0653)  (0.0652)  (0.0653)  (0.0652)  (0.0653)  
Constant 2.5660 *** 2.6143 *** 2.6237 *** 2.7596 *** 2.7745 *** 
 
(0.7358)  (0.7375)  (0.7377)  (0.7387)  (0.7389)  
Number of observations 9092  9092  9092  9092  9092  
Number of scientists 836  836  836  836  836  
χ2 7043 *** 7064 *** 7063 *** 7080 *** 7081 *** 
R2 within groups 0.2514  0.2513  0.2513  0.2516  0.2516  
R2 overall 0.4828  0.4878  0.4878  0.4876  0.4877  
R2 between groups 0.6317  0.6393  0.6394  0.6388  0.6388  
Notes: *, **, and *** show the significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively - Year dummies, research division dummies, and 
university dummies are significant - The reported numbers for R2 are approximation because they are not reported in the first stage but 
we obtain them from re-doing the first stage independently. 
